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FOREWORD 
 
The content of this, the fourth issue of this journal fully bears out the 
value of a cross-jurisdictional approach.   The topics covered by our 
articles, jurisdiction spotlight and case notes will be familiar to 
practitioners across the Commonwealth - delay, trial by jury, what 
use, if any, to make of unlawfully obtained evidence or of lawfully, 
but surreptitiously obtained evidence, accessorial liability, attempts, 
causation and the dangers inherent in vaguely defined offences, such 
as war crimes or misconduct in a public office.   If there is a theme to 
this issue, it is that of the courts putting the interests of the state 
before the interests of justice.   Ho Hock Lai (at p.232, post) presents 
a forceful case that the judiciary in Singapore have been wrong to 
reject the common law discretion to exclude illegally obtained 
evidence, on the basis that it is inconsistent with the code of evidence 
in that jurisdiction.   He suggests that this unjustifiably prioritises the 
desire of the state to maintain law and order above the protection of 
an individual’s rights.   The third and fourth articles by three 
academics from the University of New South Wales also touch on 
this theme.   Jessie Blackbourn and Nicola McGarrity present a 
compelling critique (at p.257, post) of the inadmissibility of intercept 
evidence in the United Kingdom, and compare it to the reverse 
stance taken by the Australian courts.   They argue that the U.K.’s 
approach has led to the excessive use of executive measures, such as 
control orders, because prosecutions have become largely untenable, 
and that this position should not be preferred to the use of 
safeguarded criminal proceedings.   Fergal Davis (at p.283, post) 
discusses the fate of jury trials in terrorist and gang-related cases in 
the common law jurisdictions of Ireland and New Zealand, where 
there are limitations on their use.   His article provides an excellent 
illustration of how legislation designed for one purpose can be 
misused by state agents for an entirely different purpose. 
Our opening article, by the distinguished English academic, 
Professor G.R. (“Bob”) Sullivan, continues a theme that has featured 
in previous issues:  accessorial criminal liability and causation (see the 
case notes on Gnango (England and Wales) [2011] J.C.C.L. 299,  
Kho Jabing (Singapore) [2012] J.C.C.L. 174, Mzwempi (South Africa)  
[2012] J.C.C.L. 180, and Edmonds (New Zealand) [2012] J.C.C.L. 189).    
This complex issue is discussed through a powerful and compelling 
argument which calls for the abolition of complicity and the joint 
enterprise doctrine and an extension of the class of principals to 
include persons other than the person who actually perpetrates the 
prohibited wrong.   These issues are further considered in the case 
note on Burns (at p.353, post), in which the High Court of Australia 
 vi 
had to rule on the thorny problem of the liability of a person who 
supplies unlawful drugs to another who then dies from an overdose 
of those drugs which he has voluntarily consumed.   Among the 
authorities cited to the court were the leading, but conflicting, English 
and Scottish decisions.  
Our jurisdiction spotlight focuses on the Caribbean (at p.308, post).    
This fascinating piece, written by the former Attorney-General of 
Trinidad and Tobago, John S. Jeremie S.C., brings into particularly 
sharp relief the tension between crime control initiatives and respect 
for the fundamental requirements of due process.   In addition, the 
author reflects on the conundrum as to why it is that so many 
Commonwealth Caribbean states persist with the Privy Council as 
their final court of appeal.   Decisions such as that in Campbell v.  
The Queen ([2010] UKPC 26 (and see [2011] J.C.C.L. 151)) and 
Hamilton (noted at p.335, post) make it all the more remarkable that 
these states have not long since bought into the case for the 
Caribbean Court of Justice. 
Our other case notes cover a broad, but current and important, set 
of topics.   The Hong Kong case note (at p.342, post) on the offence 
of misconduct in public office should undoubtedly resonate with 
lawyers in England and Wales, where this offence has been dusted 
down in recent years and used to prosecute all manner of conduct of 
which somebody disapproves, and often committed by persons who, 
in no meaningful sense, hold “public office”.   Case notes from  
New Zealand (at p.357, post) and Canada (at p.366, post) address the 
vexed issues of where to draw the line between a merely preparatory 
act and an attempt, and the criminal liability of a person who exposes 
another person to a potentially life-threatening disease through 
consensual sexual activity. 
Special mention should be made of Zentai, a decision of the  
High Court of Australia, and the subject of our sixth case note.    
The case deserves its place in legal history not for the decision of the 
majority, but for the remarkable dissent of the Honourable John 
Dyson Heydon A.C.   Lord Denning was famed for his intellect, his 
independence and his unmistakeable style.   As exemplified by the 
first paragraph of his judgment (quoted in full by Patricia Aloi in her 
case note, which is at p.327), Justice Dyson Heydon is right up there 
with him.   Any anthology of truly powerful judgments in the 
common law world would surely include at least one of Justice 
Heydon’s, with that in Zentai being an obvious candidate.   His 
fearless independence, intellectual brilliance and the breadth and 
depth of his learning are evident both from his judgments and his 
many extra-curial writings.   In his February, 2003, farewell speech to 
the Supreme Court of New South Wales upon his elevation to the 
High Court of Australia, he referred to the various “fresh starts” his 
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life had involved.   These, he said, were nothing compared to what lay 
ahead:  “Now I have to deal with a unique institution, peopled with 
formidable and inscrutable characters.   I have to walk up to the 
sphinx, enter the most arcane of coteries, and try to survive.    
Just ahead lie the greatest and most mysterious riddles this side of 
eternity.”   As his retirement approaches in March, 2013, it is possible 
to say that not only has he survived, but, in the course of solving a 
fair few of those riddles, he has made an invaluable contribution to 
the jurisprudence of the common law world.   Anybody in doubt 
about the value of cross-jurisdictional studies and well-stocked law 
libraries should read his speech in full (www.australianpolitics.com/ 
news/2003/02/03-02-07.shtml). 
As ever, I am grateful to the Editorial Board for their hard work 
and advice.   Their support and encouragement have been invaluable, 
especially at a less than propitious time for launching a new journal in 
the field of criminal law and practice.   Special thanks are also due to 
Atli Stannard and Lydia Waine.   Both have contributed case notes, 
and, with the former taking the lead, they have undertaken the whole 
process of putting this issue together, from commissioning articles, 
through arranging for peer-review, to sub-editing the entire content. 
 
 
J.R. 
November 25, 2012 
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DOING WITHOUT COMPLICITY  
G.R. SULLIVAN* 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
It will be argued that liability for criminal offences based on complicity 
and the joint enterprise doctrine should be abolished.   The case against 
complicity and joint enterprise is that they give rise to complexity, 
uncertainty, excessive litigation and, on occasion, injustice.   A proposal 
will be made to confine criminal liability to principal offenders.   This 
will require enlarging the class of principal offenders and also the 
availability of inchoate offences of encouraging and assisting crimes.   The 
claim will be made that, subject to those conditions, the abolition of 
secondary offenders will reduce complexity and enhance  justice without 
undermining the effective enforcement of the criminal law. 
 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
P is a contract killer currently without a usable weapon.   He is 
contacted by D(1), who gives him a new revolver and promises him 
£20,000 for the killing of V(1).   As agreed, P kills V(1) and then goes 
on to use the revolver to kill V(2) after agreeing with D(2) to do so.   
Dealing only with the potential liability of D(1) under the law of 
England and Wales, in relation to the killing of V(1) he is very likely 
guilty of conspiring or soliciting to commit murder,1 statutory 
conspiracy to commit a criminal offence,2 the statutory offences of 
intentionally encouraging or assisting crime,3 and the crime of murder 
itself as P’s accomplice.4   As for the murder of V(2) he might well be 
guilty of assisting an offence believing that it will be committed5 if he 
was sure that P as a contract killer would go on to use the weapon for 
further killings.   He might also be P’s accomplice to that murder if 
that ersatz form of complicity, sometimes called “parasitic accessory 
liability”6 (contrasted with direct or true complicity), based on a joint 
enterprise, applies to these facts.   As is well known, this form of 
 
 
* Emeritus Professor of Law, University College London.   Thanks are due to  
Atli Stannard and Lydia Waine for their invaluable help in the preparation of this article. 
1  Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s.4. 
2  Criminal Law Act 1977, s.1. 
3  Serious Crime Act 2007, s.44. 
4  Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, s.1.   The section imposes liability as an 
accomplice on whosoever aids, abets, counsels or procures the commission of an 
offence.   The different modes of complicity are not defined and the detail is to be 
found in the case law. 
5  Serious Crime Act 2007, s.45 
6  The phrase is Sir John Smith’s and was adopted by the Supreme Court in  
R. v. Gnango [2011] UKSC 59, [2012] 1 A.C. 827, [15]. 
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secondary offending imposes liability for “collateral” offences, 
provided the collateral offence is sufficiently associated with an initial 
joint enterprise to commit a separate offence.   On that last matter, 
there might be some doubt whether P’s killing of V(2) had a sufficient 
connection with the joint enterprise that D(1) and P formed to kill V(1).   
Resolution of that doubt might well require yet another appellate 
decision on the nature and limits of the joint enterprise doctrine.7 
Of course, if the facts seem clear and stable, a prosecutor may well 
rest content with seeking just one murder verdict against D(1).   But 
in the murky world of contract killings there may well be gaps in the 
evidence concerning who agreed what with whom, and any clarity of 
the initial case may be undermined by a sudden change in testimony.   
So it is not at all unreasonable for a prosecutor to keep all options open.   
It is the burden of this article to persuade readers that English and 
Anglophone Commonwealth prosecutors should have fewer options 
in cases like that of D(1).   It will be argued that liability for murder 
(and other serious offences) should be confined to principal offenders.   
Complicity, including the form of complicity based on joint enterprise, 
should be abolished.   Forms of association with the commission of 
offences by others which fall short of establishing that the defendant 
was a joint principal in the offence should be covered by the inchoate 
offences of conspiracy and assisting or encouraging crimes. 
The thought that Anglophone criminal law would be better off 
without complicity is far from novel.   That was once the opinion of 
the English Law Commission when it proposed new inchoate offences 
of assisting and encouraging crimes as a replacement for complicity.8   
Many years after this proposal, inchoate offences of assisting and 
encouraging crimes did reach the statute book,9 but as a supplement 
to, rather than a substitute for, complicity.   Moreover, by the time of 
 
 
7  Further use of the revolver to kill V(2) may be considered too remote from  
the agreement to kill V(1), and therefore not be an offence collateral to the joint 
enterprise D(1) made with P, even if D(1) foresaw the risk that P would, as a  
contract killer, use the revolver to kill in the future.   However, in R. v. Reardon  
[1998] EWCA Crim 613, [1999] Criminal Law Review 392, there is authority that if D 
gives P a knife with intent to assist him to kill V(1), he will also be implicated in the 
killing of V(2) if he foresaw the risk of that happening.   On the facts of Reardon,  
no issue arose about the scope of the joint enterprise because there was no joint 
enterprise, merely intentional assistance in the killing of V(1).   So it may be, reverting 
to our example, that D(1)’s direct assistance to P in his killing of V(1) will be the 
gateway for implication in the killing of V(2) on the basis of foresight that something 
like that might happen.   This extension of the scope of direct complicity has 
arguably been latent since Bainbridge [1960] 1 Q.B. 129.   Matters are confused by  
the fact that, in Reardon, although there was no joint enterprise, joint enterprise cases 
were decisively applied. 
8  Law Commission for England and Wales, Assisting and Encouraging Crime  
(Law Com. C.P. no. 131, TSO 1993). 
9  Serious Crime Act 2007, ss.44-66. 
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the enactment of these new offences, the English law of complicity 
had become more extensive in its coverage and, in particular, 
secondary liability based on joint enterprise had become more 
entrenched.   Nonetheless, the view that complicity is surplus to 
requirements persists.   Michael Moore has argued compellingly that 
complicity is superfluous.10   Joshua Dressler would strictly confine 
liability based on complicity to cases of substantial material assistance.11   
What follows is another contribution to the abolitionist cause, a cause 
which is not flourishing and is unlikely to flourish in England and 
Wales anytime soon.12   The case to be made has doctrinal and 
normative parts.   Essentially, the doctrinal case is that complicity law 
is too complex and unstable, too high maintenance judging by the 
amount of litigation that it generates.13   The normative case is that it 
is consistently unjust, imposing liability for the full offence on persons 
who do not share “parity of culpability” with the principal offender.14   
There is a better way to map the doing and sharing of criminal 
wrongs which is more restrained but which would not impair the 
effectiveness of the criminal law. 
It will be argued below that this better way requires a more 
accommodating conception of the circumstances in which a person 
can be considered a principal offender.   Briefly for now, a case will 
be made for enlarging the class of principals to include persons 
additional to the perpetrator.   There are persons who, though non-
perpetrators, carry more responsibility for the commission of a 
criminal wrong than anyone else.   Such a person would be D(1)  
in the example above, who conceived and greatly facilitated the plan 
 
 
10  Michael S. Moore, Causation and Responsibility (OUP 2009), ch. 13. 
11  Joshua Dressler, “Reforming Complicity Law: Trivial Assistance as a Lesser 
Offence” (2011) 5 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 427. 
12  Following the House of Commons Justice Committee’s report on joint enterprise 
(Joint Enterprise (HC 2010-12, 1597)), the coalition government announced that it 
would make no changes to the law of joint enterprise or any other aspects of 
complicity law:  <http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/policy/moj/government-response-
to-justice-committee-report-on-joint-enterprise-law> accessed November 20, 2012. 
13  The joint enterprise doctrine has been particularly troublesome, with a plethora 
of appeals on such matters as what constitutes a joint enterprise, what is a material 
variation between the crime contemplated and the crime committed (a question 
requiring debate on such matters as whether some weapons or forms of attack are 
intrinsically different from other weapons or forms of attack), whether material 
variations matter when parties to the joint enterprise share an intent to kill, whether a 
party can be found liable for manslaughter where the circumstances of a murder  
are sufficiently different from anything he contemplated, how and when a party  
can withdraw from a joint enterprise, and so forth.   See further David Ormerod,  
Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law, (13th edn, OUP 2011), 213-230. 
14  “Parity of culpability” between principals and accomplices was the test the  
Law Commission for England and Wales used in their attempt to fashion a law  
of complicity that was not over-inclusive:  Participating in Crime (Law Com. no. 305,  
TSO 2007), paras 1.5-1.9. 
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to kill V(1).   In the case of such persons it is not enough to convict 
them of inchoate offences associated with the crime that they 
sponsored.   They should bear, alongside the perpetrator, full 
responsibility for the offence itself.   However, John Gardner has 
argued that, for offences which he terms “non-proxyable,” this 
cannot be done.   For him, the only persons eligible to be principals 
to these offences are perpetrators.15   These offences are important:  
if the class of principals for these offences must be confined  
to perpetrators, then complicity must stay. 
 
II.   IS THE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL WRONGDOERS  
INTO PRINCIPALS AND ACCOMPLICES  
A NECESSARY STRUCTURAL DIVISION? 
The most straightforward way to bring D(1), the organiser of V(1)’s 
death, fully to book would be to treat him as a joint principal 
alongside P.   It will be argued below that Anglophone criminal law 
should recognise three types of principal offender.   The first type 
would be perpetrators.   The second type would be persons who 
although not perpetrators have, by their conduct, had a causal 
influence on the commission of the offence.   The third type would 
be persons who have jointly agreed with others to commit the 
offence, and intend that one or more parties to the agreement will 
commit the offence.    To be convicted as a principal would require 
proof of any mens rea specified in the offence.   A lesser form of 
culpability than that specified for the offence would not suffice, even 
for non-perpetrator principals. 
Recognition of the second type of principal would require 
acceptance of the proposition that an agent’s conduct can be 
considered caused at least in some significant sense by another 
person’s intervention, even though the conduct of the agent remains 
fully voluntary.   It will be argued that, for instance, the offer of money 
and the provision of a gun to P by D(1) was one of the causes of 
V(1)’s death.   John Gardner, for one, would agree with that, in that he 
has expressed the view that the voluntary conduct of P can be caused 
by the intervention of D.   But he would likely assert that the only 
murderer was P, and that D(1) can only be considered his accomplice.16 
He argues that the only way of capturing the doing and sharing of 
wrongs for crimes where at least one party must be the physical 
perpetrator of the wrong and where the role of other culpable parties 
is necessarily less direct, is to allocate responsibility between 
accomplices and principals.   In other words, the distinction between 
 
 
15  John Gardner, “Complicity and Causality” [2007] Journal of Criminal Law  
and Philosophy 127. 
16  ibid., 137-141 
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principals and accomplices is not merely a legal convention but a 
necessary structure to allocate liability for many crimes.   For 
Gardner, a fundamental reason for this state of affairs stems from 
what may be termed the intransitivity of many criminal and moral 
wrongs.   Take what he calls the “non-proxyable”17 wrong of rape.   If 
P penetrated a non-consenting V when possessed of the appropriate 
culpability, he is a rapist.   In respect of that token of rape, no-one 
other than P can be so described.   It may be that other persons  
stand in some form of blameworthy relationship to the rape of V.   
D, a woman, procures P to rape her enemy V.18   D’s role in the rape 
of V may be more salient than P’s.   Left to his own devices, P would 
not have raped V, making D’s procuring of P decisive in the matter of 
the rape.    But it simply would not be true to say that D was a rapist.   
It was not D but P that penetrated V, an activity that cannot be done 
by proxy.   For Gardner, it follows from this indubitable fact that the 
only way that D can be brought to book in law and in morals is to 
hold D to account as P’s accomplice.19 
It is no more than the literal truth that certain crimes as currently 
defined require the principal to be the physical perpetrator.   If we 
define the conduct element of homicides as causing the death of V, 
then clearly there may be more than one causal agent in play, and 
conduct remote in time and place from the actual killing may count as 
a causal input.   But should we define the conduct element in 
homicides as the killing of V, it follows that some physical 
involvement in the process that was the immediate cause of death is 
required.   Does this mean then, for crimes defined in that manner, 
that the cast of principals is limited to participants of that stripe – 
that, for instance, only the man who penetrated V can be a principal 
in the crime of rape?   Not so.   The conventions of the law can be 
adapted to enlarge the class of principals beyond the perpetrator even 
for crimes such as rape.   How this can be done in technical terms will 
be addressed later.   Such a technical adjustment is essential  
if complicity is to be abolished.   There will be considerable gains  
in economy of means and simplicity, should this be done.    
More importantly, better accounts of the locus of responsibility can 
be made if the class of principals is enlarged in the fashion that will  
 
 
17  A term, as Gardner acknowledges, first employed by Sanford H. Kadish:  
“Complicity, Cause, and Blame: a study in the interpretation of doctrine”  
(1985) California Law Review 323, footnote 162. 
18  As in DPP v. K and B [1997] 1 Criminal Appeal Reports 36. 
19  Institutionally, this is the case in current English law:  as the offence is worded in 
s.1 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, the principal offender can only be the person who 
penetrates V.   For Gardner, this would not merely be a matter of conventional 
definition, but a necessary truth.   It will be argued that persons additional to rapists 
may be principals to the offence of rape according to how the offence is defined. 
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be advocated.   By contrast, Gardner would argue that the division 
between principals and accomplices is of a natural kind that cannot  
be abolished by fiat.   A re-engagement with Gardner will be 
necessary when the legal specifics of enlarging the class of principals 
are presented.   Until then, the working assumption is that this change 
can and should be made. 
 
III.   COMPLICITY:  COMPLEX AND OVERLY PUNITIVE 
The rules that comprise the law of complicity are complex.    
They consistently give rise to concern about the appropriateness of 
many verdicts of guilt qua accomplice for the full crime committed by P.   
D’s part in P’s primary wrong may be peripheral or immaterial.    
Even where D’s contribution has significance for the commission  
of P’s crime, D’s culpability may be of a lesser order than P’s.20    
Of course, the converse may apply, as in our contract killing scenario.   
That is one reason to enlarge the class of principal offenders beyond 
perpetrators.   Frequently however, the class of accomplices includes 
persons whose conduct and culpability fall far short of the principal’s. 
The doctrinal starting point for analysing complicity is that the 
liability of an accomplice is derived from the wrong of the principal.21   
The presence of the primary wrong can weigh the scales against D 
from the outset.   Because D is fully liable for the same crime as P, his 
conduct should make a significant contribution to the perpetration of 
the wrong by P.   Further, there should be some form of culpability 
possessed by D which is broadly of the same magnitude as the 
culpability possessed by P.22   But the presence of P’s wrong may cast 
a shadow on any person culpably associated with it, encouraging 
expansion of the class of accomplices.   Here, the focus will be on the 
 
 
20  Dissatisfaction with the form and content of the English law of complicity has 
lead to proposals for reform from the Law Commission for England and Wales:  
Participating in Crime (n.14).   Separate proposals were made in relation to participation 
in homicide:  Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (Law Com. no. 304, TSO 2006), 
part 5.   For some tastes, the proposals cleave too closely to the current law:   
G.R. Sullivan, “Complicity in First Degree Murder and Complicity in an Unlawful Killing” 
[2006] Criminal Law Review 502;;  “Participating in Crime:  Law Com no. 305 –  
Joint Criminal Ventures” [2008] Criminal Law Review 19.   Principles similar  
to English law apply to most jurisdictions in the USA and have given rise to  
similar concerns:  see Dressler, “Reforming Complicity Law” (n.11), and his 
“Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice Liability:  New Solutions 
to an Old Problem” (1985) 37 Hastings Law Journal 91. 
21  For a comprehensive account of the implications of the derivative nature of 
criminal liability on the basis of complicity see Kadish (n.17). 
22  As liability on the basis of complicity is based on common law principles in 
England and Wales, the common law presumption in favour of mens rea has been 
interpreted as requiring some form of culpability on the part of the accomplice even 
for statutory offences of strict liability:  Hobbs v. Winchester Corporation [1910] 2 K.B. 471. 
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doctrines, or rather the lack of constraining doctrine that 
accommodates this expansion of liability.   Further on, the focus will 
change to the facts of particular cases, underscoring the injustice that 
frequently arises when accomplices are held to account on the same 
penal basis as principals. 
 
A.   The conduct element in complicity 
Using for illustration the crime of murder as understood in English 
law, the elements of liability concerning the principal are easily stated:  
P must cause the death of V while acting with an intent to cause V’s 
death or to cause V serious bodily harm.23   The moment we turn  
to D, the putative accomplice, things become considerably more 
complicated.   It is well to remember at this point that, as  
Lord Bingham observed, there are more accomplices to murder  
than murderers.24   In that sense, the elements of liability for murder 
qua accomplice are more prominent in resolutions of liability for the 
offence than the elements of the principal offence itself.   On the 
plane of actus reus, what D did should somehow connect him with P’s 
killing of V.   But what kind of connectivity should it be?   A causal 
connection, if not necessary (though some judges and theorists 
continue to insist it is necessary),25 should always be sufficient.   
However, doctrinal restraints on what may constitute a causal input 
into a wrong perpetrated by another complicate the picture.   Even if 
we can claim that D’s conduct was a sine qua non of V’s death, as in 
the contract killing discussed above, if a particular jurisdiction applies 
the doctrine that the freely chosen conduct of one agent cannot be 
considered caused by any non-coercive or non-deceptive intervention 
by another agent, then many decisive interventions are rendered 
causeless in the eye of the law.   In the absence of inchoate offences 
of assistance and encouragement, the institutional imperative to 
penalise non-coercive or non-deceptive encouragement and assistance 
within the law of complicity ensured that interventions which were 
 
 
23  There is no statutory definition of murder in England and Wales, but the form 
and nature of the culpability required for the offence seems, at last, to be settled:  
A.P. Simester et al., Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law:  Theory and Doctrine  
(4th edn, Hart 2010), ch. 10. 
24  R. v. Rahman [2008] UKHL 45, [2009] 1 A.C. 129, [7]. 
25  For example, K.J.M. Smith, A Modern Treatise on Complicity (OUP, 1991), ch. 3;  
Hughes L.J. in R. v. Mendez [2010] EWCA Crim 516, [2011] Q.B. 876.    
However, there are many decisions where any causal impact of D’s conduct on  
P’s criminal act is impossible to discern.   For a recent example, see R. v. Stringer  
[2011] EWCA Crim 1396, [2012] Q.B. 160. 
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non-causal in doctrinal terms were nonetheless within its boundaries.26   
Thus the way was opened for rulings that any acts of assistance  
or encouragement, whether salient or, as may be in some cases  
of encouragement, irrelevant to the history of P’s primary wrong, 
were enough.27 
The nature of the connectivity between D’s conduct and the 
perpetration of P’s wrong has been further weakened by the 
importation into the law of complicity of the doctrine of  
joint enterprise.   In the briefest of terms,28 this doctrine most 
obviously comes into play where D and P explicitly agree to commit a 
crime, say the crime of burglary.   However, a joint enterprise in legal 
terms may be a joint enterprise in name only.   There is authority that 
liability said to be based on a joint enterprise may in fact be based on 
mere complicity falling short of joint enterprise.29   Once under the 
roof of joint enterprise, D may find himself a secondary party to 
crimes additional to any burglary that P commits. 
For instance, if during the course of the burglary, P commits  
a further crime – he attacks the householder when she disturbs  
the burglary – and D has foreseen that this or something similar 
might happen, D too will be liable for the assault upon V.    
This controversial form of liability is now entrenched in English law 
by three appellate decisions of the highest authority.30   What those 
decisions fail to deliver is any doctrinally sustainable account of this 
form of liability.   Where D and P agree to burgle V and carry out the 
burglary together, the presence of the joint enterprise adds nothing to 
the obvious finding that they are joint principals in burglary.    
 
 
26  See Lord Bingham in R. v. Kennedy (No. 2) [2007] UKHL 38, [2008] 1 A.C. 269, 
[17], quoting with approval from Glanville Williams, “Finis for Novus Actus”  
(1989) 48 Cambridge Law Journal 391, 398: 
“Principals, accomplices encourage (or otherwise influence) or help.   
If the instigator were regarded as causing the result he would be the 
principal and the conceptual division between principals (or, as I 
prefer to call them, perpetrators) and accessories would vanish.   
Indeed, it was because the instigator was not regarded as causing the 
crime that the notion of accessories had to be developed.” 
27  For examples of non salient tokens of assistance or encouragement criminalised 
in terms of full liability for the consummated offence, see Wilcox v. Jeffery  
[1951] 1 All E.R. 464 (Divisional Court), and R. v. Bryce [2004] EWCA Crim 1231, 
[2004] 2 Cr.App.R. 35.   In Giannetto [1997] 1 Cr.App.R. 1, the Court of Appeal 
considered that D would be an accomplice to P’s murder of V if he had said  
“Oh goody” when P told him of his intention to kill V. 
28  For a full account and defence of this doctrine, see A.P. Simester, “The Mental 
Element in Complicity” [2006] Law Quarterly Review 578. 
29  R. v. Reardon [1999] Criminal Law Review 392, (Court of Appeal);  R. v. Greatrex 
and Bates [1999] 1 Cr.App.R. 126 (Court of Appeal);  R. v. Gilmour [2000] N.I. 367, 
[2000] 2 Cr.App.R. 407. 
30  R. v. Powell;  R. v. English [1999] A.C. 1 (House of Lords);  R. v. Rahman (n.24);   
R. v. Gnango (n.6). 
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The same applies where D and P agree the burglary, and D provides 
assistance – say as a look-out – and P enters the dwelling.   Proof of 
the joint enterprise is irrelevant to findings that they are, respectively, 
an accomplice and a principal in burglary.   Joint enterprise doctrine 
was formulated for circumstances where P commits a crime 
additional to burglary, as when P attacks V.   It is clearly established 
that D will be liable for any offence that P commits if he has foreseen 
a risk that P might commit the offence with the mens rea for the 
offence in circumstances sufficiently linked to the burglary.   So D 
will be guilty of murder along with P if P kills V and D foresaw a risk 
that P might intend to kill or intentionally cause serious harm to V 
should they be disturbed. 
Finding D as well as P guilty of murder in such circumstances  
may well comport with many persons’ intuitive sense of justice.    
The difficulty lies in doctrinally grounding the murder verdict against D.   
There is now a firm consensus that, given the joint enterprise to 
commit burglary (or whatever offence has been agreed), D will be 
liable for the collateral or further offence solely on the basis that he 
foresaw the offence might happen in circumstances arising out of the 
commission of the initial offence that D agreed with, or encouraged, 
or assisted P to commit.31   It will not avail D at all to claim, however 
truthfully, that he agreed to or assisted the burglary on the basis that 
no violence should be used, provided he knew there remained a risk 
of violence.   There is recent support for the view that D’s liability for 
the further offence is as a joint principal with P, but there are serious 
difficulties with accommodating that conception of D’s involvement 
in P’s crime within the current law.32   The majority opinion is that D 
is P’s accomplice, a “parasitic accessory” in Sir John Smith’s phrase.   
But how?   For direct, or, if you will, true complicity, D must 
encourage or assist P’s crime.   But the doctrine applies even if D 
expressly discountenances P’s further offence.   It even applies if D, 
foreseeing the risk of the further offence, departs the scene of the 
initial offence.33   This risk-based form of liability defies 
classification.34   This is particularly so in those joint enterprise cases 
where joint enterprise doctrine is applied without proof of a joint 
 
 
31  In Gnango (n.6), [42], in their joint judgment, Lord Phillips and Lord Judge 
confirm the joint enterprise doctrine in plain black letter terms without any doctrinal 
or normative gloss.   In the bluntest of terms, if D agrees with P the commission of 
crime A, he will also be liable for crime B if he foresaw even a slight risk that P 
would go on to commit that crime in circumstances arising from the commission  
of crime A. 
32  See the discussion at n.24, ante, and associated text.   And see further post, n.103 
and associated text. 
33  R. v. Rook [1993] 2 All E.R. 955 (Court of Appeal). 
34  See the excellent exposure of the rootlessness of joint enterprise doctrine by 
Kirby J. in Clayton v. R. [2006] HCA 58, (2006) 81 A.L.J.R. 439. 
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enterprise.   There are cases where D’s assistance to P in respect of 
crime A, a form of assistance that does not amount to a joint 
enterprise to commit crime A, will ground D’s liability as an 
accomplice to P’s crime B on the basis of D’s foresight that P might 
commit crime B after finishing with crime A.   In those cases where 
joint enterprise liability is imposed on plain accomplices,35 the bounds 
of direct complicity are expanded, but without acknowledgement or 
justification of the change.   One can only agree with Lord Bingham 
that liability under joint enterprise “lack[s] logical purity”, and is based 
on “earthy realism.”36 
The problem with realism rather than rules created from a sound 
doctrinal base is that it leaves no space to balance principle against 
pragmatism.   The reception of the joint enterprise doctrine into 
international criminal law is instructive in this regard.   In conflicts of 
considerable duration and wide geographical spread, large numbers of 
individuals, many well below command or officer level, are bracketed 
together as a joint enterprise.   Activities at different times and far 
apart places may be given a questionable unity.   Actual foresight of 
the crimes that other members of the joint enterprise might commit 
is not required.   D is liable for the crimes of others that he should 
have foreseen, in addition to the crimes he participated in or foresaw.37 
 
B.   The culpability for complicity 
Turning to the mens rea of the accomplice, there are two aspects:  
the mens rea that D must have with regard to his own conduct at the 
time that he does it and the mens rea he must have with respect to P’s 
conduct and P’s state of mind, as and when P commits the crime. 
In terms of his own conduct, at one time it seemed that D must 
act with the intention to assist P should P commit the crime.38   
Where D’s intention was of the direct kind, uncertainty whether P 
would commit the crime, and if he did whether he would use D’s 
assistance, was of no moment, provided D acted in order to assist P.   
Where the prosecution relied on oblique intention,39 the prosecution 
 
 
35  See citations at n.30, ante. 
36  R. v. Rahman (n.24), [25]. 
37  Robert Cryer et al., An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure  
(2nd edn, CUP 2010), 367-374. 
38  R. v. Fretwell (1862) L.&C. 161 (Crown Cases Reserved).   The idea that 
accomplices require a direct intention to assist the principal resurfaced in  
Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority  [1986] A.C. 112  
(House of Lords), but the decision is likely confined to cases where the alleged act  
of complicity is a bona fide medical intervention. 
39  It seems that oblique intention was received into the English law of complicity by 
the decision in National Coal Board v. Gamble [1959] 1 Q.B. 11 (Divisional Court), 
although as with many core issues in the law of complicity the matter is disputed:  
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would have to prove that D was sure that P would commit the crime 
and, if he did, he would use D’s assistance.   But it may now  
suffice that D is aware of the possibility that P might commit the 
crime and, were he to do so, he might use D’s assistance.   It may be 
that the classic requirement for intentional assistance has gone:  
recklessness may be enough.40 
Where the charge of complicity is based on encouragement,  
it seems that D must intend to encourage P in his crime and be  
aware that his encouragement has reached the notice of P.   As the 
encouragement need have no impact on P, nothing further by way of 
mens rea is required from D in respect of his own conduct. 
Turning to D’s mens rea in relation to P’s conduct, formerly, D’s 
knowledge had to be of a very specific character, including 
circumstantial details relating to P’s offence.41   That is no longer 
required.   It is enough that D knows the type of crime that P has in 
mind;  details of time and place are unnecessary.42 Further dilution of 
D’s mens rea followed a ruling that D need not assume that one crime 
of a certain type was on P’s mind.   It sufficed for D to contemplate 
that a range of crimes might be on P’s mind provided that the crime 
P committed was of a type within D’s contemplation.43   Indeed,  
it may be that it need not be proved that D assumed that P would 
commit one or more crimes:  it may be enough that he assumed that 
there was a risk that P might commit one or more crimes.44 
Finally, turning to parasitic accessory liability, a.k.a. joint 
enterprise, the mens rea requirements outlined above in relation to D’s 
own conduct apply only to the initial offence;  there is no conduct 
element in relation to the further offence.   Foresight of the 
possibility of the further offence committed by P is all that is required 
in relation to that offence. 
                                                                                                             
G.R. Sullivan, “Intent, Purpose and Complicity” [1988] Criminal Law Review 641;;  
Ian H. Dennis, “Intention and Complicity:  a Reply” [1988] Criminal Law Review 649. 
40  There are many cases where recklessness appears to be the standard applied, but 
the circumspection in the text is necessary because sometimes in the case law, D, 
though lacking a direct intent to assist P, is said nonetheless to intentionally assist P 
on the basis of foreseeing that P might commit an offence with his assistance.    
In other cases such a state of mind is more accurately described as a case  
of recklessness.   Clarity is not assisted by the fact that, in cases concerned with direct 
complicity, dicta from parasitic complicity cases are cited.   In the latter form of 
complicity, a recklessness standard clearly applies.   The Court of Appeal’s judgment 
in R. v. Bryce (n.27), a case on direct complicity, contains these kinds of imprecisions.   
For an excellent account of the vagaries of this unstable case law, see the  
Law Commission, Participating in Crime (n.14), paras 2.42-2.97. 
41  R. v. Lomas (1914) 9 Cr.App.R. 220 (Court of Criminal Appeal). 
42  R. v. Bainbridge [1960] 1 Q.B. 129 (Court of Criminal Appeal). 
43  Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland v. Maxwell [1978] 1 W.L.R. 1350 
(House of Lords). 
44  Law Commission, Participating in Crime (n.14), paras 2.64-2.66. 
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C.   Complicity and punishment 
As in the eyes of the law accomplices and principals are both guilty of 
the same crime, committed at the same place and time, and in the 
same circumstances,45 in terms of sanction, the default position for 
principals and accomplices must be that each should be subject to the 
same punishment.   That would certainly be the case for joint 
principals.   To justify that approach for pairings of principals and 
accomplices, there must be a coarse grained equivalence between the 
accomplice and principal, both in terms of the accomplice’s own 
conduct, and associated culpability and the impact of his conduct on 
the occurrence of the primary wrong.   The current law of complicity 
cannot deliver this equivalence with any consistency. 
The principal will establish the baseline.   He, at least, will satisfy 
the conduct and culpability elements that the offence requires.   
Although the wrong is directly perpetrated by P, D’s conduct should 
play a part in the history of P’s crime, sufficient to establish what 
Honoré has termed “outcome responsibility” in respect of it.46   Only 
if D’s contribution is of this order does it make doctrinal and moral 
sense to make D guilty of the same crime as P. 
Of course, it may well be that, on occasion, it will be appropriate 
to depart from this default position.   It may be perfectly fair and just 
to convict D and P of the same offence but to punish one of the 
defendants more severely.   The ruthless D may have pressurised the 
weak willed P into committing the offence, making a lighter sentence 
 
 
45  Where encouragement or assistance is given by D to P prior to the commission 
of the offence, there may well be separation in time and place between the conduct 
of D and the commission of the offence by P.   Nonetheless, D is not liable for the 
offence until it is committed by P and his liability arises at the time and place of 
commission.   Consequently if D assists P in Scotland in relation to an offence 
committed in England, D becomes liable at the time and place of the offence and  
is amenable to English criminal jurisdiction:  R. v. Robert Miller (Contractors Ltd)  
[1970] 2 Q.B. 54 (Court of Appeal). 
46  Tony Honoré, Responsibility and Fault (Hart 1999), 7-40.   For Honoré the most 
obvious form of outcome responsibility arises when an agent is causally responsible 
for the outcome at issue.   It will be argued, post, that outcome responsibility is not 
necessarily confined to cases of causality.   What should be stressed is that outcome 
responsibility must rest on some material relationship between the agent and the 
wrong.   In our context of complicity, it is not enough for outcome responsibility on 
the part of D that he approves of P’s wrongdoing and even plans to take some 
benefit from it.   There must rather be some real-world linkage between what D has 
done or omitted to do and the instantiation of the primary wrong.   Without that,  
it is incoherent to treat D on the same terms penally as if he had committed the 
primary wrong.   Where D’s association with P’s wrong is insufficient for outcome 
responsibility but is nonetheless morally reprehensible and conducive to the 
commission of crimes, there will be a strong case for criminalisation of his conduct 
on the basis of some form of inchoate liability, a form of liability now provided for  
in English Law. 
J.C.C.L. Doing Without Complicity 211 
 
© 2012 Association of Commonwealth Criminal Lawyers and contributors. 
appropriate for P.   More often the case is a large divergence in 
gravity between the conduct of the accomplice contrasted with the 
conduct of the principal, a divergence best addressed by examining 
the facts of decided cases. 
Dealing first with situations where D’s complicity takes the form 
of assistance to P, as discussed, D’s contribution need not be causal 
nor even significant.   Take the case of R. v. Bryce,47 where D gave a 
short lift to P on his motorbike to the house where P lived.   V 
resided in a caravan on a site close to P’s house.   D was aware that P 
had been ordered to kill V by their boss, the drug dealer S.   The 
prosecution accepted that when D dropped P off, P was reluctant to 
obey S and had yet to decide what to do, an indecision of which D 
was aware.   Some thirteen hours after the lift, following an 
intervening visit from S who reminded him of his responsibilities, and 
shortened the barrels of his shotgun, P shot and killed V.   Now, it 
was clearly more convenient for P to ride rather than walk to the 
vicinity where ultimately he killed V.   That assistance was enough to 
make D guilty of murder. 
Where D’s conduct takes the form of encouragement, there need 
be no impact whatever on P’s crime.48   This has been extremely 
useful for prosecutors in cases of spontaneous outbreaks of multi-
party violence.   Supporters of rival football teams, A and B, with an 
historic enmity, meet by chance, and a confrontation ensues.   Two of 
the rival supporters start fighting each other and some of the others 
on each side pile in.   V, a supporter of Team A, is killed by one of 
the Team B supporters, who used a knife in a way indicative of an 
intent to cause serious harm.   But no-one knows or is saying which 
Team B supporter it was, and the knife is untraceable.   The 
prosecution are able to identify a cohort of Team B supporters who 
were present at the crime scene, and who may or may not have 
fought with Team A supporters.   If the prosecution can persuade a 
jury that, at the very least, each of these Team B supporters remained 
in the vicinity of the fight to support their mates, that will be enough 
to prove encouragement by presence,49 and the whole cohort can be 
convicted of affray on the basis that they must be either principals or 
accomplices in that offence.50   More importantly, they are all parties 
to a joint enterprise between the Team B supporters to commit an 
affray.   Some or all can be convicted of V’s murder if it is proved in 
respect of any particular defendant that, when becoming a party to 
 
 
47  (n.27.) 
48  Recently confirmed in R. v. Luffman [2008] EWCA Crim 1752. 
49  Robinson v. The Queen [2011] UKPC 3, [2011] 4 L.R.C. 231. 
50  It is long established that D may be convicted for an offence if on the  
evidence he must either be a principal or an accomplice:  Mackalley’s Case  
(1611) 9 Co. Rep. 65b (Court of Queen’s Bench). 
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the affray, he foresaw a risk that one of his mates might intend 
serious violence by use of a knife. 
In the case of R. v. Gnango,51 direct complicity based on 
encouragement was given a significant new twist, a development 
which, if exploited by prosecutors, will further expand the bounds of 
complicity.   D successfully appealed his conviction for murder, a 
conviction based on the theory that, by exchanging gunshots with P 
in a public place, he had formed a joint enterprise with him to 
commit an affray.   On the basis of this theory, D was a party to a 
shot from P aimed at him but which killed V, a passerby.   The theory 
was quickly demolished by the Court of Appeal52 and was not 
resurrected by the Supreme Court.   Yet D’s murder conviction was 
restored.   One branch of the majority, Lord Phillips and Lord Judge 
(Lord Wilson agreeing), found in their joint judgment that D was a 
true or direct accomplice of P’s on the basis that he had encouraged P 
to shoot at him.    Applying the principle inaptly called transferred 
malice,53 their Lordships found that D was a party to P’s murder of V.   
The case merits close attention as no case better illustrates the 
fragility of the rules relating to complicity when judges are convinced 
that public confidence in the criminal justice system requires a 
conviction for murder. 
The reports of Gnango reveal little of the history between D and P 
which culminated in the exchange of shots.   It seems P owed D 
money and D was seeking him out.   P, on seeing D first, shot first.   
Mr Justice Cooke directed the jury that they could find D guilty of V’s 
murder on the basis of a joint enterprise with P to commit an affray if 
they found a prior agreement or a spontaneous agreement made on 
the spot to engage in a shoot-out.   As Lord Kerr observed in his 
compelling dissent, this direction invited the jury to make findings 
unsupported by evidence.54   There was no evidence at all of a prior 
agreement to resolve conflict by gunfire and the sudden exchange of 
shooting did not imply any agreement made on the spot:  the two 
antagonists saw each other, P shot first, and D shot back. 
 
 
51  (n.6.)   This case was also reported in this journal:  Atli Stannard, “Securing a 
Conviction in Crossfire Killings:  Legal Precision vs. Policy” [2011] J.C.C.L. 299. 
52  R. v. Gnango [2010] EWCA Crim 1691, [2011] 1 W.L.R. 1414. 
53  This criticism cannot be developed here.   Suffice to say if there is need of such a 
principle, it should be called transferred mens rea.   But such a principle is surplus to 
requirements.   The true legal issue in cases where the principle is applied is whether 
there is a coincidence of mens rea and actus reus.   Where the actus reus occurs in an 
unexpected way, yet the event in abstract terms remains within the scope of D’s  
mens rea, issues of fair causal attribution may arise.   No such complication arises on 
the facts of Gnango, as the killing of V was just the sort of thing one would expect to 
happen if gunshots are exchanged in a public place. 
54  Gnango (n.6), [115], [121]. 
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At trial Mr Justice Cooke confined the prosecution to a submission 
based on joint enterprise.   He refused an argument based on direct as 
opposed to parasitic complicity, on the basis that any agreement to 
engage in a shoot-out did not make for any agreement between D and 
P in the matter of killing each other.   Their respective intents to that 
end were mutual, contemporaneous but antagonistic.   The Court of 
Appeal accepted this analysis and ruled out any liability based on 
direct complicity. 
Lord Phillips and Lord Judge begged to differ.   They surmised 
that the jury’s finding of an agreement between P and D to have a 
shoot-out was by its very nature something akin to a duel, an 
agreement, “to shoot and be shot at”.55  An agreement of that kind 
was an encouragement to P by D to shoot at D and vice versa.   On that 
reasoning, D was a party to the shot which missed him but hit V.   
The potential of this judgment is startling.   P, a bully, challenges the 
much smaller and passive D to a fist fight, a challenge that D 
reluctantly accepts because he does not want to lose face in front of 
his girlfriend.   D is badly beaten and P is charged with an offence 
that reflects the serious harm he did to D.   And D is charged as P’s 
accomplice in the same offence.56   What punishment D should 
receive for this serious offence is open to conjecture. 
If English law had insisted that accomplices must have a direct 
intention to encourage or assist the crime of the principal, almost 
invariably there would be true community of purpose between D and P.   
When that kind of relationship exists there can be much less concern 
about the different parts that D and P play in bringing about the 
primary wrong.   If D and P hatch a plot to kill V, there will be no 
qualms about finding D guilty of murder even though D did the 
driving and P did the killing.   They have very different roles but their 
collaboration makes for parity of culpability. 
The crucial departure from the acting in concert model for 
complicity came with the decision in National Coal Board v. Gamble,57 
where a strong but divided Divisional Court ruled that an oblique 
intent on the part of D, a weighbridge operative, to assist P’s crime of 
driving an over-weight load on a highway was enough to make him a 
 
 
55  ibid. [57]-[59]. 
56  However reluctantly, D would have entered an agreement with P to “hit and  
be hit;;”  on the reasoning of Lord Phillips and Lord Judge, each man would be a 
party to the blows his opponent aimed at him.   To be sure, this reasoning was 
deployed to fix liability on D for the death of V, but the reasoning carries over to 
harms suffered by the opponent, particularly as their Lordships found, correctly, that 
D was not a victim within the scope of the rule in R. v. Tyrrell [1894] 1 Q.B. 710.    
A consensual fight outside a sporting context is, of course, an assault on the part  
of each participant:  Attorney General’s Reference (No. 6 of 1980) [1981] Q.B. 715  
(Court of Appeal). 
57  (n.39.) 
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party to the driver’s offence.   If there need be nothing in the way of a 
community of criminal purpose with P, persons such as weighbridge 
operators and taxi drivers, in the routines of working life, may find 
themselves pressurised or manipulated into assisting P’s crimes, 
sometimes dreadful crimes58 without any pre-disposition to become 
involved in such wrongdoing.   Furthermore, the attenuation of the 
mens rea requirement has continued since Gamble.   In the under 
theorised jurisprudence of English complicity law, it is difficult to be 
precise about where things stand in relation to the mens rea for 
complicity.   But there is good reason to think that English law now 
accepts recklessness on the part of D as to the effect of his own 
conduct and the future conduct of P as a sufficient form of mens rea.59 
 
D.   Why an expansive law of complicity? 
In accounts of the virtues of the English criminal justice system, the 
neutrality of prosecutors and judges concerning the outcome of 
criminal cases is taken to be a prime value.60   An acquittal is not a 
system failure.   If a defendant is acquitted by raising a reasonable 
doubt on the basis of unperjured evidence, it shows that the 
presumption of innocence is working well.   If conduct thought likely 
to be criminal by a prosecutor is shown to fall outside the bounds of 
the offences charged, this demonstrates that criminal law is a system 
of stable rules and not ad hoc judgments on the day.   At least in 
public, officials of the criminal justice system would not challenge 
these claims to a restrained and principled criminal law.   And yet 
prosecutors and judges also conceive of themselves as guardians of 
public safety and security.   As public safety and security are utterly 
legitimate concerns for public officials and judges, there is an inevitable 
tension between adhering strictly to legal principles and legal values, 
and the perceived practical realities of securing safety and security.61 
Outside terrorist and other organised threats to the general 
security, this tension rises to the surface most obviously in cases of 
serious outbreaks of multi-party violence.   In the case of the  
two defendants found guilty of the murder of Stephen Lawrence,62  
 
 
58  DPP for Northern Ireland v. Lynch [1975] AC 653. 
59  See n.40, ante, and associated text. 
60  Patrick Devlin, The Criminal Prosecution in England (OUP 1960). 
61  For exploration of various dimensions of this tension, see G.R. Sullivan and Ian H. 
Dennis (eds), Seeking Security:  Pre-Empting the Commission of Criminal Harms (Hart 2012). 
62  A case of the murder of a young black British man which received considerable 
press coverage, caused public outrage, and led to an inquest and a public inquiry, four 
years after the events.   The police investigation was bungled, and the first 
prosecution dropped.   At the inquest, the five suspects refused to answer any 
questions, claiming privilege against self-incrimination.   This case led to the 
enactment of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, s.75, permitting retrial for certain serious 
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the most that could be proved against either defendant was that they 
were present at the initial attack on Stephen in support of the 
assailants, and foresaw the possibility that an assailant might seriously 
hurt Stephen with intent to do so.63   There is a great deal of content 
with these murder convictions, not least because of a widely 
disseminated video recording, ruled admissible at trial, which showed 
these defendants to be virulent racists.   It is not unreasonable to 
consider that these long-sought convictions completely vindicate the 
joint enterprise doctrine. 
Yet it remains disturbingly the case that most murderers are not 
convicted on the basis that they intended to kill or cause serious 
harm, but rather foresaw a risk, even a slight risk, that someone else 
would kill or cause serious harm.   And of course most joint 
enterprise cases do not involve a racist, multi-party attack with  
knives on a defenceless child victim.   More typical is the sudden 
outbreak of fighting between antagonistic groups of young adult and  
teenage males – as in the Team A-against-Team B scenario above.   
As David Ormerod observes,64 although the term joint enterprise is 
suggestive of a planned offence, the expanded basis of liability based 
on joint enterprise “is readily applicable to the spontaneous conduct 
of two or more without pre-planning.”  The large numbers of murder 
convictions based on joint enterprise arising from such circumstances 
are a cause for concern.   Many young men are serving life sentences 
for doing little more than being in the wrong place at the wrong time.65 
The majority of the Supreme Court justices in Gnango were 
committed to marking the tragic death of V with a murder conviction.   
The sentiment is entirely understandable.   Magda Pniewska was 
making her daily walk home from work, talking to her sister by phone 
when she was killed as a collateral victim of a likely drug commerce 
quarrel.   The most forceful expression of this sentiment comes from 
Lord Brown: 
                                                                                                             
offences – a qualification of the “double jeopardy” rule.   Two of the five suspects 
were then convicted at retrial in 2011-12 (Vikram Dodd, Sandra Laville, “Stephen 
Lawrence verdict:  Dobson and Norris guilty of racist murder” The Guardian 
(London, January 3, 2012), <http://bit.ly/Dobson_Norris_conviction_Guardian> 
accessed November 20, 2012) – which conviction they unsuccessfully appealed to the 
Court of Appeal. 
63  R. v. Dobson [2011] EWCA 1255, [2011] 1 W.L.R. 3230.   The evidence on which 
the Court of Appeal ordered a retrial did not include evidence on which the 
defendants might be found guilty of murder other than on the basis of joint 
enterprise liability for a collateral offence. 
64  (n.13), 226. 
65  The campaigning group Justice for Families have an informative data base giving 
the circumstances of many prisoners serving life sentences for murder based on joint 
enterprise:  <http://www.justice-for-families.org.uk> accessed November 20, 2012. 
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“The public would in my opinion be appalled if in those 
circumstances the law attached liability for the death only to 
the gunman who fired the fatal shot (which, indeed, it will not 
always be possible to determine).   Is he alone to be regarded 
as guilty of the victim’s murder?   Is the other gunman really 
to be regarded as blameless and exonerated from all criminal 
liability for that killing?66   Does the decision of the Court of 
Appeal here, allowing [D’s] appeal against his conviction for 
murder really represent the law of the land?”67 
Even if one had confined one’s reading to that early part of his 
lordship’s judgment, one would know what the outcome of his 
judgment would be.   But, until enlightened by Lord Brown, it was far 
from obvious that D was a murderer.   It was obvious that P was a 
murderer, but given the vagaries of the criminal justice system he was 
never brought to book.68   For a prosecutor determined to press for  
a murder conviction against D, it was worth taking a punt on  
joint enterprise.   But once that usually trusty sword had buckled, 
many criminal lawyers would have agreed with the Court of Appeal 
that it was game over as far as a murder verdict against D was 
concerned.   It was startling to learn from Lord Phillips, Lord Judge 
and Lord Wilson that D was complicit in shots fired at him by P and, 
by that token, complicit in P’s murder of V.   And even more startling 
to learn from Lord Brown and Lord Clarke that he was a principal in 
V’s murder just as if he had shot V himself.69 
But there is more to the resilience of a wide-ranging law of 
complicity than a concern to bring violent persons to book.    
Even persons well-disposed to the idea of a precise and stable 
criminal law, based on retributivist principles, may yet take in their 
 
 
66  D was contesting his conviction for murder.   He was not contesting his 
convictions for attempted murder and possession of a firearm with intent to 
endanger life.   So the stakes were not quite as high as set by Lord Brown.   On this 
point, see Stannard (n.51), 308-309. 
67  (n.6), [68]. 
68  P was arrested and questioned for two days, then released and not re-arrested. 
69  The surprise is not at the very idea shared by Lord Brown and Lord Clarke that a 
party to a joint enterprise might through his membership be a non-perpetrator 
principal to the offence agreed, provided he has the culpability for the offence.   
Indeed the idea will be defended below.   The surprise arises from the fact that they 
did not appear to know that on the state of the authorities in English law, the 
predominant view is that the only way to be a principal is to be a perpetrator – a view 
forcefully expressed in Glanville Williams’ paragraph quoted by Lord Bingham in 
Kennedy (No. 2) (n.26), and in that judgment generally.   Neither Lord Brown nor  
Lord Clarke cited Lord Bingham, although he said what he said very recently and in a 
judgment focused on the origin and scope of the joint enterprise doctrine.   There are 
some cases to hand to test the opinion of Lord Bingham – see n.106, post,  
and associated text – but they are not cited in the judgments.   Lord Brown’s 
judgment is very brief and is suffused with the sentiment that he is dealing with  
a simple matter which has already taken too long to resolve. 
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stride complicity in its widest forms.   If D encourages or assists P in 
his crimes, or associates himself for bad reasons with a volatile P who 
may suddenly turn seriously violent, D is in poor moral case.   And the 
worse P’s crime, the worse D’s moral standing.   The potency of guilt 
by association can best be illustrated by reference to encouragement 
as a form of complicity.   Recall that under this form of complicity, 
the threshold for liability is set remarkably low.   It is not necessary 
for D to have a stake in P’s crime.   It is enough for D to manifest his 
approval of P’s crime before or during its commission.   It suffices 
that P is aware of D’s words or gestures of encouragement.    
It is immaterial should D’s encouragement of P have no effect 
whatever on P’s present or future conduct.   Notwithstanding the 
complete lack of impact the encourager’s conduct may have, D will 
be guilty of any crime that P commits which corresponds with or is 
similar to the crime that D has encouraged.70   While there can be no 
objection to proscribing the encouragement of crimes as a form of 
complicity in cases where the encouragement has a material and 
positive impact on the commission of P’s crime, or where the crime  
is a project that D shares with P and in lesser cases as a basis for 
statutory inchoate liability, it is highly questionable to impose full 
liability for the crime itself on the basis of what may amount to no 
more than a positive disposition on the part of D to P’s crime.71 
In cases of mere encouragement without material effect,  
the morally disreputable attitude of D to P’s wrongs is doing  
too much work in generating D’s liability for the crimes of others.72    
As a matter of principle, full accountability for a wrong, whether 
perpetrated by oneself or by someone else, requires responsibility for 
the wrong in terms of a material, in the world connection with the 
events that constitute the externalities of the crime, and culpability 
commensurate with the blame and censure associated with its 
commission.   Liability based on complicity regularly entails criminal 
convictions for the full crime in the absence of any material 
responsibility for the crime and with a culpability of a lesser 
dimension than is required for the principal.   The current forms of 
complicity are likely to endure in England and Wales, but there is  
a better way. 
 
 
 
70  To paraphrase the judgment of the Court of Appeal in R. v. Calhaem [1985] Q.B. 808. 
71  See references at n.27. 
72  For an elaboration of this argument see G.R. Sullivan, “First Degree Murder and 
Complicity – conditions for parity of culpability between principal and accomplice” 
[2007] Journal of Criminal Law and Philosophy 271, 279-281. 
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III.   FROM DERIVATIVE TO DIRECT LIABILITY 
As Joshua Dressler has demonstrated so well,73 overreaching 
complicity is common in Anglophone jurisdictions.   Liability based 
on a derivative model, mediated through a wrong exclusively 
attributed to the conduct of another, gives rise in many jurisdictions 
to doctrinal disputes about the sufficiency of the conduct element and 
the mental element needed to make D an accomplice to the crime.74   
Added to this is a stream of appellate case law on the nature and 
limits of the collateral offence joint enterprise doctrine.75   
Anglophone complicity is a complex body of law, frequently litigated, 
with a persistent dynamic for over-criminalisation. 
It may be time for a new approach in the matter of perpetrators of 
criminal wrongs and for associated non-perpetrators who share 
commensurate or even greater responsibility than the perpetrator for 
the commission of the wrong.   Instead of asking, “where does D 
stand in relation to P in respect of the wrong perpetrated by P,” there 
should be a more straightforward inquiry about where D stands in 
relation to the wrong itself.   In other words, when the issue at stake 
is liability for a fully realised criminal offence, such as a rape or a 
murder, liability in the form of a conviction for such offences should 
take the form of direct and not derivative liability.   Technically, this 
approach requires abolishing complicity as a legal form of liability 
and, normatively, enlarging the class of those who may be regarded as 
principal offenders. 
It will be argued that, in terms of the conduct element of an 
offence, persons who currently would not be principal offenders on 
the basis that they were not, physically, direct perpetrators of the  
actus reus, may yet be candidate members of the class of principals, if 
their own conduct, considered of itself, establishes outcome 
responsibility for the primary wrong.   The most obvious form of 
outcome responsibility will arise if D’s conduct stands in a more than 
minimal causal relationship to the crime, but consideration must also 
be given to circumstances where a non-causal association with the 
wrong may establish outcome responsibility.   Should outcome 
responsibility be established against D in respect of the crime at issue, 
liability will follow as a principal offender if, and only if, D has the 
culpability specified for the offence.   It will be contended that, 
 
 
73  “Reforming Complicity Law” (n.11);;  “Reassessing the Theoretical 
Underpinnings of Accomplice Liability” (n.20). 
74  For example, see the dispute between Dennis and Sullivan concerning the correct 
reading of the case law on the mental element for complicity, referenced at n.39, and 
the contribution to that debate in Williams, “Complicity, Purpose and the Draft Code 
– Part 1” [1990] Criminal Law Review 4. 
75  See Simester (n.28), and Law Commission, Participating in Crime (n.14), 
paras B.118-B.152. 
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provided inchoate offences of encouraging and assisting crime are to 
hand,76 the field of doing and sharing criminal wrongs will be fully 
and better mapped than is currently the case, at least for the 
jurisdiction of England and Wales. 
But in order to be in a position to argue this case, two important 
matters must be resolved.   The liability scheme that will be proposed 
rests on two contestable assumptions.   First, it will be argued that, in 
certain circumstances, the fully informed and voluntary conduct of 
one human agent may, despite its freely chosen nature, be caused in a 
more than de minimis sense by a prior or present intervention on the 
part of another human agent, even if the intervention takes a non-
coercive or non-deceptive form.   Secondly it will be argued that even 
for crimes which require some form of physical engagement at the 
point of commission, the class of principals can be enlarged to 
include persons in addition to the perpetrator.   If either argument 
fails, then retention of the class of accomplices is a conceptual 
necessity and a moral imperative if the field of wrongdoing in relation 
to consummated crimes is to be adequately covered. 
 
A.   Causation and voluntary conduct 
If P’s conduct was uninfluenced by any duty, coercion or deception, 
generally English law considers his conduct to be based on an 
autonomous choice, free of any causal influence by any other human 
agent.77  For instance, if P initially considered killing V but decided 
against it but then was later cajoled by D into the killing of V by 
appeals to his courage, the promise of a large sum of money, a gift of 
a gun and what seemed an impregnable alibi, in legal terms the sole 
causal agent involved in V’s death is P.   In conversation it would be 
perfectly natural to speak of both D and P bringing about V’s death.   
But English law mainly has it otherwise;78  only P is the causal agent 
and thus only P is a principal in the offence;  D is liable for murder, 
but as the accomplice of P. 
English law has been much influenced by the famous “ordinary 
language” account of causation of Hart and Honoré.79   The strength 
of this influence was recently confirmed by Lord Kerr in Gnango who 
cited the following passage from their seminal work: 
“The free, deliberate, and informed intervention of a second 
person, who intends to exploit the situation created by the 
 
 
76  As is now the case:  Serious Crime Act 2007, ss.44-66. 
77  R. v. Latif [1996] 1 WLR 104 (House of Lords). 
78  There has been some recent doctrinal instability in this area, discussed post. 
79  H.L.A. Hart, Tony Honoré, Causation in the Law (2nd edn, OUP 1985). 
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first, but is not acting in concert with him, is normally held to 
relieve the first actor of criminal responsibility.”80 
Lord Kerr approved this passage81 in the following terms,  
“This statement was cited by the House with approval in R. v. Latif.    
The principle is fundamental and not controversial.”82 
To adopt, for the purposes of the criminal law, the convention 
that the consequences arising from P’s free and informed choices  
are causally attributable to him alone, is to adopt a convention 
concerning the allocation of responsibility for criminal wrongs.    
It is not a causal statement as such, because causal propositions in 
order to be causal propositions must assert some factual claims open 
to empirical challenge even if the final attribution of causal status to a 
putative cause may include elements of normative and metaphysical 
reasoning.83   A normative proposition that only the direct perpetrator 
of the wrong should be regarded as the principal offender is certainly 
defensible in normative terms.   But any defence of that proposition 
as a factual proposition must claim that a direct perpetrator, when 
acting in a free and informed manner, is the only human agent in the 
causal history of the wrong.   A factual claim of that kind must be 
justified in terms of the aetiology of human action.84 
There is a broad acceptance that the conduct of human agents is 
responsive to their first order preferences, preferences which guide 
and inform second order practical reasoning.    If the Hart and 
Honoré position on free, informed choice as an uncaused choice is 
read as a factual claim,85 it asserts that, all other things equal, the 
choices of free and informed agents are uninfluenced in causal terms 
by the past or present interventions of other human agents, unless 
those interventions took a deceptive or coercive form.   For instance, 
going back to the interchange between D and P sketched above, the 
process culminating in P shooting V would have to be reported along 
the following lines:  before D’s intervention P was inclined but had 
not resolved to shoot V.   After D’s intervention he was resolved to 
shoot V.   D’s change of mind was not causally influenced even in 
part by P.   A full defence of the Hart and Honoré position in the 
 
 
80  ibid., 362.   Lord Kerr in fact cited Lord Bingham in Kennedy (No. 2) (n.26),  
who cited that work. 
81  Still citing Lord Bingham in Kennedy (No. 2) (n.26), [14], who in turn referred  
to Lord Steyn in Latif (n.77), 115. 
82  Gnango (n.6), [131] (emphasis added, in-line reference omitted). 
83  Nancy Cartwright, “From Causation to Explanation and Back” in  
Brian Leiter (ed.),The Future of Philosophy (OUP 2004), 230. 
84  Alfred R. Mele, “Action” in Frank Jackson and Michael Smith (eds),   
The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy (OUP 2005), 334. 
85  Hart and Honoré were not of course putting forward a claim about causal 
events in the natural world. 
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realm of facts about human agents and their bodily movements must 
offer an explanation of how interventions from other human agents 
which have, as in the case of D and P, clearly influenced another 
agent’s choices, bring that influence to bear in some non-causal way. 
But there can be other factual reports which fix responsibility for 
the wrong on the perpetrator while acknowledging the causal 
influence of others in bringing about what has been done.   This 
enlarges the circle of causal responsibility and in that sense shares out 
direct responsibility for the wrong but without dissipating the 
responsibility of anyone within the causal circle.   P now rues the day 
he met D because he knows that, but for the influence of D,  
he would not have killed V, and he would not now be serving a  
long prison sentence.   He may accept his own responsibility and 
blameworthiness.   He may even be contrite.   But his bitterness 
about the intervention of D is not passing the buck:  it is based on the 
reality of events.   He made a free choice to kill V, but a sine qua non  
of his choice was the intervention of D. 
Even among theorists who insist that principals to criminal 
wrongs should be confined to free and informed perpetrators, there is 
universal acceptance that other agents may share responsibility for the 
wrong.   They can only be accessories.   But the fact these accessories 
cannot doctrinally have causal responsibility for the principal wrong 
entails that there need be no causal responsibility in factual terms 
either.   That is a major reason why the class of accessories is so wide.   
Because confining principals to perpetrators rests on normative 
grounds rather than fact of the matter causation, it would make sense 
to have a more fact based take on the causal history of criminal 
wrongs if better normative results will arise. 
Despite Lord Kerr’s recent endorsement, with Lord Bingham, of 
the Hart and Honoré position as fundamental and non-controversial, 
broader views of causation consistently surface in the case law.   For 
over a decade the Court of Appeal frequently held that a supplier of 
illegal drugs may commit manslaughter if a person to whom he 
supplied drugs died as a consequence of taking the drugs supplied.86   
The doctrine that free choices are wholly uncaused by others was 
reasserted in the firmest of terms by a unanimous decision delivered 
by a composite judgment of the House of Lords in R. v. Kennedy 
(No. 2),87 ruling that a heroin addict desperate for the drug had taken 
the drug voluntarily and thereby was the sole author of his death.   
Not long before Kennedy (No. 2), the House of Lords in Empress88 
 
 
86  Timothy H. Jones, “Causation, Homicide and the Supply of Drugs”  
(2006) 26 Legal Studies 139. 
87  (n.26.) 
88  Environment Agency v. Empress Car Co (Abertillery) Ltd [1999] 2 A.C. 22. 
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decided that P Ltd had caused pollution to an inland waterway by 
(quite legally) storing oil close to a river.   This finding was made 
despite the fact that the immediate cause of the pollution was a 
voluntary act of trespass by some unidentified third party who had 
broken into the compound where the oil was stored.   It was 
reasonable to think that the decision in Empress might well have been 
different had the chronology of the two House of Lords decisions 
been reversed.   Kennedy (No. 2) seemed to be the leading case.   
However, in R. v. Williams89 and in R. v. H,90 the Court of Appeal 
preferred Empress to Kennedy (No. 2) when construing the offence of 
causing death by driving when unqualified to drive.   In R. v. Gnango, 
Lord Clarke was of the considered opinion that the free choice of P 
to shoot at D91 was caused by D shooting at him.92   There is no 
reason in principle why English law could not accept for general 
purposes that fully voluntary conduct may yet be caused at least in 
part by third party interventions.93 
 
B.   Principals and intransitive wrongs 
The commission of certain wrongs require physical presence and 
forms of direct involvement.   The wrong of rape affords an obvious 
example.   Take D, an army commander, who has decided that the 
terror campaign against the local population will include the rape of 
women.   He orders a detachment of his soldiers to capture and rape 
women and threatens to shoot any soldier who fails to carry out this 
order.94   He has a point of a sort should he demur at a description of 
himself as a rapist.   If the jurisdiction in question does not allow a 
defence of duress to the soldiers who rape women in such 
circumstances, then at least the commander can be brought to book 
as the accomplice of his men.   But what if the men can defend a 
charge of rape with the defence of duress?   Allowing the defence to 
 
 
89  [2010] EWCA Crim 2552, [2011] 1 W.L.R. 588. 
90  [2011] EWCA Crim 1508, [2011] 4 All E.R. 761. 
91  P was not acting in self defence but participating in a mutually aggressive 
exchange of gunfire. 
92  Gnango (n.6), [83]-[91].   Lord Clarke did not cite Kennedy (No. 2) (n.26). 
93  Which is not an endorsement of all the decisions cited where a broader view of 
causation was taken.   In particular the decisions in Williams and H are very debatable 
because in each of the cases V was held to be 100 per cent responsible for the collision 
that caused his death:  G.R. Sullivan and A.P. Simester, “Causation Without Limits:  
Causing Death While Driving Without a Licence, While Disqualified, or  
Without Insurance”, [2012] Criminal Law Review 753.   But surely Lord Clarke is  
correct to find that that in factual terms D caused P to fire at him if P would not 
have done so had not D fired at him.   That does not imply further agreement with 
Lord Clarke that D was thereby a party to the shots fired at him. 
94  Incidents of this kind have been reported in recent times from conflicts in 
Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
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run does not mitigate to any degree the wrong done to the women:  
they were indubitably raped.   If the rapists themselves are acquitted, 
what further legal response can there be to this dreadful crime?   
Applying it by the book, the law of complicity causes difficulty.    
As the liability of the accomplice is derived from the crime of the 
perpetrator, in the absence of a crime by the latter, there is no 
criminal liability to pass on to the accomplice. 
The best solution, surely, is to treat the commander as a principal 
in the crime of rape.95   The responsibility for instigating the wrong of 
rape lies squarely with him.   To be sure, personal participation in the 
rape of the women would have added an additional layer of turpitude 
to his conduct.   But even without that, he is steeped in the crime.   
Moreover, to describe him as the accomplice of his men strikes a  
false note.   The rape atrocity was his project.   The men he ordered 
and coerced into committing rape were his minions.   He bears 
outcome responsibility for the rapes in the most obvious form of 
causal connection.   As a technical matter of legal drafting, it is 
perfectly feasible to provide that one can be a principal in the crime 
of rape, or any other intransitive wrong, despite not being the 
physical perpetrator of the offence: 
 
Causing or agreeing to commit an offence96 
(1) If D causes P to commit an offence or agrees with P that 
P will commit an offence, D is guilty of that offence. 
(2) D causes P to commit an offence— 
(a) if his act makes more than a negligible contribution 
to the occurrence of P’s criminal act, and 
(b) he intends to cause P to do a criminal act in relation 
to the offence, and 
(c) subsection (5) is satisfied; 
 
 
95  Liability for rape is consistently found in analogous circumstances in English law, 
as in R. v. Cogan [1976] Q.B. 217 (Court of Appeal) and D.P.P. v. K. and B.  
[1997] 1 Cr.App.R. 36 (Divisional Court).   The conceptual explanation varies.   
Sometimes it is said that the presence of the external elements of the crime is a 
sufficient predicate for derivative liability as an accomplice, sometimes it is said that 
the coercive or deceptive D is the principal offender, despite the lack of any personal 
carnal connection with V.   The analysis may vary according to whether P lacks the 
fault element of the offence (as in Cogan, where D duped P into thinking that V was 
consenting) or where P has the fault elements for rape but has a personal defence, 
such as the defence of the presumed incapacity of boys under 13 (since rescinded)  
as in the D.P.P. case. 
96  This legislative proposal is influenced by clause 4 of the Law Commission  
for England and Wales’s draft Bill, in Participating in Crime (n.14) 156-161,  158.    
The Law Commission’s provision deals with the situation where the actus reus of  
an offence is perpetrated by an innocent agent.   Even in that limited form the 
Commission’s proposal would impose liability as a principal on D for intransitive 
crimes such as rape without proof of an act of penetration on his part. 
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and, for the purposes of paragraph (a), D’s act may be found a 
more than negligible contribution to the occurrence of P’s 
criminal act irrespective of whether P’s criminal act is freely 
chosen by P. 
 (3) D agrees with P to commit an offence— 
(a) if he agrees with P that P will do a criminal act in 
relation to the offence, and 
(b) he intends that P will do a criminal act in pursuance 
of the agreement, and 
(c) P does a criminal act in pursuance of the agreement 
and, 
(d) subsection (5) is satisfied. 
 (4) For the purposes of this section, P does a criminal act in 
relation to an offence if he does an act (or failure to act) that falls 
within the definition of the act (or failure to act) that must be 
proved in order for the person to be convicted of the offence. 
(5) If a particular state of mind requires to be proved for 
conviction of the offence that D causes P to commit or agrees 
that P will commit, D’s state of mind must be such that, were he 
to do the act that he intends to cause or has agreed to be done, 
he would do it with the state of mind required for conviction of 
the offence. 
 
Such a scheme of liability should work smoothly in our army 
commander example.   Should his men have a defence of duress, the 
commander would be the only principal offender, on the basis that he 
caused his men to rape.   Should his machinations fall short of duress 
but secure the agreement of his men to rape the women, he would 
satisfy the subsections relating to agreements to commit crimes and 
be a joint principal with his men (that agreement to commit crimes 
generates outcome responsibility for the commission of the offences 
agreed will be argued in the next section). 
But John Gardner’s insistence that only the physical perpetrator can 
be the principal in a non-transitive wrong must be confronted again: 
“…..there are many actions that do consist in making a causal 
contribution to something, but which also have the feature of 
being nonproxyable, because the causal contribution is a 
refined one.   [Killing, torturing, coercing, enslaving, inducing, 
destroying, igniting] and countless other action-types.   Where 
nonproxyable actions are wrongs per se or necessary 
ingredients of more complex wrongs, one cannot be a 
principal in these wrongs by making one’s causal contribution 
through another principal.   In such cases, who acts through a 
principal must be an accomplice.   So in such cases the 
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attempt to eliminate complicity from the moral landscape, in 
favour of a more capacious domain of principalship, fails.”97 
Gardner’s argument appears conceptual rather than normative.   If 
it means nothing more than observing that the commander cannot 
become a rapist per se by coercing his men into committing rapes, one 
can only agree.   But it seems he intends to convey more than that.   
He is stipulating that, for nonproxyable wrongs such as rape, it is a 
category error to find anyone other than the rapist guilty as a principal 
to rape.   It may be conceded that the term rapist should be confined 
to the male who penetrates V.   Likewise the term “killer” should be 
confined to persons who shoot, knife, strangle, etc.   The argument  
in opposition to Gardner is that persons in addition to killers can be 
coherently found guilty as principals to the crime of murder.   And that 
argument carries over to the crime of rape despite the fact that rapists 
can only rape by penetrating non-consenting victims. 
Insisting that principals in rape must be confined to rapists may 
exact a high price.   If the soldiers do have a defence of duress, under 
Gardner’s strictures, the commander cannot be made the principal.   
As it is inconceivable that he should go unpunished, and if there is no 
other crime that he has committed reflective of the great wrong he 
has done,98 somehow he has to be made an accomplice to his men’s 
rape of the women.   This will put great stress on the derivative 
model of complicity in its application to a non-proxyable offence.   
Normatively and conceptually it would be better to take a more 
capacious view of principals.   In addition to perpetrators, the class of 
principal offenders should accommodate all other persons with 
outcome responsibility for commission of the crime and with the mens 
rea required for conviction of the crime. 
 
IV.   DOING WITHOUT COMPLICITY – AN OUTLINE  
One of the tasks undertaken here has been to demonstrate that 
voluntary wrongdoing by P can in a more than de minimis sense be 
caused by some prior or concurrent intervention of D, even if D’s 
intervention is non-coercive or non-deceptive.   In other words, such 
an intervention by D may be one of a necessary set of conditions 
sufficient to cause P to commit a particular wrong.   If this has been 
demonstrated to be the case, the way opens to dispense with complicity 
and make all criminals principals.   Conviction for any crime would 
require proof that P had outcome responsibility for the actus reus of 
 
 
97   Gardner, (n.15), 141. 
98  The commander may well be guilty of a war crime  or a crime against humanity if 
appearing before the International Criminal Court or one of the ad hoc tribunals 
applying the principles of international criminal law.   If before a domestic court, 
charges of rape may be more appropriate. 
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the crime.   If the crime is a strict liability crime, that would be all that 
is required.   If the crime required proof of any form of mens rea, that 
would have to be proved in respect of each convicted person.99    
This simple scheme of liability assumes that the jurisdiction adopting 
it has inchoate offences of conspiracy, assisting crimes and 
encouraging crimes. 
What is “outcome responsibility”?   The phrase is Honoré’s,  
and what he had in mind was unmediated causal responsibility for  
an outcome.100   If, unlike him, you are persuaded that D’s prior or 
current intervention, even if non-deceptive or non-coercive, may be a 
more than de minimis cause of P’s voluntary conduct, D will have 
outcome responsibility for a wrong more immediately caused by P if, 
but for D’s intervention, the wrong would not have occurred, or 
would have occurred in materially different circumstances.    
Is outcome responsibility confined to causal responsibility for  
the outcome?   In the legislative proposal set out in the previous 
section stipulating conditions for the expansion of principals in 
addition to perpetrators, provision was made for agreements between 
D and P that P should commit a crime.   If D and P form a joint 
criminal project, they share responsibility for the commission of the 
crime and its associated harms.   An analogy can be made with an 
unlimited commercial partnership where all partners will share profits 
 
 
99  This offers an escape from the enduring problems of formulating appropriate 
forms of mens rea for accomplices.   In terms of the conduct element of offences, that 
element will be satisfied if D has outcome responsibility (a matter for legal 
stipulation) for the instantiation of the external elements of the offence and, in terms 
of any fault element, the question becomes whether, when D incurred outcome 
responsibility through his acts or omissions, he did so with the fault element required 
for the offence.   Some technical adjustments in the expression of mens rea may be 
necessary where the mens rea for the relevant offence attaches to some direct physical 
action which D did not perform.   The English and Welsh Law Commission’s idea 
that D will possess mens rea for the offence if he would have the requisite mens rea 
were he to do the deed himself rather than prevail on P to perform the deed is useful:  
see n.96, ante.   Difficulties in dispensing with forms of mens rea customised for non-
perpetrators may arise where D’s conduct suffices for outcome responsibility in 
respect of a wrong directly perpetrated by P, but D is unaware of salient details of P’s 
intended or completed wrong.   For instance, D, a gangland boss, may order P to do 
“whatever is necessary” to make V pay for the drugs supplied by the organisation, 
aware that P will choose from a grisly menu of options but be astute not to concern 
himself with the details.   Adapting the principle laid down in DPP for Northern Ireland 
v. Maxwell [1978] 1 W.L.R. 1350 (House of Lords), D should be considered a 
principal in any offence that P commits, provided it is an offence of a type that D 
contemplated that P might commit.   For circumstances where P’s offence fell 
beyond anything that D contemplated, there should be liability under an 
appropriately drafted offence of assisting and encouraging crime. 
100  See n.46. 
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and losses.101    In Gnango, as previously discussed, a majority of the 
Supreme Court found that D and P had agreed to a hostile exchange 
of gunfire in a public place, an agreement that for Lords Phillips, 
Judge and Wilson formed the basis for a finding that D was P’s 
accomplice in the shot that killed V notwithstanding that the target of 
the shot was D.   Lord Clarke and Lord Brown went a different route: 
“…the victim was shot and killed in the course of the 
respondent carrying out the agreement between the two men 
as principals to shoot and be shot at, just as in a duel.”102   “I 
am not disposed to analyse the defendant’s liability for 
murder in accessory terms but as a principal to a joint 
enterprise … .”103 
Using this rationale to restore the murder conviction on the facts 
of the case was highly problematic.   There was scant if any evidence 
of an agreement to shoot and be shot at and even if there was such an 
agreement it was an agreement to resolve by arrangement a mutual 
antagonism by using fatal force.   This did not bring the parties  
into concert except as to the time and place for their gunfight.104   
Furthermore, enlargement of the class of principals to include non-
perpetrators probably requires legislation or at the very least some 
doctrinal heavy lifting notably absent from the judgments.105 
From first principles, however, where parties to an agreement are 
true collaborators in crime, it makes perfect sense to regard them as 
joint principals to the crimes carried out pursuant to the agreement.   
So, if D and P have agreed to burgle V’s home it would be 
appropriate to treat them as joint principals in the offence:  it would 
not matter if there was uncertainty about who was the lookout and 
who broke in.   Less welcome perhaps is the fact that under the 
liability scheme under discussion, as principals they would require full 
mens rea for any offence charged.   Any offence collateral to the 
burglary such as the murder of V would require proof against each 
 
 
101  Where that condition is satisfied, it can be justifiably asserted that anything that P 
does in pursuance of the project and which is something that D contemplates that he 
might do, is assignable to D. 
102  Gnango (n.6), [76] (Lord Clarke). 
103  ibid., [81] (Lord Clarke)   His Lordship expressly agreed with Lord Brown’s 
similar conclusions at [69]-[71]. 
104  This was accepted by Cooke J. and the Court of Appeal, see n.52 and associated 
text.   The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Sokoloski v. R. [1977] 2 S.C.R. 
523 is instructive on this point.   D, the purchaser of drugs, did not become a party 
to P’s drug trafficking by agreeing the time and place to purchase drugs from him.   
Buyers and sellers have to co-ordinate their activities but they are on different sides 
of the fence. 
105  Lord Brown and Lord Clarke do not refer to Lord Bingham’s firm assertion, with 
Glanville Williams, that principals must be perpetrators (n.26), nor to any authority 
helpful to their position (see n.106, post). 
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man of an intent to kill or cause serious harm.   Below it will be 
argued that this is a virtue.   Regarding D as a party to the agreement 
as a joint principal with the perpetrator, P, re-engages with the older 
tradition that parties to a conspiracy are joint principals in any offence 
carried out pursuant to the agreement, a tradition that could be 
usefully revived if complicity were to be abolished.106  
Do encouragement and assistance by D without more generate 
outcome responsibility on his part for any crime committed by P 
within the terms of D’s encouragement?   In certain circumstances 
this may be the case.   For instance, P’s commitment to a crime  
may be flagging but then reinvigorated by a pep talk from D.   Or P 
may be daunted by the difficulty of his contemplated crime but then 
greatly assisted by advice from P on the best modus operandi.    
If encouragement or assistance has a sufficient salience in the history 
of the wrong, and was provided with intent to assist and encourage, 
then a finding that D was a causal agent in P’s offence is likely.    
But tokens of encouragement and assistance that do not pass that 
threshold should be excluded.   As Dressler has so clearly 
demonstrated, assistance and encouragement have been extensively 
interpreted.107   The tendency to embrace within the sphere of 
complicity tokens of assistance or encouragement which have no 
impact on the commission of the wrong appears to be endemic in 
Anglophone systems in criminal law.   This expansionary approach to 
the conduct element of complicity is compounded by lowering the 
culpability standard to include knowledge or even recklessness that 
 
 
106  “It is a principle of law, that if several persons act together in pursuance of a 
common intent, every act done in furtherance of the common intent is, in law,  
done by all.   The act, however, must be in pursuance of the common intent.” 
Macklin (1838) 2 Lew.C.C. 225, (Alderson B.).   This theory was employed by 
Hobhouse L.J. in Stewart and Schofield [1995] 1 Cr.App.R. 441, 447, where he 
distinguished parties to a joint enterprise from “mere aider[s] and abettor[s] etc.” 
stating:  “In contrast where the allegation is joint enterprise, the allegation is that one 
defendant participated in the criminal act of another.”   Similar ideas can be found in 
Mcauliffe v. The Queen [1995] HCA 37, (1995) 183 C.L.R. 108;  Gillard v. The Queen 
[2003] HCA 64, (2003) 219 C.L.R. 1;  and Clayton v. R. [2006] HCA 58,  
(2006) 81 A.L.J.R. 439.   Hobhouse L.J.’s idea, that one can participate in a crime 
as a principal without being a perpetrator through a joint enterprise which includes 
the perpetrator, is based on agency.   That, with respect, seems correct, provided a 
finding of agency is based on something more than foresight on D’s part that if he 
agrees crime A with P, the commission of crime A may lead to P committing crime 
B.   What is frequently overlooked by those favouring findings that D is a principal to 
P’s criminal act by way of agency or authorisation is that D, as a principal, must have 
full mens rea with respect to all offences he is charged with, thereby limiting liability 
for offences collateral to offences agreed between D and P.   So if the collateral 
offence is murder, D would have to foresee as a virtual certainty that on committing 
crime A, P would go on to commit murder. 
107  “Reforming Complicity Law” (n.11);;  “Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings 
of Accomplice Liability” (n.20). 
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one may assist or encourage as a sufficient alternative to a direct 
intention to assist or encourage.   As a consequence persons such as 
taxi drivers, providers of otherwise lawful services, and family 
members with no criminal disposition whatever may find themselves 
embroiled in the crimes of others and held fully responsible for  
the offence. 
 The best way forward would be to dispense with assistance 
and encouragement per se in the liability scheme put forward here.    
That is not to say that non-causal assistance or encouragement should 
go unpunished.   In England and Wales, we have to hand a new 
inchoate crime of assisting and encouraging crime, intending to or 
foreseeing that one might assist or encourage crime.108 
To summarise:  all forms of liability for the commission of 
substantive offences would be direct liability.   In terms of conduct, 
there would have to be outcome responsibility for the criminal wrong 
at issue.   That would be present if D’s conduct has more than a  
de minimis causal impact on the commission of the wrong, or if he has 
agreed with others that the wrong be committed, and intends that the 
crime should be carried out pursuant to the agreement.   Liability for 
the offence would follow if D has the culpability, if any, that the 
offence requires.109   Assistance and encouragement to commit crimes 
lacking any causal impact would be penalised under the inchoate 
offence of encouraging and assisting crime. 
If this reform agenda were ever to be fulfilled one major basis for 
criminal liability would be absent, namely liability for offences 
committed collaterally to a joint enterprise.   In particular, murder 
convictions would only be obtainable on proof that the defendant 
had a direct or oblique intention to kill or cause serious bodily harm.    
If the public satisfaction arising from the two murder convictions 
finally obtained with respect to the killing of Stephen Lawrence is 
recalled, surely any proposal to dispense with this route to a murder 
conviction based on foresight of the risk of serious violence is doomed. 
That may well be the case.   But as a matter of principle murder 
verdicts should only be available against persons who intend to kill or 
cause serious harm.   It is not appropriate that mandatory life 
sentences are imposed on persons who lack that high form of 
 
 
108  See n.32, ante. 
109  If no mens rea is required, all principals will be on the same footing.    
In Hobbs v. Winchester Corp. [1910] 2 KB 471, P was liable for the strict offence of 
selling food unfit for human consumption.   D, a vetinary surgeon had negligently 
certified that the meat was safe.   As the non-selling accomplice, it was ruled in  
his favour that liability on his part required knowledge that the meat was unsafe.    
Under our proposal, each would be liable, as P would not have sold the meat but for 
D’s certification.   Of course, the outcome may still be criticised on the basis of  
a disapproval of strict liability. 
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culpability.   That said, the fact that D agrees with P to commit crime 
A, aware that P may go on to commit crime B, a more serious 
offences of violence associated with the commission of crime A, 
deepens his culpability for crime A.   It is obviously a more serious 
matter to become involved in crimes aware that this may lead their 
associates to commit more serious crimes than to enter criminal 
associations that do not give rise to that possibility. 
To a large extent it is possible to reflect this enhanced culpability 
in terms of liability and sentence.   Currently, if D is aware that his 
involvement with P in crime A is capable of encouraging P to commit 
the more serious offence of crime B, under the Serious Crime Act 2007, 
D can be punished up to the maximum provided for crime B.110   It 
should be further provided that involvement on the part of D with P 
in crime A with foresight that on committing crime A, P may go 
forward to commit crime B, should of itself expose D to the 
possibility of receiving the maximum penalty for crime B.   So for the 
Stephen Lawrence kind of case, murder verdicts would not be 
available on the basis of mere foresight that a criminal associate might 
inflict serious violence.   However, as Stephen was clearly murdered 
by someone, life sentences might well be passed on persons proved 
to be in a criminal association with the murderer at the time and place 
of the victim’s death. 
 For many persons the absence of a murder verdict in cases of this 
kind will fall short of vindicating the memory of the victim and  
stand in the way of eventual peace of mind for the victim’s family  
and friends.   The strength of these emotions can clearly affect the 
judicial process.   But, as the Supreme Court’s decision in Gnango111 
exemplifies, there is a danger of constructing rather than finding 
liability for this most serious offence. 
 
V.   CONCLUSION 
During the time that a criminal code was in prospect at some time 
for England and Wales,112 one of the good things anticipated was the 
simplification and reduction of those parts of judge made law that 
made for uncertainty and complexity.113   The first proposals for 
 
 
110  Serious Crime Act 2007, ss.45 and 58. 
111  (n.6.) 
112  In 2010 the Law Commission announced in its annual report that it would no 
longer work towards producing a comprehensive criminal code. 
113  The reduction of complexity and uncertainty with the avoidance of the inevitable, 
numerous appeals is certainly possible in some areas of law.   The general fraud 
offence created by s.1 of the Fraud Act 2006 attracted many critics.   But whatever  
its substantive merits or demerits it replaced many separate offences of deception  
that gave rise to a considerable volume of litigation and, to date, despite thousands  
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reforming the law of complicity by the English Law Commission 
were more radical than anything advocated here.114   Complicity was 
to go, including joint enterprise, without any enlargement of the class  
of principals.   It was to be replaced by spare and elegant inchoate 
offences of encouraging and assisting offences.   Inchoate offences of 
encouraging and assisting crime did eventually reach the statute book 
but as a supplement to complicity and in a more dense and 
convoluted form than when first proposed.   There has been a further 
Law Commission report on complicity and joint enterprise, but it  
was in large part a recommendation to incorporate the current  
common law of complicity and joint enterprise into statutory form.115    
There are no governmental plans to change any part of this picture.116 
In the last two decades, true or direct complicity has become  
ever more expansive, and parasitic accessory liability has grown  
like knotweed.   If the whole field of conduct associated with, but not 
constituting, principal offending is surveyed (including conspiracy), 
there is a vast amalgam of statutory and common law, with overlaps, 
uncertainties and occasional contradictions.   Little wonder that  
the boundaries of complicity are frequently tested by appeals on 
points of law.   In England and Wales, change is not forthcoming,  
but change there should be. 
 
                                                                                                             
of prosecutions for the offence, there have been no reported appeals on points  
of interpretation. 
114  Law Commission for England and Wales, Assisting and Encouraging Crime  
(Law Com. C.P. no. 131, TSO 1993). 
115  See Law Commission, Participating in Crime (n.14). 
116  See n.12. 
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“NATIONAL VALUES ON LAW AND ORDER” 
AND THE DISCRETION TO EXCLUDE 
WRONGFULLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE  
HO HOCK LAI∗ 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
In Singapore, recent decisions, beginning with the case of Phyllis Tan, 
have held that there is no general judicial discretion to exclude evidence on 
the ground that it was wrongfully obtained.   This article scrutinises the 
soundness of this ruling and explores the criminal justice philosophy that 
might have influenced the courts in taking this position.   It is argued 
that the evidence code that applies in Singapore does not bar the 
recognition of such discretion, and that the approach taken in the earlier 
case of Cheng Swee Tiang, under which improperly obtained evidence 
may be excluded on a discretionary basis, is to be preferred. 
 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
Law enforcement officers sometimes employ wrongful means to 
obtain evidence.   The wrong may take the form of an illegal act or  
an act that, although not illegal, is unfair or otherwise improper.    
In Singapore, the judiciary have recently changed their position on 
the discretion to exclude such evidence.   Although the common law 
discretion to exclude illegally obtained evidence was previously 
recognised, recent decisions have rejected it as being inconsistent  
with the code of evidence – the Evidence Act1 (hereafter “the EA”) –  
which applies in Singapore.   The recent developments are described 
and placed in historical context, and the relevant cases and legislation 
analysed, in Part II.2   Part III offers broad and somewhat speculative 
reflections on the criminal justice philosophy that influenced the shift 
in the law and the political values underpinning it.   These reflections 
are related to the theme of the conference at which a version of this 
paper was presented:3  is there an Asian identity to law?   It is difficult 
to see how the answer can be other than negative, given the great 
 
 
∗  Professor, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore.   I am grateful to 
Paul Roberts for his valuable comments on a draft of this article and the anonymous 
referees for their helpful suggestions. 
1  Cap. 97, rev. edn 1997 (original enactment:  Ordinance 3 of 1893). 
2  See also Jeffrey Pinsler, “Whether a Singapore Court has a Discretion to Exclude 
Evidence Admissible in Criminal Proceedings” (2010) 22 Singapore Academy of Law 
Journal 335.   See also Tan Yock Lin, “Sing a Song of Sang, a Pocketful of Woes?” 
[1992] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 365. 
3  9th Asian Law Institute Annual Conference 2012, “Law:  An Asian Identity?”, 
National University of Singapore, May 31 to June 1, 2012. 
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diversity of legal systems and traditions in Asian countries.4   But that 
is not the claim that is defended in this article.   Instead, the general 
observation will be made that, on the chosen topic and more 
generally in the field of criminal evidence and procedure, there are 
reasons to be critical of invocations of Asian or national values in 
defending the balance that is struck between competing interests.   
These broad reflections are apposite because, as Lord Scarman noted 
in R. v. Sang,5 the topic raises “problems that lie at the root of the 
criminal justice of a free society.” 
 
II.   DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW ON THE DISCRETION 
A.   “National values on law and order” 
In December, 2007, in Law Society of Singapore v. Tan Guat Neo Phyllis6 
(henceforth “Phyllis Tan”), the Singapore High Court declined to 
follow the approaches to wrongfully obtained evidence taken in a 
number of Western liberal democracies, namely, England, Australia 
and Canada.   It was held that, unlike the law in those jurisdictions, 
the law in Singapore does not give judges a general discretion to 
exclude relevant evidence on the ground of its wrongful provenance.   
The court read the EA in a manner that left no room for such  
a discretion.   Chan C.J. delivered the judgment of the three- 
judge bench.   In remarks that prefaced the discussion of the  
foreign approaches, the Chief Justice emphasised that “the objectives 
and values of [the Singapore] criminal justice system”, her  
“social environment” and her “national values on law and order” 
were different from those that prevailed in the countries just named.7 
 
B.   The law before Phyllis Tan 
This decision marked a turn in the law.   Before December, 2007, it was 
accepted that courts in Singapore had a discretion to exclude wrongfully 
obtained evidence.   In the 1964 case of Cheng Swee Tiang v. P.P.,8  
the accused was charged with assisting in the carrying out of a public 
 
 
4  Even if, as Ruskola suggests, there is a classical Chinese legal tradition that may 
be loosely identified as “East Asian” and that historically spanned across China, 
Japan, Korea and Vietnam, that tradition has long lost its cultural hegemony.    
The present legal systems of those countries are based on civil law, socialist law, and, 
in the case of Hong Kong, the common law.   “Although the classical East Asian 
tradition was far from unitary, the contemporary political and ideological fragmen-
tation seems even great and the commonalities even fewer”:  Teemu Ruskola,  
“The East Asian Legal Tradition” in Mauro Bussani and Ugo Mattei (eds),  
The Cambridge Companion to Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press 2012), 276. 
5  [1980] A.C. 402, 450 (House of Lords). 
6  [2007] SGHC 207, [2008] 2 S.L.R.(R.) 239. 
7  ibid., [58]. 
8  [1964] M.L.J. 291 (Court of three Judges). 
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lottery.   At trial, the prosecution relied on evidence that had been 
procured unlawfully.9   The accused was convicted on the basis of  
this evidence.   He appealed against his conviction.   The Attorney-
General, to his credit, decided not to resist the appeal.   However, since 
full arguments had been made on “a point of law on the discretionary 
exclusion of evidence illegally obtained”,10 the court decided to rule 
on the issue.   There was a split among the judges.   The majority 
took the following position: 
“It is undisputed law … that while evidence unlawfully 
obtained is admissible if relevant, there is a judicial discretion 
to disallow such evidence, if its reception would operate 
unfairly against an accused.”11 
This discretion was to be exercised on a case-by-case basis.    
In doing so, the trial judge had to be mindful of the following 
competing interests: 
“On the one hand there is the interest of the individual to be 
protected from illegal invasions of his liberties by the 
authorities and on the other hand the interest of the state to 
secure that evidence bearing upon the commission of crime 
and necessary to enable justice to be done shall not be 
withheld from the courts on any merely technical ground.”12 
The majority relied on the common law.   In particular, they 
referred to the cases of Kuruma v. R.13 (a decision of the Privy Council 
sitting in London hearing an appeal from Kenya) and Callis v. Gunn14 
(a judgment of the English High Court’sQueen’s Bench Division ).15   
Dicta in those cases supported a judicial discretion to exclude unfairly 
obtained evidence, as where it was gained by “a trick”16 or by 
 
 
9  The unlawful act was presumably the abetment of the crime which occurred 
when the undercover police officer made a test purchase of the lottery.  
10  Cheng Swee Tiang (n.8), 292. 
11  ibid.   This principle was approved by the Court of Appeal in Chan Chi Pun v. P. 
[1994] SGCA 36, [1994] 1 S.L.R.(R.) 654, [12].  
12  Cheng Swee Tiang (n.8), 293. In Phyllis Tan, (n.6), [99], the court observed an 
“uncanny resemblance” between this statement and a passage in the judgment of 
Barwick C.J. in R. v. Ireland [1970] HCA 21, (1970) 126 C.L.R. 321, 335.   But the 
majority judges in Cheng Swee Tiang could not have been inspired by Ireland since the 
former decision predated the latter.   It is quite clear from the near identity of the 
words used that the quotation above was based instead on a passage in Lawrie v. Muir 
[1950] S.L.T. 37, 39 (High Court of Justiciary).   This Scottish authority was not cited 
in Cheng Swee Tiang. 
13  [1955] A.C. 197 (Privy Council). 
14  [1964] 1 Q.B. 495. 
15  Other relevant cases include Jeffrey v. Black [1978] Q.B. 490, 498;  R. v. Payne 
[1963] 1 W.L.R. 637 (Court of Criminal Appeal);  and King v. R. [1969] 1 A.C. 304 
(Privy Council). 
16  Kuruma (n.13), 204. 
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“oppressive” means or “by false representations, … by threats,  
by bribes, anything of that sort”.17   In following these foreign 
judgments, none of the judges in Cheng Swee Tiang saw any need to 
consider whether the “social environment,” the criminal justice 
“objectives” and “national values on law and order” in Kenya and 
England were any different from those in Singapore. 
In 1979, the scope of the common law discretion was curtailed by 
the House of Lords in R. v. Sang.18   All of the law lords agreed on this 
answer to the certified question that was placed before them: 
“(1) A trial judge in a criminal trial has always a discretion to 
refuse to admit evidence if in his opinion its prejudicial effect 
outweighs its probative value.   (2) Save with regard to 
admissions and confessions and generally with regard to 
evidence obtained from the accused after commission of the 
offence, he has no discretion to refuse to admit relevant 
admissible evidence on the ground that it was obtained by 
improper or unfair means.”19 
Despite the unanimous endorsement of this answer, there were 
important differences in the individual judgments.20   Glossing over 
those differences, the general effect of Sang was to confine within 
limits the reach of the discretion to exclude evidence “on the ground 
that it was obtained by improper or unfair means”.   As can be 
gathered from limb (2) above, this discretion was available only for two 
categories of evidence.   The first was “admissions and confessions”:  
for example, a confession taken in breach of the Judges’ Rules, when 
they were still in force, could be excluded at the court’s discretion.21   
 
 
17  Callis v. Gunn (n.14), 502. 
18  (n.5.) 
19  ibid., 437. 
20  As one commentator put it, “no single ratio clearly emerged from the case”:  
Sybil Sharpe, Judicial Discretion and Criminal Investigation (Sweet & Maxwell, 1998), 52. 
The judgment of Lord Diplock had the most impact on later cases:  Peter Mirfield, 
Silence, Confessions and Improperly Obtained Evidence (Clarendon Press, 1997), 118, 119. 
Amongst the judges, he and Viscount Dilhorne gave the discretion the narrowest scope.   
The latter judge disagreed with the dicta found in earlier cases insofar as they 
suggested a wide discretion (e.g. Callis v. Gunn (n.14)), and he took the view that  
some of the earlier cases, such as R. v. Payne (n.15), 637 and Jeffrey v. Black (n.15),  
were wrongly decided:  R. v. Sang (n.5), 440-441.   Lord Scarman, on the other hand, 
explicitly declined to reject the earlier dicta:  ibid., 456. 
21  The Judges’ Rules were guidelines for police officers on interviewing suspects.   
They were first drawn up by English judges in 1912 at the request of the  
Home Secretary:  R. v. Voisin [1918] 1 K.B. 531 (Court of Criminal Appeal), 539.    
The Rules underwent several revisions.   As the Privy Council explained in Peart v. R.  
[2006] UKPC 5, [2006] 1 W.L.R. 970, [1], “Although classed formally as administrative 
directions …, they were afforded over time a higher status, and a general requirement 
became established that police officers had to observe them if confessions received 
were to be admitted in evidence.   They have been replaced in England and Wales by 
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The second was “evidence obtained from the accused after 
commission of the offence”.22   For example, if a blood sample was 
extracted from the accused by oppression, the judge has the 
discretion to prevent the prosecution from proving that the sample 
contained traces of the prohibited drug.23   Outside of these two 
categories, impropriety in obtaining evidence is not a ground for its 
exclusion.   So, if the police were to enter illegally and steal evidence 
from the premises of a third party,24 this would not in itself give rise 
to a discretion to exclude it:  limb (2) would not be engaged because 
the police did not get the evidence “from the accused”.   Since the 
evidence must be obtained “after the commission of the crime”,  
limb (2), on the face of it, also does not allow the exclusion of 
evidence obtained during or before the commission of a crime;  hence, 
according to one commentator, the discretion will not apply to 
“evidence of an agent provocateur” or to evidence procured “by such 
means as illegal telephone tapping or bugging”.25 
In addition to the limited discretion to exclude evidence on the 
basis that it had been improperly or unfairly obtained, the House of 
Lords acknowledged in limb (1) above the existence of a separate 
discretion to exclude evidence that was more prejudicial than probative.   
In exercising this discretion, the concern is whether the evidence is 
likely to mislead the court.   This has nothing directly to do with the 
                                                                                                             
the provisions of Code C made under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984”.   
In Singapore, Schedule E to the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap. 113, 1970 edn)  
was based on a version of the Judges’ Rules.   A statement taken in breach of this 
Schedule could be excluded at the judge’s discretion under s.125(1) of the same Act.   
Schedule E was repealed in 1976. 
22  Lord Diplock confined this limb to cases where the evidence was “tantamount to 
a self-incriminatory admission which was obtained from the defendant, after the 
offence had been committed, by means which would justify a judge in excluding an 
actual confession which had the like self-incriminating effect”:  R. v. Sang (n.5), 436.   
Other judges took broader views and were content to leave the discretion under  
limb (2) open-ended:  ibid., 445 (Lord Salmon), 450 (Lord Fraser), 456-57 (Lord Scarman).   
Real and uncontroversial examples are difficult to find, but see n.23, post. 
23  Lord Diplock in Sang (ibid., 435) used the principle in limb (2) to explain the 
decision in R. v. Payne (n.15), where the accused, who was charged with drunk 
driving, was wrongly induced to submit himself to a medical examination, and it was 
held by the Court of Criminal Appeal that the evidence given by the doctor of his 
unfitness to drive ought to have been excluded at the trial.   Lord Diplock’s 
interpretation of Payne was adopted by the Singapore High Court in Ajmer Singh v. P., 
[1986] SGHC 39, [1985-1986] S.L.R.(R.) 1030, [17]. 
24  For Lord Fraser, the discretion applied not only to cases where the evidence was 
obtained from the accused, but also to cases where the evidence was obtained from 
premises occupied by the accused:  R. v. Sang (n.5), 452.  
25  Rosemary Pattenden, Judicial Discretion and Criminal Investigation (Clarendon Press, 
1990), 266. 
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manner in which the evidence was obtained before the trial;26  it has 
to do, instead, with the effect of using the evidence at the trial itself. 
Sang has been followed repeatedly by the courts in Singapore.27    
It is sometimes cited alongside Cheng Swee Tiang on the (inadequately 
examined) premise that the two cases are consistent with each other 
and concurrently applicable.28   Thus, the general understanding was 
that some judicial discretion existed to exclude wrongfully obtained 
evidence:  if the scope was not as wide as it was left open in Cheng 
Swee Tiang, it was not narrower than it was acknowledged in Sang.29   
Then came Phyllis Tan.30 
 
C.   Phyllis Tan 
Phyllis Tan was one of a string of cases31 arising from a series of sting 
operations targeted at law firms suspected of touting, specifically, of 
engaging in the practice of procuring conveyancing work from real 
estate agents by giving them referral fees.   The sting operations were 
conducted by a private investigation agency hired by a group of 
solicitors from other firms.   The respondent was one of the lawyers 
who were ensnared.   Highly incriminating conversations were secretly 
recorded by the undercover private investigator.   Following the 
success of the sting operation, the private investigator lodged a 
complaint with the Law Society.   Phyllis Tan was brought before the 
Disciplinary Committee for unprofessional conduct.   After hearing 
the evidence, which included the secret recordings, the Disciplinary 
Committee found that the charges against her were made out.    
The Law Society then applied to the High Court for Phyllis Tan to 
show cause as to why she should not be disciplined in accordance 
with the relevant provisions of the Legal Profession Act.32 
A number of legal arguments were made by counsel for Phyllis 
Tan before the High Court.   One of them was that the Disciplinary 
Committee should have excluded the recorded conversations because 
they had been illegally or unfairly obtained.   The court held that the 
 
 
26  However, the manner in which evidence was obtained may cast doubt on 
reliability of the evidence, and this in turn may contribute to the conclusion that its 
probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect:  see (n.114) post. 
27  e.g. Ajmer Singh v. P. (n.22);  P. v. Teo Ai Nee [1995] SGHC 70, 
[1995] 1 S.L.R.(R.) 450;  How Poh Sun v. P. [1991] SGCA 22, [1991] 2 S.L.R.(R.) 270;  
Choo Pit Hong Peter v. P. [1995] SGHC 108, [1995] 1 S.L.R.(R.) 834. 
28  Ajmer Singh v. P. (n.22), at [18];  P. v. Teo Ai Nee (n.27), [79]. 
29  Jeffrey Pinsler, Evidence, Advocacy and the Litigation Process (2nd edn, LexisNexis 
Butterworths 2003), ch. 9. 
30  (n.6.) 
31  e.g. Law Society of Singapore v. Bay Puay Joo Lilian [2007] SGHC 208, [2008] 2 S.L.R.(R.) 316;  
Wong Keng Leong Rayney v. Law Society of Singapore [2007] SGCA 42, [2007] 4 S.L.R.(R.) 377;  
Law Society of Singapore v. Liew Boon Kwee James [2007] SGHC 209, [2008] 2 S.L.R.(R.) 336. 
32  Cap. 161, rev. edn 2009 (original enactment:  M Ordinance 57 of 1966). 
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strict rules of evidence did not apply to hearings by the Disciplinary 
Committee;33  furthermore, the private investigator “had not acted 
illegally or improperly”,34 and the respondent was not entrapped.35   
While the case could have disposed on those grounds, the court 
proceeded anyway to state its views on the discretion to exclude 
illegally obtained evidence in the criminal context.36   Although the 
discussion was obiter, it carried great weight.37   The position taken in 
Phyllis Tan has been followed in later decisions38 and endorsed by the 
Court of Appeal.39 
The Chief Justice referred to foreign authorities, paying especially 
close attention to the reasoning of the judgments of the Law Lords in 
R. v. Loosely,40 and in the Australian High Court case of Ridgeway v. R.41   
This examination of foreign judgments was preceded by the remarks 
alluded to earlier and which are now set out in full: 
“[I]n formulating the principles of law in relation to the legal 
issues raised in this case, we must give primacy to the objectives 
and values of our criminal justice system.   The principles which we 
lay down must conform to the fabric of our law, including 
our constitutional structure.   Whilst we pay great respect to 
the decisions of the appellate courts in Australia, Canada and 
England on these issues, we must also bear in mind that the 
legal and social environments in these jurisdictions are not the same, and 
that the courts in each jurisdiction must take into account the values  
and objectives of the criminal justice system which they wish to promote.    
The common law is infused with common or universal values 
which are applicable in all common law jurisdictions, but, in 
the field of criminal law, national values on law and order may 
differ not only in type, but also in intensity of adherence.”42 
Rejecting the approaches taken elsewhere, the Chief Justice declared, 
without any qualification, that the Singapore criminal court “has no 
 
 
33  Phyllis Tan (n.6), [59], following the earlier ruling made in Wong Keng Leong Rayney 
v. Law Society of Singapore (n. 31). 
34  (n.6), [48]. 
35  ibid., [52]. 
36  ibid. 
37  The case was heard by a strong bench of three judges, one of whom was the 
Chief Justice, another a Judge of Appeal.   In Wong Keng Leong Rayney v. Law Society  
of Singapore, (n.30) the Court of Appeal deferred discussion of the discretion under  
the EA to the case of Phyllis Tan which was then pending appeal.  
38  Law Society of Singapore v. Bay Puay Joo Lilian (n.30);  Law Society of Singapore v.  
Liew Boon Kwee James (n.31). 
39  Lee Chez Kee v. P. [2008] SGCA 20, [2008] 3 S.L.R.(R.) 447, at [106];   
Muhammad bin Kadar v. P. [2011] SGCA 32, [2011] 3 S.L.R. 1205. 
40  [2001] UKHL 53, [2001] 1 W.L.R. 2060. 
41  [1995] HCA 66, (1995) 184 C.L.R. 19. 
42  (n.6), [58] (emphasis added). 
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discretion to exclude illegally obtained evidence”.43   Is illegality, 
however grave, never a ground for exclusion?   To test this out, 
suppose this incident, which has occurred elsewhere, were to happen 
in Singapore:  in order to retrieve the incriminating evidence that  
the suspect had swallowed, four police officers pinned him down 
while a doctor administered emetics forcibly to him by injection  
and by inserting a tube into his stomach through his nose.    
In Jalloh v. Germany,44 the Grand Chamber of the European Court of 
Human Rights held that this treatment of the suspect was  
“inhuman and degrading” and therefore in violation of article 3 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights.   The court also held that 
the use of the illegally obtained evidence was, in the circumstances, in 
breach of the right to a fair trial under article 6 of the Convention.    
If (the literal reading of) the ruling in Phyllis Tan is correct, the 
Singapore criminal court is powerless to exclude the evidence in the 
scenario just painted.   Infringement of the civil liberty of a citizen, 
however outrageous, would seemingly not give the judge any discretion 
to prevent the state from using the evidence against him.   It would 
be unfortunate if the High Court really intended to go this far.45 
 
 
43  ibid., [150].   See also ibid., [126], where the High Court held that Cheng Swee Tiang 
was not “consistent with the EA in so far as [it] sanction[s] the exclusion of evidence 
on the ground of unfairness to the accused”.   A similar holding can be found ibid., 
end of [127].   See also Muhammad bin Kadar v. P. (n.39), [51], noting that it was 
observed in Phyllis Tan: 
“that the principle … that the court had a discretion to exclude 
evidence only on the ground that it was obtained in ways unfair to 
the accused was incompatible with the [EA].   That principle was 
ousted, in particular, by s 2(2) of the EA”. 
For discussion of this section, see Part D post.   On the same point, see also  
Mohamed Emran bin Mohamed Ali v. P. [2008] SGHC 103, [2008] 4 S.L.R.(R.) 411, [19]:   
“In Phyllis Tan …, the court of three judges … held unequivocally 
that the position in Singapore was that the courts have no discretion 
under the [EA] to exclude illegally obtained evidence”. 
As to the position taken by the High Court in Phyllis Tan on the discretion to exclude overly 
prejudicial evidence (under limb 1 of the formulation in Sang), see text at nn.76-78, post. 
44   [2006] ECHR 721, (2007) 44 E.H.R.R. 32.   For a similar case which occurred in 
the United States, see Rochin v. California (1952) 342 U.S. 165 (U.S. Supreme Court).   
In Singapore, an incident has been reported in which a doctor, acting on the request 
of the police, retrieved a stolen ring that the suspect had swallowed by inserting an 
endoscope into his stomach through his nose:  Thant Zin, “Got it”, The Straits Times 
(Singapore, March 7, 2008), 45. 
45  The possibility of a different legal recourse was left open.   It was suggested that 
the court has the power to declare the prosecution unconstitutional for infringement 
of the accused’s “constitutional rights to equality before the law and equal protection 
of the law” where the means used to obtain the evidence was “particularly egregious” 
and “the Attorney-General condones the unlawful conduct of the law enforcement 
officers … by not prosecuting them as well”:  (n.6), [147].   This constitutional argument  
– which was made but rejected in Mohamed Emran bin Mohamed Ali v. P. (n.43) –  
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While the police misconduct will often be less serious, falling short 
of “inhuman or degrading”46 treatment of a suspect or of behaviour 
that “shocks the conscience”,47 it is always a problem when the 
executive arm of the state exceed or abuse their power in the 
investigation of crimes.   In all of such cases, the substantive question 
arises against the rule of law backdrop of the need for an institutional 
check on executive power:  given this need, what sort of response to 
the problem can we expect of the court, qua criminal court?48 
 
D.   Exclusionary Discretion and the Evidence Act 
One might think, from reading the long quotation in the previous 
section, that the High Court, speaking through the Chief Justice, took 
an autochthonous path because Singapore’s special “social environ-
ment” and “national values on law and order” set her apart from 
Western liberal democracies.   One might then have expected the 
Chief Justice to tell us exactly what those distinctively Singaporean 
“social environment”, “national values” et cetera are.   However, there 
is no discussion or explanation along those lines in the judgment. 
The court relied on technical legal reasoning.   In broad strokes, 
the argument ran as follows.   In Singapore, the law of evidence is as 
codified in the EA.   The EA does not provide for any discretion to 
exclude illegally obtained evidence.   Section 2 of the EA allows 
judges to draw on the common law but only if the common law is 
consistent with the EA,49 and the common law discretion to exclude 
improperly obtained evidence is not.   Under the EA, so long as the 
evidence that is sought to be admitted is “relevant” (a key term in the 
EA which is commonly treated as synonymous with “admissible”), 
the court has no power to prevent its admission.   Hence, on a literal 
reading of the court’s ruling, criminal judges in Singapore have no 
residual exclusionary discretion at all. 
It was implicit in the decision of the majority judges in Cheng Swee 
Tiang that the EA allowed room for the discretion and this has not 
been controverted by any court before Phyllis Tan.   Had judges in all 
                                                                                                             
does not squarely address the accused’s grievance;;  his core objection is not unequal 
treatment but to the state enforcing the criminal law against him through unlawful means. 
46  As was found by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights 
to be the case in Jalloh v. Germany (n.44). 
47  Rochin v. California (n.44), 172. 
48  On theories of the criminal trial, see e.g. Ho Hock Lai, “Liberalism and the 
Criminal Trial” [2010] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 87, and “The Presumption 
of Innocence as a Human Right” in Roberts and Hunter (eds), Criminal Evidence and 
Human Rights (Hart 2012), 270-275. 
49  See generally, Jeffrey Pinsler, “Approaches to the Evidence Act:  the Judicial 
Development of a Code” [2002] 14 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 365. 
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of the previous cases, save for Ambrose J.50 who dissented in Cheng 
Swee Tiang, overlooked the constraints of the EA?   We should hesitate 
to lay this charge, especially against the majority in Cheng Swee Tiang.   
The majority must have been aware that the dissent was based on  
the argument that the EA precluded the availability of a residual 
exclusionary discretion.   It is unfortunate that they did not explicitly 
deal that argument but, given how their decision went, it must be that 
they disagreed with it. 
In theory, the availability of a general discretion is defensible as an 
“unwritten” law supplement to the EA that comports with the 
Aristotelian insight that no legal code can be exhaustive and that the 
universal claim of codified rules must, at some point, be read in the 
light of the particularistic demands of justice.51   On this view, the 
recognition of a residual discretion is not inconsistent with the code;  
on the contrary, justice in the application of a code, in virtue of the 
fact that we are dealing with a code, requires that it be refined by 
discretion in exceptional cases. 
The reasoning in Phyllis Tan is contestable not only as a matter of 
abstract theory.   At the textual level, the position is not as clear as  
it was made out to be.   There is no provision in the EA that  
positively or convincingly precludes a general exclusionary discretion.    
 
 
50  It seemed to Ambrose J. that the fairness discretion “referred to in Kuruma’s case 
and Callis v Gunn [was] a new development of the common law in England”, and he 
could “not see how the courts in Singapore can recognize such a discretion without 
express statutory provision”:  Cheng Swee Tiang (n.8), 294.   In Phyllis Tan (n.6), [124], 
the High Court seemed to have misread Ambrose J., stating that: 
“[he] expressed the view that the Kuruma … discretion (that illegally 
obtained evidence was admissible unless its prejudicial effect 
outweighed its probative value) was a new development.   But, at the 
same time, Ambrose J conceded that the courts in Singapore had the 
power to exclude evidence which was unfair to the accused”. 
It is even more puzzling that in the very next paragraph, the High Court took a 
different reading of Ambrose J.’s dissent, noting that, “while commenting that the 
Kuruma discretion to exclude illegally obtained evidence on grounds of fairness was 
contrary to the EA,” he “nonetheless accepted that the court could exclude evidence 
which was more prejudicial than probative” (ibid., [125]). 
51  On the Aristotelian virtue of equity in law, see generally, Roger A. Shiner, 
“Aristotle’s Theory of Equity” 27 (1994) Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 1245;;  
Lawrence B. Solum, “Equity and the Rule of Law” in I. Shapiro (ed.), The Rule of Law:  
NOMOS XXXVI (New York University Press 1994) 120;  Eric G. Zahnd,  
“The Application of Universal Laws to Particular Cases:  A Defense of Equity in Aristo-
telianism and Anglo-American Law” 59 (1996) Law and Contemporary Problems 263.   
Jeffrey Pinsler has made an argument to the same effect although not in the same terms.   
As he puts it:  “the nature of the law of evidence demands flexibility which … can never 
be offered by fixed rules in a statute notwithstanding the quality of draftsmanship”;;  
the exceptional exercise of an exclusionary discretion “may have particular significance 
in preventing the injustice which may otherwise result from the technical application 
of a rigid statutory rule”:  (n.2), 354. 
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Section 5 of the EA, in brief, provides that only facts declared 
relevant under the EA “may” be proved;;52  to put this crudely, 
relevant evidence is admissible.   The EA deals with admissibility of 
evidence as a matter of law.   If the evidence is inadmissible under the 
EA, the discretion has no application;  the court must, not may, 
exclude the evidence.   However, if the evidence is admissible under 
the EA, then and only then can the discretion become an issue.53   
The discretion is consistent with the EA insofar as legal admissibility 
is conceded rather than denied in its exercise:  there is no logical 
contradiction here.   The principle in section 5 that only relevant 
evidence is admissible does not logically entail that evidence, if 
relevant, must be admitted.54 
The same point has to be borne in mind when reading 
“Explanations 2” to section 258(3) of the Singapore Criminal Procedure 
Code 2010, which was formerly section 29 of the EA.55   It provides 
that certain forms of improprieties (such as the use of deception) in 
obtaining a statement does not render it “inadmissible”.   Although this 
provision has drawn criticisms,56 it is uncontroversial if seen as no 
more than an expression of the common law principle that the use of 
wrongful means to obtain evidence does not make it inadmissible.   
Importantly, this still leaves open the question of whether the evidence 
may nevertheless be excluded in the exercise of judicial discretion.   
And the answer to that question cannot be found in the statutory 
provision itself. 
The Singapore EA is based on the Indian Evidence Act 1872 
(“Indian EA”).   Relying on a commentary in an Indian treatise on 
evidence law, the High Court in Phyllis Tan concluded that the 
“Indian position confirm[ed its] understanding of the general scheme 
 
 
52  “Facts in issue” may also be proved under s.5 of the EA.   For present purposes, 
this category of facts may be ignored. 
53  See e.g. King v. R. (n.15), 315:  “the exercise of discretion is called for in order  
to decide whether, even though admissible, [the evidence] should be excluded in 
fairness to the accused”.  
54  In this connection, it may be noted that in P. v. Dahalan bin Ladaewa 
[1995] SGHC 126, [1995] 2 S.L.R.(R.) 124, at [27], (decision upheld by the Court  
of Appeal, P. v. Dahalan bin Ladaewa [1995] SGCA 87, [1996] 1 C.L.A.S. News 75), 
Rajendran J. drew a distinction between the phrase “shall be admissible” and “shall 
be admitted”.   He held that the use of the former phrase in a statutory provision was 
consistent with the availability of a judicial discretion to exclude evidence that was 
admissible under that provision.   Cf. Muhammad bin Kadar v. P. (n.39), [46]-[56]. 
55  Act 15 of 2010.   Cf. Phyllis Tan (n.6), [127]. 
56  See the parliamentary debate on this provision during the second reading of the 
Criminal Procedure Code Bill on May 18 and 19, 2010:  (2010) 87 Parliamentary Debates 
Singapore Official Report, cols 416-7, 429-430, 443, 456-457;  461-464, 549-550, 553-556;  
also available at <http://bit.ly/SingaporeParlReps> accessed November 20, 2012.   
See also “ACLS and the CPC Bill” (2010) 6(1) Pro Bono 9 (containing criticisms of 
the provision by Mr Subhas Anandan, a prominent defence lawyer). 
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of the admissibility of evidence under the EA”.57   The High Court 
could also have cited (but it did not cite) the Ninety-Fourth Report of 
the Law Commission of India issued in 1983.58   On the Law 
Commission’s reading of the Indian EA, “there is no residuary power 
in the court to reject … evidence, however gross may be the illegality 
perpetrated in collecting it”.59   This was found to be highly 
unsatisfactory, and reform to the law was advocated.   The Law 
Commission – perhaps out of the desire to make more compelling 
their recommendation – seemed to have overstated the defect they 
were seeking to rectify.   As they noted, there is in fact a 1973 
decision of the Indian Supreme Court which “is sometimes regarded 
as recognising a discretion in the courts in India to exclude evidence 
obtained illegally”.60   But the Law Commission found this authority 
to be inconclusive.   They recommended the introduction of a section 
into the Indian EA that would confer an exclusionary discretion in 
explicit terms.61 
The recommended provision was never enacted.   Indian law on 
the present topic is unclear and judicial authorities are not always 
consistent.   What can be said is that the Indian Supreme Court has, 
in a number of cases, acknowledged that judges have the discretion to 
exclude illegally obtained evidence even though the Indian EA is 
silent on the matter.   An especially strong endorsement can be found 
 
 
57  (n.6), [128], citing Sarkar’s Law of Evidence (16th edn, Wadhwa & Co. 2007), vol. 1, 121. 
58  Law Commission of India, Evidence Obtained Illegally or Improperly:  Proposed  
Section 166A, Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (L.C.I. no. 94, 1983). 
59  ibid., 36.   Similarly, in two general reviews of the Indian Evidence Act 1872,  
the Law Commission of India asserted that “in India, the Judge has no discretion to 
exclude evidence if it is relevant and admissible and not excluded by any specific 
provision of law”:  The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (L.C.I. no. 69, 1977), [76.6],  
and repeated in Review of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (L.C.I. no. 185, 2003), 433.   
This assertion was made in a comment on s.136 of the Indian EA (which is 
equivalent to s.138 of the Singapore EA).   It was not supported by any argument, 
and neither of the reports cited any Indian authority.  
60  (n.58), 7.   The case is R. M. Malkani v. State of Maharashtra [1972] INSC 232, 
[1973] A.I.R. 57.   Referring to Kuruma v. R. (n.13), the Indian Supreme Court noted 
“that the Judge has a discretion to disallow evidence in a criminal case if the strict 
rules of admissibility would operate unfairly against the accused.   That caution is the 
golden rule in criminal jurisprudence”.   The Law Commission found this case 
inconclusive on the availability of the discretion.   But they added that if this decision 
“is to be construed as indicating that the courts in India have such a discretion, then 
[the Law Commission’s] recommendation to incorporate such a discretion in … 
statute law should be welcome”:  Law Commission of India (1983) (n.58), 7. 
61  See Law Commission of India (1983) (n.58), 37 for the text of the draft provision.   
The proposed discretion allowed the court “to exclude evidence obtained illegally or 
improperly if, in the circumstances of the case, the admission of such evidence would 
bring the administration of justice into disrepute”:  ibid., 35. 
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in State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh.62   Sitting as a court of five judges on a 
special reference by a three-Judge bench, the Indian Supreme Court 
affirmed the existence of the discretion and founded it on these 
general principles and policies: 
“Conducting a fair trial for those who are accused of a 
criminal offence is the cornerstone of our democratic society.   
A conviction resulting from an unfair trial is contrary to our 
concept of justice.   Conducting a fair trial is both for  
the benefit of the society as well as for an accused. …  
Courts cannot allow admission of evidence against an accused, 
where the court is satisfied that the evidence had been obtained 
by a conduct of which prosecution ought not to take advan-
tage particularly when that conduct had caused prejudice to 
the accused.   If after careful consideration of the material on 
the record it is found by the court that the admission of 
evidence collected in [an illegal] search… would render the 
trial unfair then that evidence must be excluded…63 
“In every case the end result is important but the means 
to achieve it must remain above board.   The remedy cannot 
be worse than the disease itself.   The legitimacy of judicial 
process may come under cloud if the court is seen to condone 
acts of lawlessness conducted by the investigating agency 
during search operations and may also undermine respect for 
law and may have the effect of unconscionably compromising 
the administration of justice.”64 
In Malaysia, the evidence legislation65 is also based on the Indian 
EA.   The Malaysian judiciary has similarly reserved for itself the 
discretion to exclude wrongfully obtained evidence.   In Goi Ching Ang 
v. P.P.,66 the Federal Court, sitting as a five-judge bench, made an 
equally strong pronouncement on the need for this power: 
 
 
62  [1999] INSC 224, (1999) 6 S.C.C. 172.   See also:  Madhya Pradesh v. Paltan Mallah 
[2005] INSC 51, (2005) 3 S.C.C. 169, [28], [31], [32];  Khet Singh v. Union of India 
[2002] INSC 154, (2002) 4 S.C.C. 380, [13], [16].   Cf. Pooran Mal v. The Director  
of Inspection (Investigation), New Delhi [1973] INSC 243, (1974) 1 S.C.C. 345, [25];   
State v. NMT Joy Immaculate [2004] INSC 367, (2004) 5 S.C.C. 729, [15]. 
63  Punjab v. Baldev Singh (n.62), [44]. 
64  ibid., [56]. 
65  Evidence Act 1950. 
66  [1999] 1 M.L.J. 507, 527, relying on, inter alia, the dictum in Kuruma v. R. (n.13).   
This discretion was exercised to exclude a statement which was admissible under the 
Evidence Act 1950, s.27.   (The Singapore EA previously had a same provision but it 
has been deleted and now appears as s.258(6)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010.)   
This discretionary power has its source in the common law.   The common law is 
applicable in West Malaysia under the Civil Law Act 1956, s.3(1)(a), provided that no 
“other provision has been … made by any written law in force in Malaysia”.   
According to the Malaysian Federal Court, nothing in the Malaysian Evidence Act 1956 
has taken away this discretionary power:  Goi Ching Ang, ibid., 525.   Goi Ching Ang has 
been followed in a number of cases, e.g. Francis Antonysamy v. P. [2005] MYFC 9, 
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“Fairness requires fair trial which, in turn, needs fair 
procedure.   Fair process requires that the legitimate interests 
of both the prosecution and the defence are adequately 
provided for.   While the police ought to be given a 
reasonable opportunity to question suspects and accused 
persons, in its investigation, the accused must also be 
reasonably protected from the danger of extraction of 
unreliable statements and of statements (even if reliable) by 
some improper means.   Evidence obtained in an oppressive 
manner by force or against the wishes of an accused person 
or by trick or by conduct of which the police ought not to 
take advantage, would operate unfairly against the accused 
and should in the discretion of the court be rejected for 
admission.” 
It is worth observing that the passages just quoted were written by 
Asian judges sitting in Asian courts.   They spoke in the face of an 
Evidence statute that is similar to the EA that applies in Singapore.   
And they upheld principles and values that are about as “liberal” as 
can be found in any “Western” judgments. 
The High Court in Phyllis Tan relied on section 138(1) of the EA 
in support of its ruling.67   It is true that section 138(1) does state, in the 
relevant part, that “the court shall admit the evidence if it thinks that the 
fact, if proved, would be relevant”.   But four points must be noted. 
First, section 138 is in the portion of the EA that deals with 
“Examination of Witnesses” which in turn is located in Part III  
on “Production and Effect of Evidence”.   This provision merely 
addresses the procedure on how issues of relevancy are to be raised, 
addressed and proved at the trial.   It is difficult to believe that  
the provision would be tucked away in such a remote corner of  
the EA if it was meant to have the drastic effect of eliminating  
all exclusionary discretion.68 
Secondly, even a mandatorily worded provision may be qualified 
by judicial discretion.   A good, albeit historical example, is the former 
                                                                                                             
[2005] 3 M.L.J 389;  P. v. Mohd Farid bin Mohd Sukis [2002] 3 M.L.J. 401 (High Court 
of Malaya);  these two cases in turn were cited in Hanafi bin Mat Hassan v. P.  
[2006] MYCA 42, [2006] 4 M.L.J 134, [69]-[74].   In the highly publicised  
sodomy trial of Anwar Ibrahim, the Malaysian High Court excluded certain  
DNA samples on the finding that the police had obtained them by wrongful means.    
(“3 items ‘Inadmissible as Evidence’”, New Straits Times (Singapore, March 9, 
2011).)    
About two weeks later, the same court reversed its own decision on the ground that 
new evidence showed that the samples were obtained lawfully.   (“Court Rules 3 
Items can be Admitted as Evidence”, New Straits Times (Singapore, March 24, 
2011).) 
67  (n.6), [124], citing commentary on this provision in Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore 
(Butterworths Asia 2000), vol. 10, [120.009]. 
68  See also Pinsler (n.2), 358. 
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section 1(f)(ii) Criminal Evidence Act 1898 of England and Wales.   
Prior to the repeal of this provision, the position was as follows.   
Should the shield against cross-examination on the accused’s bad 
character be lifted under this section, he “shall … be required to 
answer … any question” that he cannot otherwise be asked or be 
required to answer under that section.69   As Lord Fraser noted in 
Sang,70 this “statute does not in terms confer a discretion”.   Yet, the 
cases have “clearly established” that “a judge has a discretion to 
exclude evidence of the previous record or character of the accused 
and to refuse to allow him to be cross-examined as to his character 
notwithstanding that such evidence or cross-examination may be 
legally admissible under s 1(f)(ii)”.71   Indeed, as Professor Tapper has 
pointed out, “[i]t was just because the conditions were unqualified in s 
1(f)(ii) that the discretion was developed”.72   It may similarly be 
argued in Singapore that the use of the mandatory term “shall” in 
section 138 does not prevent the court from assuming (to borrow the 
words of Lord Fraser) “an underlying discretionary power” as part of 
its inherent power to ensure a fair trial.73 
Thirdly, a provision identical to section 138(1) of the EA can be 
found in the evidence legislation of India and Malaysia.74   
Notwithstanding this, and as we just saw, there are authorities in 
those jurisdictions which support a residual discretion to exclude 
wrongfully obtained evidence. 
Fourthly, resting the argument against the discretion on section 
138(1) has far-reaching consequences.   As it is construed in Phyllis 
Tan, the effect of the provision is that once the court finds the 
evidence to be relevant, it must admit it.   There is no discretion to 
exclude evidence that is relevant.   A consistent application of this 
construal of the provision would force the court to surrender not 
 
 
69  Unless the shield is lifted, the accused “shall not be asked, and if asked shall not 
be required to answer, any question tending to show that he has committed or been 
convicted of or been charged with any offence other than that wherewith he is then 
charged, or is of bad character”. 
70  (n.5), 447. 
71  Lord Fraser reasoned that “[i]f there were not some underlying discretionary 
power it would be difficult to explain how the judges were able, when the [Act]  
came into force, to exclude legally admissible evidence”:  ibid. 
72  Colin Tapper (ed.), Cross and Tapper on Evidence (9th edn, Butterworths 1999), 181. 
73  (n.71).   Limb (1) of the discretion formulated in Sang was grounded by the  
law lords in the imperative of ensuring a fair trial and, at least for Lord Salmon,  
Lord Fraser and Lord Scarman, the same was true of limb (2).   For an argument that 
the exclusionary discretion to exclude unduly prejudicial evidence lies within the court’s 
inherent jurisdiction, see Pinsler, (n.2), cited in Muhammad bin Kadar v. P. (n.39), [52];  
the same view was taken by the Minister for Law in a speech delivered in Parliament 
on February 14, 2012, during the second reading of the Evidence (Amendment) Bill:  
<http://bit.ly/SingaporeParlReps> accessed November 20, 2012. 
74  Indian EA, s.136(1);  Malaysian Evidence Act 1950, s.136(1). 
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only the discretion to exclude evidence on the ground of its wrongful 
procurement but all other types of discretion to exclude relevant 
evidence – including, for example, “the discretion founded at 
common law to exclude accomplice evidence if there was an obvious 
and powerful inducement for him to ingratiate himself with the 
Prosecution”75 (the objection here is not one of irrelevancy) and, 
more importantly, the general discretion to exclude overly prejudicial 
evidence. 
A few years after Phyllis Tan was decided, the Court of Appeal 
revisited the topic in Mohammad bin Kadar v. P.P.76   The Court of 
Appeal affirmed the applicability of limb (1) of the answer given in 
Sang;;  it held that the discretion to exclude “evidence that had more 
prejudicial effect than probative value” was consistent with the EA 
and therefore applicable in Singapore.   According to the Court of 
Appeal, this much was in fact accepted in Phyllis Tan.77   If it was in 
fact so accepted, it was by no means clearly accepted.78   Leaving this 
aside, a difficulty arises.   Either section 138(1) has the effect 
attributed to it in Phyllis Tan or it has not.   If it has the effect 
attributed to it in Phyllis Tan, the court must admit the evidence so 
long as it is relevant;  it should matter not that the evidence, although 
relevant, is at the same time unduly prejudicial.   There is no express 
provision in the EA that gives the judge the general discretion to 
exclude relevant evidence which is overly prejudicial.   Yet, this did 
not prevent the Court of Appeal in Mohammad bin Kadar, or, as we are 
told, the High Court in Phyllis Tan, from assuming such an 
exclusionary power.   If the reception of this common law discretion 
to exclude prejudicial evidence is not barred by section 138(1) and is 
consistent with the EA, why should it be any different for the 
common law discretion to exclude illegally obtained evidence? 
 
 
75  See Lee Chez Kee (n.39), [106], citing Roy S. Selvarajah v. P. [1998] SGHC 272, 
[1998] 3 S.L.R.(R.) 119, [59], and adding:  “I do not propose to comment fully on the 
validity of any such discretion, save to say that the court of three judges has recently 
in … Phyllis Tan … persuasively ruled that apart from the confines of the EA, there 
is no residual discretion to exclude evidence which is otherwise rendered legally 
relevant by the EA.” 
76  (n.39.) 
77  ibid., [51].   See also Pinsler, (n.2), [19]-[20]. 
78  What the High Court did say in Phyllis Tan (n.6), [126], was that: 
“the fairness exception has no practical effect in the case of 
entrapment evidence since, by definition, the probative value of such 
evidence must be greater than its prejudicial value in proving the 
guilt of the accused…   For this reason, the Sang formulation is, in 
practical terms, consistent with the EA and in accordance with the 
letter and spirit of s 2(2), and is therefore applicable in the Singapore 
context.” 
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Curiously, one form of exclusionary discretion seemed to have 
been endorsed in Phyllis Tan itself.   The court apparently accepted, 
during its discussion of P.P. v. Knight Glenn Jeyasingam,79 that there was 
judicial discretion to exclude evidence of a representation made in 
plea bargaining.   This discretion was founded on “a long-established 
practice or convention … that such representations were made 
‘without prejudice’ and that the [Public Prosecutor] will not seek to 
admit them in evidence against the accused should the 
representations be rejected”.80   If breach of a mere convention can 
be the basis of an exclusionary discretion, even though it is not 
explicitly provided for in the EA, it is strange that illegality, the 
breach of a law – which is after all a higher norm – cannot be.81 
To bring the discussion in this Part to an end, three conclusions 
may be drawn.   Firstly, it is at least debatable whether the framework 
of the EA, or any provision in it, prevents the recognition of a 
residual discretion to exclude evidence on the ground of its wrongful 
provenance.   Secondly, the courts have accepted that the EA does 
not prevent them from assuming and exercising certain types of 
exclusionary discretion;  in particular, the Court of Appeal has 
affirmed the availability of a general discretion to reject evidence 
which, although relevant, is unduly prejudicial.   Thirdly, Phyllis Tan 
rendered unavailable one type of discretion:  the court has no power 
to exclude evidence merely on the basis that it has been illegally 
gathered.   However, going back to the first point, it is possible to 
read the EA in a manner that supports the contrary view. 
 
III.   BROAD REFLECTIONS 
A.   Underlying criminal justice philosophy 
If, as just argued, there is room in the EA for interpretive manoeuvre, 
why did the High Court take the interpretation which it did in  
Phyllis Tan?   What broader considerations might have underpinned  
its decision?   Some speculations will be offered. 
 
 
79  P. v. Knight Glenn Jeyasingam [1999] SGHC 91, [1999] 1 S.L.R.(R.) 1165.   In Phyllis Tan, 
it was apparently accepted that the court in Knight Glenn Jeyasingam was right to have 
prevented the prosecution from relying on the representation (see (n.6), end of [181]);  
where it found the court to have erred was in providing “a legal basis for its ruling 
rather than rely on the convention” (ibid., [182]). 
80  (n.6), [118]. 
81  I thank Paul Roberts for perceptively pointing out a difference.   In disallowing 
reliance on the “without prejudice” representation, the court is directly enforcing the 
norm against disclosure and preventing its violation, whereas in the case of illegally 
obtained evidence, the wrong has already been done.   While this difference may have 
normative significance, the crucial fact is that the court acknowledged the existence 
of an exclusionary power outside the confines of the EA. 
J.C.C.L. “National Values on Law and Order” 249 
 
© 2012 Association of Commonwealth Criminal Lawyers and contributors. 
In 1964, when the majority judges in Cheng Swee Tiang 
acknowledged the discretion to exclude illegally obtained evidence, 
they had in clear view the social interest – the collective interest of the 
citizenry –  in protecting “the individual … from illegal invasions  
of his liberties by the authorities”.   In contrast, the judgment in  
Phyllis Tan made no mention of civil liberties.82   The emphasis was on 
“convicting and punishing the guilty”, the belief being that the law 
should not place undue obstacles in the path of securing conviction 
of the factually guilty.83   Obviously, it would be wrong to claim  
that due process values did not matter to the court in Phyllis Tan.84    
What is in contention, however, is the balancing or prioritizing of 
different criminal justice values and interests. 
Those who have been following the Chief Justice’s thinking on  
the subject will not be surprised by the present development.    
His outlook on criminal justice may be gleaned from his judgments, 
articles and speeches.   (It should be clarified straightaway that the 
statements that will be referred to were not directed specifically at 
illegally obtained evidence.   It should also be remembered that the 
judgment delivered by the Chief Justice in Phyllis Tan was not his 
personal judgment but the judgment of the three-judge bench.) 
In 1996, before he became the Chief Justice and when he was the 
Attorney-General, Mr Chan defended the “Singapore model” of the 
“criminal process” in a published public lecture.85   In it, he remarked: 
“Each country must have a criminal justice system which 
meets its own needs.   Most Singaporeans, I believe, 
 
 
82  There is however mention of the “public interest in ensuring that the administra-
tion of justice is not brought into disrepute by the courts overlooking egregious 
illegal conduct on the part of the law enforcement officers”:  (n.6), [44]. 
83  In a speech given while he was the Attorney-General, Mr Chan observed that 
“Singapore ceased to give maximum due process to accused persons from 1976  
and has progressively favoured the crime control model”:  Chan Sek Keong,  
“Rethinking the Criminal Justice System of the Singapore for the 21st Century” in  
The Singapore Conference:  Leading the Law and Lawyers into the New Millenium @ 2020 
(Butterworths Asia 2000), 42. 
84  As the Chief Justice acknowledged soon upon taking office:  “The Judiciary must 
always give priority to upholding the fundamental values of the legal system, such as 
due process or procedural fairness”:  Chan Sek Keong, “Welcome Reference for the 
Chief Justice – Response” (April 22, 2006) <http://bit.ly/SG-CJWelcome-Response> 
accessed November 20, 2012.   In remarks made at a lunch gathering of judges, 
prosecutors and defence lawyers, the Chief Justice stressed that all sides “have a vital 
stake in the fairness and integrity of our criminal justice system”:  Chan Sek Keong, 
“Tripartite Forum:  Bench-Prosecution-Bar – Brief Remarks of the Chief Justice”, 
Singapore Law Gazette (Singapore, December 27, 2010). 
85  Chan Sek Keong, “The Criminal Process – The Singapore Model” 
(1996) 17 Singapore Law Review 433. 
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appreciate the safe environment they live in and support a 
criminal justice system that is responsible for it…86 
“What that balance should be, between community needs 
and individual rights in the criminal process, is determined by 
the ideological and social goals of the government of the day.   
If anything has been made clear in Singapore, it is that  
crime control has always been and is a high priority on the 
Government’s action agenda.”87 
In his address before the “International Conference on Criminal 
Justice under Stress:  Transnational Perspectives” held in New Delhi, 
India, on November 24, 2006,88 the Chief Justice said: 
“The basic values, principles and objectives of our criminal 
justice system have largely been shaped by Mr Lee [Kuan 
Yew]’s beliefs.   Today, Singapore has a high degree of social 
and political stability, a modern economy and an effective 
criminal justice system with low crime rates…89 
“Singapore has a relatively safe and secure environment 
that is free from crime because our leaders had the political 
will to enact an appropriate legal framework to achieve it.”90 
On 27 October 2009, the Chief Justice gave the keynote address at 
the New York State Bar Association Seasonal Meeting held in 
Singapore.91   He recounted a speech that he had heard as a law 
student by the then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew defending 
detention without trial and the abolition of the jury system.92    
Mr Lee’s primary message, as paraphrased by the Chief Justice,  
was that: 
“English law and English legal institutions are fine for 
England but not necessarily for Singapore because the 
political, social and cultural conditions are not the same.   
Adapt them for our needs, as blindly applied, they could be 
our undoing…   If you study the Singapore statute book 
 
 
86  ibid., 434. 
87  ibid., 438. 
88  The speech is unpublished but available at <http://pyxis.smu.edu.sg/subjects/ 
CrimeControlSpeechIndia(Final)24Nov06(4).pdf> accessed November  2012). 
89  ibid., [12].   In a separate speech, Mr Chan, then holding the office of Attorney-
General, posits this connection between the national economy and criminal law enforce-
ment:  “the effectiveness of the criminal justice system in maintaining law and order has 
become an important factor in attracting new investments to Singapore”:  (n.83), 32. 
90  (n.88), [13]. 
91  The text can be obtained from the website of the Supreme Court:  
<http://bit.ly/NYSBA-SG-09-Keynote> accessed November 20, 2012. 
92  Mr Lee’s speech, given in 1962, can be found at <http://bit.ly/SG-PM-1962-
law-speech> accessed November 20, 2012 (from Google cache).  
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today, you will find [Minister Mentor] Lee’s precepts and 
values reflected in all the laws.”93 
We get a glimpse of those “precepts and values” of Mr Lee from 
his 1990 address to the Singapore Academy of Law on the occasion of 
his appointment as the first honorary fellow.   He told his audience:94 
“The basic difference in our approach [to criminal justice] 
springs from our traditional Asian value system which  
places the interests of the community over and above that of 
the individual. 
“In English doctrine, the rights of the individual must be 
the paramount consideration.   We shook ourselves free from 
the confines of English norms which did not accord with 
customs and values of Singapore society. 
“In criminal law legislation, our priority is the security and 
well-being of law-abiding citizens rather than the rights of the 
criminal to be protected from incriminating evidence.” 
 
B.   Critique 
This section reflects on the claims made in the quotations above, and 
the assumptions on which they rest, both generally and in the context 
of wrongfully obtained evidence.   The controversial “Asian values” 
idiom has gone out of fashion.   In Phyllis Tan, the Chief Justice wisely 
refrained from speaking of “Asian values”.   He spoke instead of 
“national values on law and order”.   It is undoubtedly true that 
Singaporeans value law and order.   But so do everyone else, both in 
the East and in the West, in the North and in the South, including all 
of the foreign jurisdictions examined in Phyllis Tan.   We can be 
certain that the Chief Justice was not implying that the peoples of 
England, Australia and Canada do not care about law and order.    
His point presumably was that, compared to these “Western” 
societies, “we” in Singapore accord greater importance to law and 
order than to due process and civil liberties.95 
 
 
93  (n.91), [5].   See also Chan, (n.83), 30: 
“Mr Lee’s vision of how Singapore should be governed in the 
context of law and order has shaped the criminal justice system, its 
basic values, principles and objectives.   For this reason, our criminal 
justice system can be said to be truly autochthonous.” 
94  “Address by the Prime Minister, Mr Lee Kuan Yew” [1990] 2 Singapore 
Academy of Law Journal 155. 
95  But it should also be noted that it is not in Asia alone that there are (or have 
existed) criminal justice systems that allow (or have allowed) interests in “law and 
order” to prevail over the rights of accused persons.   Introduction of the 
exclusionary rule in Germany, Russia and Taiwan was driven by political movement 
towards greater transparency and accountability in government:  Margaret K Lewis, 
“Controlling Abuse to Maintain Control:  The Exclusionary Rule in China”  
(2011) 43 Journal of International Law and Politics 629, Pt II. 
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If “we” refers to the government, the statement is generally true 
so far as it goes.   It is true as a description.   But the government is 
not the nation.   The values of the nation cannot be equated with the 
values the government imposes via its laws.   In Singapore, support 
for the balance the criminal law has struck between our interests in 
law and order and our interests in due process and civil liberties is not 
as widespread as it is sometimes suggested.   Strong dissent is evident 
in views expressed by Professor Michael Hor96 and Mr Michael Hwang 
(a respected former president of the Singapore Law Society),97  
in parliamentary debates on criminal justice issues,98 on the pages of 
the newsletters of the Singapore Association of Criminal Lawyers, in 
the writing of the late Mr K. S. Rajah and others.99   In the public 
lecture that has already been referred to, the Chief Justice himself 
noted, and went on to argue against, a growing disquiet in some 
quarters about criminal evidence and procedure having become too 
“pro-prosecution”.100 
The balancing that is to be done in the administration of criminal 
justice is all too frequently formulated in terms of a tension between 
the interests of the community and the rights of individuals.   This is 
unhelpful.   Surely society as a whole has an interest in the state 
adhering to due process and respecting the rights of fellow citizens 
who are under investigation.101   Conversely, interest in the 
 
 
96  e.g., Michael Hor, “Change, Contestation and Conservatism in the Court of Appeal” 
in Yeo Tiong Min, Hans Tjio, Tang Hang Wu (eds), Developments in Singapore Law 
between 2006 and 2010:  Trends and Perspectives (Singapore Academy of Law 2011), 161-62, 
engaging the Court of Appeal in Tan Kiam Peng v. P. [2007] SGCA 38, 
[2008] 1 S.L.R.(R.) 1, especially [75], on the legitimacy of reversing the burden of 
proof through the use of legal presumption (see also P. v. Tan Kiam Peng 
[2006] SGHC 207, [2007] 1 S.L.R.(R.) 522, [16]). 
97  See, e.g., the speech he gave at the opening of the Legal Year 2008, reproduced in 
Singapore Law Gazette (February 2008), 1-2:  “What [is] disillusioning for our criminal 
practitioners is the perception that the basic structure of criminal procedure is 
unnecessarily weighted in favour of the prosecution, and does not give adequate 
consideration to the rights of the defendants.” 
98  e.g. (n.56). 
99  e.g. K. S. Rajah, “The Constitutional Right of Access to Counsel” Singapore Law 
Gazette (August 2002), 31. 
100  (n.85), 437:  The Attorney-General, as he then was, noted the worry in some quarters 
that “our criminal process [was] … tilted against the accused, and that its underlying 
common law traditions and values [were] being uprooted slowly but surely in favour 
of a model which [accepted] a high risk of the innocent accused being charged and 
convicted”.   However, he believed “that the concerns of the criminal bar and of the 
law teachers [were] exaggerated”.   In a separate speech, he attributed the general 
unhappiness of the criminal Bar with “some aspects of the system” to the fact that 
the “criminal justice system [was] seen by criminal lawyers as leaving little room for 
the factually guilty to squeeze through to escape conviction”:  Chan, (n.83), 36. 
101  As Mr Subhas Anandan, president of the Association of Criminal Lawyers, put it, 
“in protecting the rights of the community Parliament should not forget that  
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apprehension and conviction of criminals is held by individual 
members of the community.   It is just as misleading, if not worse, to 
depict the situation as a contest between the interests of law-abiding 
citizens and the interests of criminals.   A rational law-abiding citizen 
does not believe that she alone should abide by the law;  she believes 
that generally others should as well, including (indeed especially) law 
enforcement officers when wielding their considerable liberty-
infringing powers.   Law-abiding citizens would surely want the law to 
be correctly applied;  therefore, they would want innocent persons to 
be protected from wrongful conviction, and this gives them a reason 
to believe in due process.   It is distorting to frame the problem as 
one of “community needs versus individual rights” and wrong to 
suppose that an easy resolution is dictated by any official version of 
the “national” or “shared value” of “community over self”.102 
It is better to examine the problem substantively by identifying the 
matters that (ought to) concern all as members of a political 
community.   For the majority in Cheng Swee Tiang, it matters that 
citizens are “protected from illegal invasions of … liberties by the 
authorities”.   It also matters that “evidence bearing upon the 
commission of crime and necessary to enable justice to be done shall 
not be withheld from the courts on any merely technical ground”.    
It clearer and truer to state the competing interests in this way, as 
principles that bear at once community and individual dimensions.   
The proper accommodation or balancing of the competing 
considerations is a normative question with which the polity ought to 
engage in free and equal discussion;  it should not be left to be 
“determined by the ideological and social goals of the government of 
the day”.103   Some commentators in Singapore see signs of a more 
consultative approach being taken in the reform of criminal evidence 
and procedure, and of steps being taken towards leveling the playing 
field in criminal trials.104 
                                                                                                             
the rights of the accused are also a concern of the community”:  “ACLS and the  
CPC Bill”, (n.56), 10. 
102  See Singapore Government, Shared Values (White Paper, Cmd. 1 of 1991);   
Jon S.T. Quah (ed.), In Search of Singapore’s National Values (Institute of Policy Studies, 
Times Academic Press 1990);  and, for a highly critical perspective, see Neil A. Englehart, 
“Rights and Culture in the Asian Values Argument:  The Rise and Fall of Confucian 
Ethics in Singapore” (2000) 22 Human Rights Quarterly 548, 561-563 
103  Chan, “The Criminal Process” (n.85);  full quote at n.87. 
104  See Melanie Chng, “Modernising the Criminal Justice Framework – The Criminal 
Procedure Code 2010” (2011) 23 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 23.    
The Singapore Association of Criminal Lawyers has welcomed the recent intro-
duction of the criminal case disclosure procedure in the Criminal Procedure Code 2010, 
and expressed the hope that it “may herald a new dawn in criminal prosecutions in 
Singapore”:  (2010) 6(1) Pro Bono 1. 
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The approach taken by the majority judges in Cheng Swee Tiang to 
wrongfully obtained evidence has much to commend it.   They could 
have evaded, but did not evade, the difficulty of accommodating or 
balancing competing principles by taking either of two extreme 
positions:  it is as unwise to exclude evidence peremptorily once it is 
established to have been obtained by illegal means as it is never to 
exclude evidence however odious the misconduct in procuring it.   
While the law is clear and easy to apply if placed on either footing, 
clarity and predictability are not all there is to justice.   The majority 
judges preferred a particularistic approach, one that strikes the balance 
in each case as it comes along, taking full account of the context.   
The fear of this resulting in an arbitrary or capricious exercise of 
discretion is unfounded;105  as the High Court in Phyllis Tan itself noted, 
“Courts are used to evaluating competing interests all the time”.106   
As to how the discretion should be exercised, there is much 
experience in other countries that Singapore judges can draw upon.107 
A rich source of experience is accessible in the comparative 
literature.   The discretion to exclude illegally obtained evidence has 
been justified by courts and academics in other jurisdictions on 
different reasoning.   Exclusion has been defended, for instance, on 
the ground that the evidence may be unreliable;  that it deters similar 
illegal conduct by law enforcement officers in the future;  that it 
vindicates the suspect’s right to certain standards of treatment by the 
state and is the proper remedy for the breach of that right;  that it 
prevents the administration of justice from falling into disrepute;   
and that it is demanded by the need to preserve judicial integrity.108 
In Singapore, there was a tentative gesture towards the integrity 
principle only a few years before Phyllis Tan was decided.   In Wong 
Keng Leong Rayney v. Law Society of Singapore,109 V.K. Rajah J. (as he  
 
 
105  That has not been the experience in New Zealand which recently moved to a 
multi-factorial balancing approach:  Scott Optican, “The U.S. Exclusionary Rules:  
Lessons from New Zealand” [2011] J.C.C.L. 226, 248. 
106  (n.6), [46]. 
107  Factors considered relevant to the exercise of the discretion can be found in 
academic literature (for comparative discussion, see e.g. Ben Emerson,  
Andrew Ashworth, Alison Macdonald (eds), Human Rights and Criminal Justice  
(3rd edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2011), 641-644;;  Meng Heong Yeo, “The Discretion to  
Exclude Illegally and Improperly Obtained Evidence:  A Choice of Approaches” 
(1981) 13 Melbourne University Law Review 31, 46-52;  Optican, (n.105));  in judicial 
decisions (e.g. R. v. Shaheed [2002] 2 N.Z.L.R. 377 (New Zealand Court of Appeal)  
and R. v. Williams [2007] NZCA 52, [2007] 3 N.Z.L.R. 207, both cases discussed in 
Optican, (n.105));  and legislative provisions (e.g. Australian Evidence Act 1995, s.138(3), 
New Zealand Evidence Act 2006, s. 30(3)). 
108  For an overview of the enormous body of relevant literature, see Paul Roberts, 
Adrian Zuckerman (eds), Criminal Evidence (2nd edn, O.U.P. 2010), 179-91;   
Peter Mirfield, Silence, Confessions and Improperly Obtained Evidence (O.U.P. 1997), 6-33. 
109  [2006] SGHC 179, [2006] 4 S.L.R. 934. 
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then was) showed receptiveness to a general exclusionary discretion 
in these words:110 
“[A]ssuming I were unfettered by any authority, I would be 
persuaded that there will be particularly egregious instances of 
misconduct where the courts should reject evidence that has 
been procured in a manner that might be inimically repellent 
to the integrity of the administration of justice.” 
Unfortunately, the hope held out by this obiter dictum did not 
survive Phyllis Tan.   In the later case of Lee Chez Kee v. P.P.,111 Rajah 
J.A. found himself persuaded by the ruling in Phyllis Tan “that apart 
from the confines of the EA, there is no residual discretion to 
exclude evidence which is otherwise rendered legally relevant under 
the EA”.   And in Muhammad bin Kadar v. P.P.,112 the same judge, 
speaking for the Court of Appeal, held that there was no judicial 
power to exclude evidence “based only on facts indicating unfairness 
in the way [it] was obtained”;;113  hence, the serious failure of the 
investigating officer in that case to follow the prescribed procedure 
for taking a statement from the suspect did not of itself or directly 
provide a ground for its exclusion.114   However, the Court of Appeal 
held that procedural non-compliance could cast doubt on the 
reliability of the statement, and where this was so, the statement 
might be excluded if the prejudicial effect of admitting the evidence 
outweighed its probative value.   Under this approach, illegality may 
only be of indirect relevance to the exercise of the exclusionary 
discretion:  it is relevant only where it undermines sufficiently the 
probative value of the evidence.   While this is better than nothing, or 
the best to be had for the moment, and while the result is sometimes 
as good as having a “fairness” discretion, it does not go far enough.   
Highly probative evidence can be obtained by “particularly egregious 
… misconduct”, and when that happens, the discretion of the form 
exercised in Muhammad bin Kadar is toothless. 
 
 
110  ibid., [64].   The High Court in Phyllis Tan (n.6), [148], distanced itself from this 
remark of Rajah J. by observing that his “view was expressed without the benefit of 
hearing arguments about the effect of the EA and the separation of powers”. 
111  (n.39), [106]. 
112  ibid.  
113  ibid., [68]. 
114  In some earlier cases, statements taken by police officers were excluded by the 
court in the exercise of judicial discretion, and the exclusion appeared to have been 
grounded directly on findings of serious procedural irregularities on the part of the 
investigating officers:  e.g. P. v. Dahalan bin Ladaewa, (n.54), [77]-[86];  Kong Weng Chong v. P. 
[1993] SGCA 81, [1993] 3 S.L.R.(R.) 453, [27]-[28];  see also other cases cited in 
Muhammad bin Kadar v. P. (n.39), [54].   However, the exclusion in these cases were 
subsequently explained by the Court of Appeal in Muhammad bin Kadar (n.39), [53],  
as having rested on the different ground that the evidence was more prejudicial  
than probative. 
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IV.   CONCLUSION 
Singapore courts have recently disavowed the discretion to exclude 
evidence on the ground of its wrongful provenance.   It is said that 
the EA precludes judicial recognition of this discretion.   Both the 
conclusion and the reasoning on which it rests are contestable.    
The EA does not positively and clearly prevent the court from 
assuming an exclusionary discretion.   In fact, this much is accepted 
by the judiciary in Singapore insofar as it has vested itself with the 
power to exclude relevant evidence which is overly prejudicial.    
If the lack of express mandate in the EA does not prevent the court 
from taking on this discretion, neither should it prevent judges from 
recognising the discretion to exclude wrongfully obtained evidence.   
In most parts of the common law world, courts have assumed some 
power to prevent the prosecution from relying on such evidence.    
In denying itself of the same, the Singapore judiciary is taking a 
somewhat exceptional stance.   Larger considerations seem to be at 
play, considerations that accord priority to maintaining law and order 
and that attribute decisive weight to the interest in convicting the 
factually guilty.   Somewhere along the way, the countervailing 
“interest of the individual to be protected from illegal invasions of his 
liberties by the authorities” has lost the currency it once had.    
The balance of competing considerations was more wisely struck in 
Cheng Swee Tiang than in Phyllis Tan. 
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ABSTRACT 
This article examines the United Kingdom’s prohibition on the use of  
intercepted evidence in court proceedings.   It does so in light of  the 
Australian experience with using such evidence in terrorism trials.    
The different approaches taken in the United Kingdom and Australia to 
intercepted evidence have led to a significant difference in the strategies 
used to pre-empt terrorism.   In large part, Australia has relied upon a 
variety of  preparatory criminal offences, whilst the United Kingdom has 
relied upon civil executive orders, such as indefinite detention of  non-
citizens, control orders and, most recently, terrorism prevention and 
investigation measures.   The article argues that the grounds relied upon 
in the United Kingdom for prohibiting intercept evidence are not borne 
out by the Australian experience.   Further, the United Kingdom could 
reduce its controversial reliance upon civil executive orders and move back 
to a traditional criminal law approach by allowing the use of  intercept 
evidence in terrorism trials. 
 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
The common thread in post-9/11 anti-terrorism laws is an emphasis 
on pre-emption.1   Almost 3,000 people died in the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks;  202 in the October 2002 Bali attacks;  191 in the March 2004 
Madrid attacks;  and 52 in the July 2005 London attacks.   With these 
fatalities in mind, many jurisdictions have seen a shift over the last 
decade from the traditional reactionary approach of  the criminal law 
towards the pre-emption of  terrorism before it actually occurs.   
Government agents are empowered to intervene in the activities of  
terrorist organisations and individuals engaging in preparatory 
activities well before the commission of  a terrorist attack.   A logical 
 
 
*  Post-Doctoral Fellow, Australian Research Council Laureate Project, Gilbert + 
Tobin Centre of Public Law, University of New South Wales. 
†  Lecturer, Australian Research Council Laureate Project, Gilbert + Tobin Centre 
of Public Law, University of New South Wales. 
1  The pre-emptive focus of anti-terrorism laws has been examined in the 
Australian and UK contexts.   See Tamara Tulich, “A View Inside the Preventive 
State:  Reflections on a Decade of Anti-Terror Law” (2012) 21(1) Griffith Law 
Review 209;;  Lucia Zedner, “Fixing the Future? The Pre-emptive Turn in Criminal 
Justice”, in Bernadette McSherry, Alan Norrie and Simon Bronitt (eds), Regulating 
Deviance:  The Redirection of Criminalisation and the Futures of Criminal Law (Hart 
Publishing 2009), 35-58;  Lucia Zedner, Security (Routledge 2009), 72-87. 
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consequence of  this shift in approach has been to increase the 
significance of, and need for, intelligence-gathering.   The interception 
of  telecommunications is one of  the key tools used by law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies to gather information about 
potential terrorist activities at a very early stage in their planning. 
This article will examine the United Kingdom (“UK”) and 
Australian approaches to the interception of  telecommunications.   
For the purposes of  this article, “intercept” means the listening to, or 
recording of, communications, whether sounds, text or images, as 
they pass over a telecommunications system.   The UK and Australia 
each allow for the covert interception of  telecommunications for the 
purpose of  intelligence-gathering.   This obviously raises issues about 
the circumstances in which material may be intercepted, the 
categories of  material that may be intercepted, the need to respond to 
technological developments and the appropriate level of  judicial and 
other forms of  oversight.   However, much of  the recent debate in 
the UK has focused upon a different aspect of  the telecommuni-
cations interception regime – that is, the use to which intercepted 
material may be put.   The UK and Australia have starkly different 
approaches to the use of  intercepted material.   Australia permits the 
use of  telecommunications intercepts as evidence in court proceedings.   
The UK, on the other hand, is alone in the common law world in 
generally prohibiting the use of  intercept evidence. 
The problem with recent debates in the UK about whether to alter 
the status quo – to bring its approach to telecommunications 
interception into line with the rest of  the common law world – is that 
they have largely been conducted in the abstract.   This article seeks 
to remedy this deficiency by considering what light the Australian 
experience in the anti-terrorism context might shed on the issues 
involved.   To date, Australian authorities have charged 38 people 
with terrorism offences.   Twenty-five of  these have been convicted.2   
The Australian experience therefore provides us with an insight into 
the real, rather than imagined, advantages and disadvantages of  using 
intercept evidence in court proceedings. 
This article will commence with an overview of  the UK (Part II) 
and Australian (Part III) statutory regimes for the interception  
of  telecommunications.   It will concentrate, in particular, upon the 
extent to which material obtained through this method may be used 
as evidence in court proceedings. 
The principal argument made against the use of  intercept 
evidence in the UK is that it would not have any positive impact upon 
 
 
2  For a detailed overview of Australia’s terrorism prosecutions, see Nicola McGarrity, 
“‘Testing’ Our Counter-Terrorism Laws:  The Prosecution of Individuals for 
Terrorism Offences in Australia” (2010) 34(2) Criminal Law Journal 92. 
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terrorism prosecutions in the courts.   In other words, the use of  
intercept evidence would not increase the number of  convictions in 
the UK for terrorism offences.   Part IV will consider whether the 
Australian experience bears out this argument.   It will examine what 
role (if  any) intercept evidence has played in the conviction of  people 
for terrorism offences in Australia. 
Even if  the use of  intercept evidence in court proceedings would 
increase the number of  convictions for terrorism offences, this is not 
a complete answer to UK concerns about altering the status quo.    
The question whether to permit intercept evidence in a certain 
category of  case is a balancing act.   Any advantages of  using intercept 
evidence must be balanced against the disadvantages.   The UK has 
pointed to a number of  such perceived disadvantages and these  
– as well as whether they are borne out by the Australian experience – 
will be examined in Part V.   These disadvantages are:  impact on 
intelligence-gathering;  impact on law enforcement investigations;  
financial burden of  collating and transcribing intercept material;  
inaccessibility of  intercept material;  increasing the length of  
terrorism trials;  inability to keep pace with technological change;  
consistency with human rights (in particular, the right to a fair trial);  
and overuse of  interception warrants. 
 
II.   UK STATUTORY REGIME 
A.   The pre-1985 regime 
An unwritten power to intercept communications has been 
recognised in the UK for over 200 years.3   In 1951, the Secretary  
of  State laid down guidelines as to the circumstances in which he or 
she would issue warrants.   These guidelines stressed the exceptional 
nature of  interception.   For a warrant to be issued to the police in 
cases of  serious crime, the police had to demonstrate that normal 
methods of  investigation either had failed or were unlikely to succeed.4   
Two additional criteria had also to be satisfied for a warrant to be 
issued in cases involving a threat to national security.   Firstly, there 
“must be a major subversive or espionage activity that is likely to 
injure the national interest”.   Secondly, the “material likely to be 
obtained by interception must be of  direct use in compiling the 
information that is necessary to the Security Service in carrying out 
 
 
3  Privy Council, Report of the Committee of Privy Councillors appointed to inquire into the 
interception of communications (Cmnd 283, 1957), 5.   The origin of this power is unknown. 
4  ibid., 17, 18. 
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the tasks laid upon it by the state”.5   Intercepts could only be used as 
evidence in court proceedings “in the most exceptional cases”.6 
 
B.   The Interception of  Communications Act 1985 (UK) 
In Malone v. United Kingdom,7 the European Court of  Human Rights 
found that the interception of  telecommunications without a 
statutory foundation violated the individual’s right to respect for 
private and family life.   The UK Parliament therefore enacted the 
Interception of  Communications Act 1985 (UK) (“the 1985 Act”).   The 
purpose of  the 1985 Act was “to provide a clear statutory framework 
within which the interception of  communications on public systems 
will be authorised and controlled in a manner commanding public 
confidence”.8   In essence, the 1985 Act codified the previous unwritten 
law with respect to telecommunications interceptions.   It made it an 
offence to intercept communications except as authorised under a 
warrant issued by the Secretary of  State.9   Warrants could be issued in 
three situations:  (a) in the interests of  national security;  (b) to prevent 
or detect crime;  and (c) to safeguard the economic well-being of  the 
United Kingdom.10   The traditional rule that intercepted material 
could not be used as evidence in court proceedings was maintained.11   
The only exception was for proceedings before a tribunal empowered 
to investigate breaches of  the warrant regime.12 
 
C.   The Regulation of  Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (UK) 
The 1985 Act was replaced by the Regulation of  Investigatory Powers  
Act 2000 (“RIPA”).13   RIPA was enacted to take into account the vast 
changes that occurred in the telecommunications industry in the 
1990s, such as the growth of  the internet and mobile phone usage.14   
For the most part, RIPA replicated the provisions of  the 1985 Act.   
There was only one area of  significant divergence.   This related to 
the use of  intercept evidence in court proceedings. 
 
 
5  ibid., 18. 
6  ibid., 21.   In practice, such material was only used for investigatory purposes  
and not in criminal prosecutions:  UK Home Office, The Interception of Communications 
in Great Britain (Cmnd 7873, 1980), 5. 
7  [1984] ECHR 10, (1985) 7 E.H.R.R. 14. 
8  Home Office, The Interception of Communications in the United Kingdom (Cmnd 9438, 
1985), 4. 
9  Interception of Communications Act 1985 (UK), s.1(1). 
10  ibid., s.2(2). 
11  ibid., s.9. 
12  ibid., s.9(3). 
13  Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (UK), Sched 5. 
14   Home Office, Interception of Communications in the United Kingdom:  A Consultation Paper 
(Cm. 4368, 1999), 13-15. 
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RIPA provided for six situations in which intercepted evidence 
could be admitted in court.15   The first four might be described as a 
re-categorisation (rather than an expansion) of  the single exception in 
the 1985 Act.16   They each concerned matters arising out of  the use 
of  the interception regime, such as proceedings for breach of  the 
regime.   To conduct such proceedings effectively, it is obviously 
necessary for a certain amount of  intercept evidence to be used.   
There is no doubt, however, that the final two exceptions significantly 
expanded the scope for intercept evidence to be used in the UK in 
the anti-terrorism context. 
The first of  these exceptions was for proceedings before the 
Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission or arising out of  such 
proceedings.   The commission was established by the Terrorism Act 
2000 (UK) to hear appeals against refusals by the Secretary of  State 
to de-list terrorist organisations.17   The second exception was for any 
proceedings before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission or 
arising out of  those proceedings.   This commission was established 
by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 (UK) to hear 
appeals in a range of  immigration matters.   For example, under Part 
4 of  the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (UK), appeals 
could be brought before it against the indefinite detention of  
suspected international terrorists.   This indefinite detention regime 
was repealed in 2005.18 
Since 2000, a further four exceptions have been introduced.   Each 
of  these, like the final two exceptions in RIPA, has been justified by 
the need to protect national security, and applies only in the anti-
terrorism context.   First, control order proceedings.19   In 2005, the 
government introduced a new system of  control orders in the 
Prevention of  Terrorism Act 2005 (UK).   These orders could be issued 
 
 
15  Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (UK), s.18(1). 
16  Firstly, any proceedings for a relevant offence.   A “relevant offence” means an 
offence listed under s.18(12) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (UK).   
Secondly, any civil proceedings under s.11(8).   Section 11(8) makes it the duty of a person 
to give effect to a warrant enforceable by civil proceedings by the Secretary of State.   
Thirdly, any proceedings before the Tribunal.   Fourthly, any proceedings on  
an appeal or review for which provision is made by an order under s.67(8).    
Section 67(8) states: 
“Except to such extent as the Secretary of State may by order 
otherwise provide, determinations, awards, orders and other 
decisions of the Tribunal (including decisions as to whether they 
have jurisdiction) shall not be subject to appeal or be liable to be 
questioned in any court.” 
17  Terrorism Act 2000 (UK), s.5. 
18   Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (UK), s.16(2). 
19  ibid., Sched., para. 9(2). 
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by the Secretary of  State with the prior permission of  the court.20   
They aimed to prevent the subject of  the order from participating in 
terrorism-related activities by placing restrictions (such as a curfew) or 
obligations (such as reporting to the police at certain times of  the 
day) on him or her.21   The control order regime ceased to operate in 
December 2011.22   Secondly, financial restrictions proceedings under 
the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (UK).23   Thirdly, financial restrictions 
proceedings under the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010 (UK).24   
Finally, terrorism prevention and investigation measures (“TPIMs”) 
proceedings under the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures  
Act 2011 (UK).25   TPIMs replaced the old regime of  control orders.   
However, they have been criticised as being control orders “in all  
but name”.26 
The exceptions discussed above represent a significant – albeit 
piecemeal – expansion of  the circumstances in which intercept 
evidence may be used in civil proceedings.   They do not, however, 
have any impact on the use of  intercept evidence in criminal 
proceedings.   The blanket rule remains that intercept evidence may 
not be used in the prosecution of  a person for a terrorism offence.   
Or, more accurately, domestic intercept evidence may not be used.   
Intercept material collected by foreign agencies may be used as 
evidence in UK terrorism trials.27   This is not the only anachronism 
in the UK regime.   Another is that evidence collected from 
eavesdropping “bugs” installed in private vehicles or premises –  
 
 
20  The Secretary of State was required by s.3(1)(a) of the Prevention of Terrorism  
Act 2005 (UK) to apply to the court for permission to make a control order.   
However, s.3(1)(b) allowed the Secretary of State to issue a control order in urgent 
cases without the prior permission of the court, as long as he or she immediately 
referred the order back to the court:  ibid., s.3(1). 
21  ibid., s.1. 
22  The control order regime was subject to an annual sunset clause.   This clause 
was not renewed in 2011. 
23  The financial restrictions proceedings included any proceedings in relation to  
UN Terrorism Orders, Freezing Orders in Part 2 of ATCS Act and the Terrorist 
Financing and Money Laundering proceedings contained within Schedule 7 to the 
Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (UK):  Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (UK), s.63(1). 
24  The financial restrictions proceedings listed in s.28 of the Terrorist Asset-Freezing 
etc. Act 2010 (UK) included the appeal and review proceedings relating to the freezing 
of funds and economic resources to persons designated under the Act. 
25  Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (UK), Sched. 7, para. 4. 
26  The only differences between control orders and TPIMs are:  (1) TPIMs are based 
on a “reasonable belief” rather than “reasonable suspicion” standard;;  (2) the TPIM 
legislation sets out an exhaustive list of conditions that may be attached to a TPIM;  
and (3) TPIMs operate for two years and can only be renewed if there is evidence of 
new terrorism-related activities (whereas control orders operated for one year and 
could be renewed even without such evidence). 
27  Privy Council, Privy Council Review of Intercept as Evidence:  Report to the Prime Minister 
and the Home Secretary (Cm. 7324, 2008), 9. 
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as opposed to telecommunications interceptions – may be used in 
court proceedings.28   These anachronisms have prompted claims that 
the UK regime is internally inconsistent and should not be maintained.   
This is not, however, the focus of  this article.   Instead, this article 
takes each of  the UK’s arguments against the use of  intercept evidence 
at face value, and considers them in light of  the Australian experience.   
Before we engage in this task, the following section will highlight the 
main features of  the Australian statutory framework as it relates to 
both the collection and disclosure of  intercept material. 
 
III.   AUSTRALIAN STATUTORY REGIME 
The Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) (“the TIA 
Act”) regulates the interception of  communications in Australia.29    
In general, it is an offence to intercept another person’s 
communications.30   However, the TIA Act gives the Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation (“ASIO”) and law enforcement agencies the 
power to intercept telecommunications in three circumstances. 
 
A.   Warrantless intercepts 
An ASIO officer, or an officer of  a Commonwealth, state or territory 
law enforcement agency, may, of  their own initiative, intercept 
communications, if  three conditions are met.31   First, the non-
suspect party to the communication must consent to the interception.   
Secondly, there must be reasonable grounds for believing that the 
suspect party to the communication has:  (a) done an act that has 
resulted or may result in loss of  life or the infliction of  serious 
personal injury;  (b) threatened to kill or seriously injure another 
person or cause serious damage to property;  or (c) threatened to take 
his own life or to do an act that may endanger his or her own life or 
create a serious risk to his or her health or safety.   Finally, there must 
be an urgent need for the interception such that it is not reasonably 
practicable to apply for a warrant. 
 
 
 
28  Lord Lloyd of Berwick Q.C., Inquiry into Legislation against Terrorism (Cm. 3420, 
1996), 35-36. 
29  The relevant definitions are set out in s.5(1) of the Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Act 1979 (Cth).   A “communication” includes a conversation or a message 
whether in the form of sound (such as speech or music), data, text, visual images  
or signals.   A “telecommunications system” means any part of a system in Australia 
for carrying communications by means of guided or unguided electromagnetic energy 
(but not for carrying communications solely by means of radio-communication). 
30  ibid., s.7(1). 
31  ibid., s.7(4). 
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B.   ASIO warrants regime 
Applications by ASIO for a warrant to intercept telecommunications 
are determined by the Commonwealth Attorney-General.   A warrant 
may be issued where two criteria are met.32   The first criterion relates 
to the use of  the telecommunications service.   Prior to 2006, it was 
necessary for the service to, or to be likely to, be used (a) for purposes 
prejudicial to security or (b) by a person who is reasonably suspected 
of  engaging in activities prejudicial to security.   However, after the 
enactment of  the Telecommunications (Interception) Amendment Act 2006 
(Cth),33 limb (b) was expanded.   ASIO was no longer restricted to 
obtaining warrants in relation to suspects;  it was also able to obtain 
warrants in relation to non-suspects or “B-parties”.   A warrant may 
now be issued if  the telecommunications service is being, or is likely 
to be, used as the means by which a person receives or sends a 
communication from or to another person who is reasonably 
suspected of  being engaged in activities prejudicial to security.34    
The second criterion is that the interception is likely to assist ASIO in 
obtaining intelligence relevant to security.35   For “security reasons”, 
precise figures of  the occasions on which ASIO has sought warrants 
are not made publicly available.36 
 
C.   Law enforcement warrants regime 
Law enforcement agencies listed in the TIA Act (such as the 
Australian Federal Police (“AFP”)), and state agencies declared by 
regulation, may apply for a warrant to intercept telecommunications.37   
The circumstances in which such a warrant may be issued are 
significantly broader than for ASIO warrants.   This is unsurprising, 
 
 
32  ibid., s.9(1). 
33  Telecommunications (Interception) Amendment Act 2006 (Cth), Sched 2, item 1. 
34   Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth), s.9(1)(a)(i) and (ia).    
A “B-party” warrant may only be issued by the Attorney-General if he or she is 
satisfied that ASIO has exhausted all other practicable methods of identifying the 
telecommunications service used by the suspect or the interception of communi-
cations used by the suspect would not otherwise be possible:  ibid., s.9(3). 
35  ibid., s.9(1)(b) 
36   Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Annual Report 2009-2010 (2010), 
21.   The most recent Annual Report of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and 
Security states:  “Each year the office aims to inspect as many warrants and related 
documents as possible.   In 2009-10 this office examined 100% of the security 
intelligence warrants which were issued to ASIO. ... These inspections are thorough 
and go beyond simply ‘ticking off’ each warrant. ... Our inspections of warrant 
documents in this reporting period found that the quality of the warrant requests and 
other warrant related documentation which is presented to the Attorney-General was 
of a consistently high standard”:  ibid. 
37  Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth), s.5, definition of 
“enforcement agency”. 
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given that such warrants must be issued by an eligible judge or, since 
the mid-1990s,38 a nominated member of  the Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal (“AAT”).39 
Warrants may be sought in relation to the investigation of  “serious 
offences,” such as “an offence constituted by conduct involving an 
act or acts of  terrorism”.40   There are two types of  warrant that may 
be sought.   The first type is a “telecommunications service” 
warrant.41   This authorises the interception of  only one service, such 
as a single telephone number.   Usually, this service will be one used, 
or likely to be used, by a suspect.   However, as with the ASIO 
warrants regime, it was extended to include non-suspects in 2006.   
The second type of  warrant is a “named person” warrant.42   This 
authorises the interception of  any telecommunication services or 
devices that are likely to be used by the person named in the warrant.   
Before issuing either type of  warrant, the issuing authority must 
consider:  the privacy of  any person likely to be interfered with;  the 
gravity of  the offence;  how much the information likely to be 
obtained would assist the investigation;  the availability of  alternative 
methods of  investigation;  how much the use of  the methods would 
assist the investigation;  and how much the use of  such methods 
would prejudice the investigation (whether by reason of  delay or for 
any other reason).43 
 
D.   Use of  intercept evidence in court proceedings 
At first glance, the Australian approach to the use of  intercept 
evidence in court proceedings seems to mirror that of  the UK.   The 
general rule is that lawfully intercepted information may not be used 
as evidence in court proceedings.44   The difference between the 
Australian and UK approaches lies in the scope of  the exceptions to 
this general rule.   Section 74 of  the TIA Act provides that a person 
may give lawfully intercepted information (other than foreign 
intelligence information)45 in evidence in an “exempt proceeding”.   
The definition of  an “exempt proceeding” is broad and includes 
prosecutions for terrorism offences.46   As a consequence of  the 
 
 
38  Telecommunications (Interception) and Listening Device Amendment Act 1997 (Cth), 
Sched. 1, item 6. 
39  Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth), s.39(1). 
40  ibid., s.5D(1)(d). 
41  ibid., s.46. 
42  ibid., s.46A. 
43  ibid., ss.46(2) and 46A(2). 
44  ibid., s.63(1)(b). 
45  This is the reverse of the position in the UK (discussed above).  
46  The definition of an “exempt proceeding” is contained in s.5B of the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth).   See also the definition of a 
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Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment Act (No. 2) 2010 
(Cth), it also includes proceedings under, or relating to a matter 
arising under, Divisions 104 (control orders) and 105 (preventative 
detention orders) of  the Criminal Code.47 
 
IV. THE ROLE OF INTERCEPT EVIDENCE  
IN TERRORISM PROSECUTIONS 
In 2007, the UK Interception of  Communications Commissioner, Sir 
Swinton Thomas, stated that the “perceived advantage” of  using 
intercept evidence in court proceedings is outweighed by its negative 
effects for intelligence agencies, law enforcement agencies and the 
trial process.48   The commissioner did not explain what was meant by 
“perceived advantage”.   However, it is likely that he was referring to 
the potential for intercept evidence to increase the number of  
convictions for terrorism offences.   The main argument made by 
those in the UK who seek to maintain the status quo is that intercept 
evidence would secure only a modest increase in the conviction rate 
for general criminal offences;  in the anti-terrorism context, intercept 
evidence would not increase the conviction rate at all.49   This 
argument is premised upon an assumption that intercept material is 
of  relatively minor significance to the investigation of  terrorism 
offences.   For example, the then UK Secretary of  State, Charles 
Clarke, stated that the “intelligence and surveillance and the data we 
                                                                                                             
“prescribed offence” in s.5 (offences punishable by imprisonment for a maximum 
period of at least three years).   Information gathered by way of telecommunications 
intercepts may be used as evidence against individuals other than the suspect under 
surveillance.   Williams and Hume note that:  “[u]nder the TIA Act, the collected 
information can be used to initiate investigations or prosecutions against people 
entirely unrelated to the original suspect using information that under other laws 
would be protected from such use.   The non-suspect and other innocent parties run 
a real risk of being the subject of criminal investigation merely because they 
happened to talk to someone who was a suspect (or talked to someone who talked to 
a suspect)”:  David Hume, George Williams, “Who’s Listening?   Intercepting the 
Telephone Calls, Emails and SMS’s of Innocent People” (2006) 31(4) Alternative 
Law Journal 211, 212-213. 
47  Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth), subss 5B(bb) and (bc). 
48  Interception of Communications Commissioner, Report of the Interception of 
Communications Commissioner for 2005-2006 (2007), 11. 
49  Charles Clarke, Written Ministerial Statement 26 January 2005:  Interception of 
Communications, HC Deb, January 26, 2005, vol. 430, cols 18-19WS;  Oral Evidence of 
Charles Clarke, in Joint Committee on Human Rights, Prevention of Terrorism Bill (2004-05, 
HL 68, HC 334), Ev. 8;  Joint Committee on Human Rights, Counter-Terrorism Policy 
and Human Rights:  Prosecution and Pre-Charge Detention (2005-06, HL 240, HC 1576), 58;  
Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C., Operation Pathway:  Report Following Review (2009), 16;  
Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C., Fifth Report of the Independent Reviewer Pursuant to Section 
14(3) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (2010), 25. 
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get from that, particularly in relation to terrorism, relies often on 
individuals and agents, more so than intercept”.50 
The Australian experience in prosecuting suspected terrorists 
strongly contradicts this assumption.   In each of  Australia’s terrorism 
trials, intercept evidence has played a critical role.   The use of  
intercepts in the 2008 trial of  Benbrika and eleven other men before 
the Victorian Supreme Court is a good example.   In this case, the 
prosecution “relied to a large degree on 481 conversations which 
were covertly, but lawfully, recorded by use of  telephone intercepts 
and listening devices”.51   In summarising the prosecution’s closing 
address, Bongiorno J. stated: 
“Apart from putting an argument as to the importance of  the 
evidence of  the former co-accused, Izzydeen Atik, and of  
SIO39, an undercover police officer, and referring briefly to 
some of  the other largely uncontested evidence, the prose-
cutor relied almost entirely on the electronically intercepted 
statements of  the various accused.   Most of  these statements 
were made by the accused in the presence of  other accused, 
including Atik, and SIO39, but some of  them were made to 
other persons who were not alleged to be part of  the terrorist 
organisation which is central to the Crown case on most of  
the counts on the indictment.”52 
There are two primary reasons why intercept evidence plays such an 
important role in the prosecution of  terrorism offences.   The first 
relates to the definition of  a terrorist act.   One element of  the 
definition is that the action or threat of  action be done with the 
intention of  advancing a political, religious or ideological cause.53   
Normally, identification of  a defendant’s motive could only occur as a 
result of  cross-examination of  the defendant during trial or 
confessions made to investigating officials.54   However, in many of  
Australia’s terrorism trials, the defendant’s desire to pursue violence in 
the name of  Islam was apparent from the intercept evidence 
presented to the court.   For example, the motive of  Saney Aweys, 
one of  the defendants in the Operation Neath trial before the 
Victorian Supreme Court, was evident from comments such as  
the following:  “[s]traight away, after the conviction, one day later fires 
 
 
50  Oral Evidence by Charles Clarke, Prevention of Terrorism Bill (n.49), Ev 8. 
51  Benbrika & Ors v. R. [2010] VSCA 281, [7]. 
52  R. v. Benbrika & Ors (Ruling No 30) [2008] VSC 477, [2]. 
53  Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s.100.1(1). 
54  Peters v. R. (1998) 192 C.L.R. 493, 551 (Kirby J.):  “absent a comprehensive and 
reliable confession, it is usually impossible for the prosecution to get into the mind of 
the accused and to demonstrate exactly what it finds was there at the time of the 
criminal act”. 
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broke out in the country and all were happy … we say Allah bring the 
fitna [trouble] ...   Allah bring them calamity.”55 
The second reason why prosecutors have relied so heavily upon 
intercept evidence relates to the nature of  Australia’s terrorism offences.   
As noted in the introduction, the underlying purpose of  Australia’s 
anti-terrorism legislation is to pre-empt terrorist attacks.   With this 
aim in mind, the Australian Parliament provided for the proscription 
of  organisations,56 created offences for involvement with such an 
organisation57 and criminalised activities preparatory to the commission 
of  a terrorist act.58   This approach represents a significant deviation 
from the traditional criminal law.   In R. v. Lodhi,59 Spigelman C.J. 
(with whom McClellan C.J. at C.L. and Sully J. agreed) stated:   
“It was … the clear intention of  Parliament to create offences 
where an offender has not decided precisely what he or she 
intends to do.   A policy judgment has been made that the 
prevention of  terrorism requires criminal responsibility to 
arise at an earlier stage than is usually the case for other kinds 
of  criminal conduct, e.g. well before an agreement has been 
reached for a conspiracy charge.”60 
This approach is not unique to Australia.   Australia’s definition of  
terrorism “largely reproduced” the UK definition.61   Further, the UK 
provided for the proscription of  organisations and created terrorist 
organisation offences in 2000.62   It also criminalised preparatory acts 
in 2006.63 
The ability to use telecommunications intercepts in criminal pro-
ceedings has undoubtedly given Australian law enforcement agencies 
the ability to arrest people at a much earlier stage.   Intercept evidence 
 
 
55  Ian Munro, “Three guilty, two walk free over terror attack plan”, The Age 
(Melbourne, December 24, 2010). 
56  Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), Div. 102.   See also Charter of the United Nations  
Act 1945 (Cth), ss.20-21. 
57  Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), Div. 102. 
58  Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), Div. 101. 
59  Lodhi v. R. [2006] NSWCCA 121, (2006) 199 F.L.R. 303. 
60  ibid., [66]. 
61  Bills Digest to the Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill [No. 2] 2002 (Cth).   
The only difference between the UK and Australian cause elements is that the former 
refers to actions done or threats made “for the purpose of” advancing the cause and 
the latter to actions done or threats made “with the intention of” advancing the 
cause.   The Bills Digest states:  “Whether this disparity reflects a difference in 
operation or a difference in drafting style is unclear.   Arguably both simply point to 
the motivation behind the conduct.   It is significant that the focus on motivation,  
in addition to ordinary criminal intention, may cause problems in criminal trials”.    
See also Kent Roach, “The Post-9/11 Migration of Britain’s Terrorism Act 2000”, in 
Sujit Choudhry (ed.), The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (CUP 2006), 386-389. 
62  Terrorism Act 2000 (UK), Pt II. 
63  Terrorism Act 2006 (UK), s.5. 
J.C.C.L. Listening and Hearings 269 
 
© 2012 Association of Commonwealth Criminal Lawyers and contributors. 
means that individuals may be prosecuted not only for their physical 
acts but also on the basis of  discussions they might have had about 
preparations to commit a terrorist act.   The significance of  intercept 
evidence to the conviction of  terrorists is clearly demonstrated by the 
aforementioned trial of  Aweys and four other men.   The most 
damning evidence against the three convicted men was a conversation 
in which Aweys requested permission from a Somali sheikh for 
“them” to engage in a terrorist attack on an Australian army base.   
There was also physical surveillance of  a visit by one of  the other 
convicted men, Wissam Fattal, to Holsworthy Army Barracks in Sydney.   
However, the purpose of  this visit would have been unclear  
without the admission of  Aweys’ conversation into evidence.64    
The Australian experience therefore undermines the UK assumption 
that the admission of  intercept evidence would not lead to increased 
conviction rates for terrorist suspects.  
The UK argument is further undermined by an examination  
of  the use of  intercept evidence as part of  the control order and 
TPIM regimes.   As discussed above, intercept evidence may be used 
in such proceedings.   Control orders were issued in relation to 52 
persons in the UK under the Prevention of  Terrorism Act 2005.65    
Nine notices imposing TPIMs are currently in force.66   However, 
both Clarke and the former Independent Reviewer of  Terrorism 
Legislation, Lord Carlile of  Berriew, have argued that the ability to 
use intercept evidence in criminal proceedings would not have led to 
the conviction of  any of  the people subject to a control order.67   
This argument is counter-intuitive.   There is no reason in principle 
why intercept evidence that is admitted in a control order proceeding 
could not also be used as a tool for securing a criminal conviction. 
Clarke and Carlile’s argument can only be sustained if  intercept 
evidence has never been successfully relied upon in control order 
proceedings.   It is difficult (if  not impossible) to determine the extent 
to which intercept evidence has been so relied upon.   Most of   
the evidence presented during control order proceedings is “closed”,  
that is, both the type and content of  the evidence is subject to strict  
non-disclosure requirements.68   However, the Interception of  
Communications Commissioner has said that “[t]he interception of  
 
 
64  AAP, “Terror accused Wissam Mahmoud Fattal seen at army base”, Herald Sun 
(Melbourne, September 14, 2010);  Andrea Petrie, “18 years’ jail for army terror-
attack plan”, Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney, December 16, 2011). 
65  David Anderson Q.C., Control Orders in 2011:  Final Report of the Independent Reviewer 
on the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (2012), 4. 
66  HC Deb, September 7, 2012, vol. 549, col. 38WS. 
67  Charles Clarke (n.49), cols 18-19WS;  Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C., Fifth Report (n.49), 25. 
68  For a discussion of this issue, see Adam Tomkins, “National Security and the 
Due Process of Law” (2011) Current Legal Problems 1. 
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communications continues to play a vital role in the battle against … 
terrorism currently being fought by the UK’s law enforcement and 
security agencies”.69   This suggests that a significant part of  the 
“closed” material in control order proceedings is likely to have been 
intercept evidence. 
The logical consequence of  the UK’s prohibition on the use of  
intercept evidence in court proceedings is to force government agents 
to rely upon control order or TPIM, rather than criminal, proceedings.   
In contrast to the 52 control orders and nine TPIMs in the UK,  
only two control orders have been issued in Australia to date.    
Joseph “Jihad Jack” Thomas was convicted in February 2006 of  
receiving funds from a terrorist organisation and possessing a falsified 
passport.   The Victorian Court of  Appeal quashed the conviction on 
the basis that admissions made by Thomas had not been voluntary.   
A control order was issued in August 2006.   In August 2007,  
an agreement was reached that another control order would not be 
sought and, in return, Thomas would abide by conditions identical to 
those contained in the control order until the conclusion of  his retrial.   
At his second trial, Thomas was convicted of  only the passport 
offence and was released with time served.   David Hicks, one of  two 
Australians detained at Guantanamo Bay, pleaded guilty before a 
United States military commission to providing support to terrorism.   
In April 2007, he was transferred to an Australian jail to serve the 
remaining nine months of  his sentence.   Upon his release in 
December 2007, a control order was issued.   This order expired  
a year later and was not renewed. 
This statistical comparison of  the UK and Australia reveals that 
the latter has predominantly relied upon criminal prosecutions rather 
than control order proceedings to pre-empt the threat of  terrorism.   
The strong likelihood is that the UK, if  it were to repeal or relax the 
prohibition on the use of  intercept evidence, could similarly return to 
a traditional criminal law approach in the anti-terrorism context. 
 
V.   NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF  
THE USE OF INTERCEPT EVIDENCE 
A.   Impact on the intelligence-gathering process 
In the UK, the Security Service (“MI5”) is the lead agency in the 
interception of  communications.70   MI5 is responsible for 
“protecting the UK against threats to national security from 
 
 
69  Interception of Communications Commissioner, 2010 Annual Report of the 
Interception of Communications Commissioner (2011), 55. 
70  Interception of Communications Commissioner, Report of the Interception of 
Communications Commissioner for 2009 (2010), 14. 
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espionage, terrorism and sabotage, from the activities of  agents of  
foreign powers, and from actions intended to overthrow or undermine 
parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means.”71   
To this end, MI5 collects and assesses intelligence regarding national 
security threats to the UK.   The argument has been made that if  
intercept material were disclosed in court proceedings, it would put at 
risk the “sensitive techniques and capabilities” of  MI5 and reveal  
the identity of  its agents to terrorists.72   This would seriously 
undermine MI5’s ability to conduct effective terrorism investigations 
in the future.73   However, the UK Home Affairs Select Committee 
concluded in January 2010 that “[o]ther states have adopted the use 
of  intercept evidence without compromising the work of  their 
security agencies so it is clear that a way can be found without 
impacting on security services too adversely”.74 
The Australian experience demonstrates that the nature of  
intercept evidence is such that it will only rarely have the potential to 
prejudice the activities of  intelligence agencies.   Intercept evidence in 
a terrorism trial will most often consist of  conversations between the 
defendant and his or her co-accused or between the defendant and 
another private citizen.   The most likely issues to arise out of  such 
evidence are the attribution of  the conversation and the interpretation 
that should be placed upon it.75   As to the former, the intercepting 
agency may be required to provide additional information about  
the time, location and circumstances in which the conversation  
was intercepted.   However, such information is highly unlikely  
to reveal anything about the “sensitive techniques and capabilities”  
of  intelligence agencies. 
There are only two categories of  intercept evidence that might 
conceivably prejudice the activities of  intelligence agencies.    
Where such evidence is sought to be presented to the court, there  
are various tools at hand to minimise any such prejudice.   Given this, 
to prohibit the use of  intercept evidence altogether, would be  
“to throw the baby out with the bathwater”. 
The first situation is where the parties to the intercepted 
conversation are the defendant and an undercover officer.    
The defendant’s right to a fair trial may require that the officer make 
 
 
71  MI5, “What We Do” <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/what-we-do.html> 
accessed November 20, 2012. 
72  Privy Council (n.27) 19-20;  Oral Evidence of Charles Clarke, Prevention of 
Terrorism Bill (n.49), Ev. 8;  Interception of Communications Commissioner (n.48) 11;  
Home Office (n.14), 23. 
73  Privy Council (n.27), 19. 
74  House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, The Home Office’s Response  
to Terrorist Attacks (HC 2009-10, 117-I), 17. 
75  Interception of Communications Commissioner (n.48), 11. 
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himself  or herself  available for cross-examination.   To do so would 
involve the officer revealing his or her identity.   This is particularly 
problematic if  the intercepting agency is ASIO;  it is an offence to 
disclose the identity of  an ASIO officer.76   In this situation, there are 
three main options available to the intercepting agency.   First, the 
agency could argue that the information is protected by public 
interest immunity.77   However, if  the intercepted conversation is of  
central importance to the prosecution case, this may not be an option.   
A successful claim of  public interest immunity means that the 
intercepted communication may not be admitted as evidence in  
court proceedings.   In this respect, it is a “blunt instrument”.78    
Secondly, the agency could rely upon the National Security Information 
(Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth) (“NSIA”).   The NSIA 
sets out a process to determine how evidence that may prejudice 
national security should be dealt with.   The court may, for example, 
be closed to the public or evidence may be admitted in a summary 
form, redacted or as a statement of  facts that the evidence  
would establish.   This regime is, however, rarely utilised. 
The aforementioned trial of  Aweys and four other men reveals  
a third option.   In this case, one of  the defendants sought to make 
out an argument that he had been entrapped by an undercover officer 
into making violent statements.   The trial judge accepted that the 
defendant was entitled to cross-examine the officer.   To protect the 
interests of  the intercepting agency, the officer gave evidence via 
video-link and his identity was revealed to the minimum number of  
people possible.   Only the judge, jury and defence and prosecution 
counsel were permitted to view the screens;; the officer’s identity was 
kept hidden from the defendants, the public and even the solicitors.79 
The second situation is where the intercepted conversation 
includes information about a current investigation.   This information 
may well be excluded on the ground that it is irrelevant to the current 
proceedings.   However, even if  the information is relevant, the court 
may still grant a public interest immunity claim made by the agency 
conducting the investigation.   Such a claim may seek to exclude the 
conversation in its entirety or, alternatively, to redact the offending 
material from the audio and written versions of  the conversation. 
 
 
 
76  Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth), s.92. 
77  As it exists at common law or as codified in the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth).  
78  Australian Law Reform Commission, Keeping Secrets:  The Protection of Classified and 
Security Sensitive Information, (ALRC 98, 2004), para. 8.209. 
79 Emma O’Sullivan, “Undercover officer gives evidence at terror trials”, ABC News 
(Sep 23, 2010) <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2010-09-22/undercover-officer-gives-
evidence-at-terror-trial/2269988> accessed November 20, 2012. 
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B.   Impact on law enforcement investigations 
MI5 is currently prepared to share intercepted material with law 
enforcement agencies.   This enables law enforcement agencies to 
conduct more effective investigations into criminal activities.   
However, this cooperation takes place on the assumption that the 
material will not be used as evidence in court.   If  there were the 
potential for intercept evidence to be disclosed in court proceedings, 
it is a distinct possibility that MI5 might refuse to share intercepted 
material.   The Privy Council has said that “[s]uch a reduction in 
cooperation could have a profound impact on law enforcement 
agencies’ ability to combat serious crime and terrorism in the UK.”80 
The opaque nature of  intelligence agencies makes it difficult  
to assess any potential impact on the willingness of  agencies to  
share information resulting from telecommunications intercepts.   
However, in Australia, there has been no obvious adverse impact.   
Indeed, in Australia, investigations into terrorism offences are 
generally conducted by a number of  different intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies working cooperatively.   For example, a 2004 to 
2005 investigation that resulted in the arrest, and ultimately the 
conviction, of  nine Sydney men was a joint investigation of  the  
New South Wales Police Force, the Australian Federal Police,  
New South Wales Crime Commission and ASIO.81   Further, ASIO 
frequently shares its intelligence with law enforcement agencies.    
In 2002, Dennis Richardson, the Director-General of  ASIO, gave 
evidence to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee 
that “[w]e do share information with the AFP and state police, and 
that is under agreed protocols.”82 
 
C.   Financial burden of  collating and transcribing intercept material 
The use of  intercept evidence would impose a significant burden  
on the human and financial resources of  MI5 by requiring the 
collation and transcription of  huge quantities of  intercepted material.83   
 
 
80  Privy Council (n.27) 19. 
81  New South Wales Government, “Timeline of Events – Operation Hammerli / 
Pendennis Eden” <http://bit.ly/Hammerli-Pendennis-Eden> accessed November 20, 2012. 
82  Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Australian Parliament, 
Parliamentary Debates (November 12, 2002), L&C 5. 
83  Oral Evidence of Charles Clarke, in Joint Committee on Human Rights, 
Counter Terrorism Policy and Human Rights:  Terrorism Bill and Related Matters Oral Evidence, 
(2005-06, HL 75-II, HC 561-II), Ev. 14;  Home Office, Intercept as Evidence:  A Report 
(Cm. 7760, 2009), 7;  Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C., Fifth Report (n.49), 25;  
Interception of Communications Commissioner (n.48), 11.   This organisation 
currently has a staff of about 3,800 persons (MI5, “Staff” <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/ 
output/staff-and-management.html> accessed November 20, 2012) and an annual 
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The Interception of  Communications Commissioner offered an 
example of  the potential monetary costs of  transcription: 
“In a recent case a court felt it had to order that 16,000 hours 
of  eavesdropping (not intercept) material must be transcribed 
at the request of  the defence.   I believe that the cost was of  
the order of  £1.9 million.   The work and cost in intercept 
cases would be very great indeed, and quite disproportionate 
to any perceived advantage.”84 
The allocation of  MI5 employees to the task of  collation and 
transcription would take away from the primary function of  this 
organisation, namely, to protect the UK from terrorist and other 
security threats.   This was highlighted by the Interception of  
Communications Commissioner in his 2005-2006 Annual Report: 
“The workload for the intelligence and law enforcement 
agencies in preserving and presenting intercept product as 
evidence would be very severe indeed, and very expensive, 
and would distract them from the work which they should  
be doing, and also from the work they are actually doing,  
so greatly reducing as opposed to increasing the value of   
the intercept.”85 
The Australian experience bears out the argument that the burden  
of  collating and transcribing intercept material is a significant one.    
For example, in the Operation Hammerli trial before the New South 
Wales Supreme Court, 127,000 conversations were intercepted.    
Of  these, 30,000 were included in the brief  of  evidence and 448 calls 
were ultimately played to the jury.86   However, the burden does not 
necessarily justify a blanket ban on intercept evidence.   This is for 
two reasons.   First, a large proportion of  the burden of  collating and 
transcribing intercept material would fall upon an intercepting agency 
regardless of  the admission of  intercept evidence in court proceedings.   
Transcription is necessary in order for the intercepting agency to keep 
track of  an investigation and to identify other persons and avenues 
which should be investigated.87   As has already been discussed, MI5 
often briefs law enforcement agencies and prosecutors about any 
intercepted material.   It would be fair to assume that, in the course 
                                                                                                             
budget of 2.1 billion pounds (MI5, “Funding” <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/ 
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84  Interception of Communications Commissioner (n.48) 11. 
85  ibid. 
86  Christopher Craigie, “Management of Lengthy and Complex Counter-Terrorism 
Trials:  An Australian Prosecutor’s Perspective” (AIJA Criminal Justice in Australia 
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87 MI5, “Day in the Life” <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/careers/working-at-mi5/day-
in-the-life.aspx?id=131> accessed November 20, 2012. 
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of  these briefings, careful notes (if  not full transcriptions) of  the 
intercepted material are provided.   Secondly, practices have emerged 
in the Australian context whereby the burden on the intercepting 
agency is reduced.   Only those conversations that are included in the 
prosecution brief  of  evidence are transcribed in full.   The remaining 
conversations are provided on CDs, generally with a brief  summary 
of  the conversation made in real-time by the intercepting officer.    
It is for the defence to obtain transcriptions of  these conversations  
as they see fit.   Given the limited resources of  the defence, this 
situation may not be ideal.   However, it does have the effect of  
distributing the burden of  collating and transcribing intercept 
material between the intercepting agency and the defence.88 
 
D.   Accessibility of  intercept material 
The accessibility of  intercept evidence has also been questioned.   
The Interception of  Communications Commissioner claims that:   
“Criminals and terrorists do not speak in a language which is 
readily comprehensible to juries, even if  their native language 
is English.   Many conversations are in foreign languages  
or slang.   In those that are not, they use their own particular 
language.”89 
This means that interpreters would often be required at trial or, at the 
very least, to provide translations of  the material for the jury to follow.   
This is problematic because “interpreters and translators very rarely 
agree upon the meaning of  anything, and there is never any difficulty 
in finding one interpreter who will disagree with another.”90   
However, interpreters are frequently used at other stages of  the 
criminal process, such as during the arrest, interviewing and charging 
of  terrorist suspects who speak little or no English.   At trial,  
they may be used where the defendant or another person with poor 
English skills gives evidence.   Furthermore, in order for intelligence 
agencies to use intercept evidence effectively in the intelligence-
gathering process, it will be necessary for them to have any 
conversations in a foreign language translated.91 
In Australia, the courts have found a relatively easy means of  
getting around this language difficulty by providing English transcripts 
of  each conversation to the jury.   This also serves the purpose of  
giving the jury a reference point where the sound quality of  a 
particular audio recording is poor.   These transcripts are generally 
 
 
88  This information has been obtained from counsel involved in Australia’s 
terrorist trials. 
89  Interception of Communications Commissioner (n.48), 11. 
90  ibid. 
91 “Day in the Life” (n.87). 
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agreed between the parties.   However, if  there is a disagreement,  
the transcript will either use the word in its original language  
(for example, “jihad”) or make a note of  the two competing translations.   
Witnesses will then give evidence at trial as to which of  the 
translations they believe to be correct.   It must be kept in mind that 
it is the audio recording of  a conversation which is the evidence, and 
the transcript is merely an aid.   Therefore, in addition to providing 
the jury with a transcript, any recordings in English will be played 
onto the court record.   If  the recording is in a foreign language, the 
English translation will be read onto the court record by a barrister 
briefed for this purpose.92 
There is a further reason (albeit not given much attention in the UK) 
why intercepted material might be regarded as inaccessible for juries.   
As the Operation Pendennis trial demonstrates, there are often a 
massive number of  intercepted conversations put before the jury.    
To assist juries in navigating through the many telecommunications 
intercepts, a tool that has been used is the provision of  charts 
summarising the conversations to the jury.   These charts set out full 
particulars of  the conversations, the participants in them and the  
date and time they occurred.   It is not permissible to include  
summaries of  the contents of  these conversations as that would be 
“conclusionary or argumentative”.93 
 
E.   Impact on length of  terrorism trial 
The complicated nature of  terrorism offences, and the often circum-
stantial evidence making up the prosecution case, means that terrorism 
trials will inevitably be longer than most other criminal proceedings.   
The UK Interception of  Communications Commissioner said that 
“[a]dmitting intercept evidence would take a very long time, and 
would greatly increase the length of  already over-long trials and the 
expense involved.”94   However, the longest Australian terrorism trial 
was 10 months with an additional month of  jury deliberations.95   
This is shorter than the longest trial in the UK.   Even without the 
use of  intercept evidence, the trial of  seven defendants in the UK 
“fertiliser plot” case lasted over a year.96   Therefore, the argument 
 
 
92  Christopher Craigie (n.86). 
93  R. v. Benbrika & ors (Ruling No. 11) [2007] VSC 580 [18], [32].    
94  Interception of Communications Commissioner (n.48), 11. 
95  James Madden, “Sydney Terror Case Legal Costs Hit a High at $9m”,  
The Australian (Sydney, October 17, 2009).   There was also an additional eight 
months of pre-trial argument. 
96  “The Fertiliser Plot”, in Crown Prosecution Service, “The Counter-Terrorism 
Division of the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) - cases concluded in 2007” 
<http://bit.ly/CPS-CTD-2007> accessed November 20, 2012. 
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that the admission of  intercept evidence would automatically result in 
lengthier terrorism trials simply cannot be sustained. 
The main reason why opponents argue that intercept evidence 
would result in longer trials is because defence counsel “would impose 
exhaustive demands on the prosecution and courts in an attempt to 
ascertain the very details of  the methodology about how a mobile 
phone call is intercepted”.97   This has not, however, proven to be the 
case in Australia.   The Australian courts have developed techniques 
for minimising time-wasting.   In many terrorism trials, extensive pre-
trial conferences have been held between the parties to sort out, by 
consent, as many evidentiary issues as possible.   It is only if  an 
agreement cannot be reached about attribution, interpretation and the 
inadmissible parts of  an intercept that the court will need to hear 
argument and resolve the matter.   In relation to voice attribution,  
the Commonwealth Director of  Public Prosecutions has explained 
the usual approach: 
“[I]t was assumed that, unless otherwise informed, voice 
attribution in the intercepted conversations would not be 
challenged.   In the absence of  formal admissions and with 
the strong support of  the trial judge in each case, these 
assumptions provided a much needed framework for the 
more efficient conduct of  these proceedings and helped to 
render manageable what could very easily have become 
unduly lengthy and unmanageable trial proceedings.”98 
In contrast to the UK’s approach, common sense suggests that the 
admission of  intercept evidence may actually have the effect of  
decreasing the length of  terrorism trials.   This is for two reasons.   
First, most categories of  evidence require a witness to appear in court.   
For example, human surveillance requires the officer to give evidence 
as to the movements of  the defendants and to answer any questions 
in cross-examination.   In contrast, intercept evidence generally 
speaks for itself  (except in cases where an interpreter is required).   
Second, the use of  intercept evidence may in fact remove the  
need for a trial to be held.   This is because “the weight of   
evidence obtained through telecommunications interception results in 
defendants entering guilty pleas, thereby obviating the need for the 
information to be introduced into evidence”.99 
 
 
 
97  Arthur Hayes, “UK Counter Terrorism and Electronic Intercept Evidence”,  
The Heptagon Post (London, June 17, 2011). 
98  Christopher Craigie (n.86). 
99  Attorney-General’s Department, Australian Government, Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Act 1979:  Report for the Year Ending 30 June 2011 (2011), 47. 
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F.   Keeping pace with technological change 
The UK has argued that any new legislative scheme permitting the 
use of  intercept evidence would be made redundant by the speed of  
technological change.100   In evidence submitted to the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights, the Home Office stated that in its 
study on the use of  intercept material as evidence, it found that “new 
technology would make evidential use more, not less, difficult to 
achieve, not least because of  the inherent complexity and diversity of  
IP communications and the potential difficulties in accrediting the 
interception systems involved to an evidential standard.”101   There is 
no doubt that it is difficult for both governments, in enacting 
interception legislation, and intercepting agencies, in applying for and 
carrying out warrants under this legislation, to keep pace with 
technological change.   This includes the development of  new 
methods of  communication (for example, instant messages, which are 
currently not covered by the TIA Act) as well as technologies for 
detecting interception devices.   However, this does not bear out the 
UK’s argument.   These are difficulties already faced by governments 
and intercepting agencies.   They do not affect the admission of  
intercept material into evidence. 
 
G.   Consistency with human rights 
The objection has been raised in the UK that the admission of  
intercept evidence would violate the right to a fair trial in Article 6 of  
the European Convention on Human Rights.   The former Home 
Secretary, Alan Johnson M.P., stated: 
“This testing has demonstrated that the model, if  fully  
funded … would not be legally viable, in that it would  
not ensure continued fairness at court.   This has been 
confirmed by a recent European Court of  Human Rights case 
(Natunen v. Finland).   The result would be to damage rather 
than enhance our ability to bring terrorists and other serious 
criminals to justice.”102 
Three points should be made in response to this.   First, many 
European countries permit the use of  intercept evidence in court 
 
 
100  Oral Evidence of Charles Clarke, Prevention of Terrorism Bill (n.49), Ev. 8;   
Joint Committee on Human Rights (n.49), 59;  Oral Evidence of Tony McNulty M.P.,  
in Joint Committee on Human Rights, Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights:   
28 Days, Intercept and Post-Charge Questioning (2006-07, HL 157, HC 394), Ev. 33. 
101  Joint Committee on Human Rights (n.49), 59. 
102  House of Commons Written Ministerial Statements, “Intercept as Evidence” 
(December 10, 2009), referring to Natunen v. Finland [2009] ECHR 2066,  
(2009) 49 E.H.R.R. 32. 
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proceedings.103   Secondly, there is nothing in either the terms of  the 
European Convention or the judicial interpretation of  this document 
to suggest that it would be an infringement of  human rights simply to 
admit intercept evidence.   Rather, the jurisprudence suggests that 
there may be human rights issues with certain types of  intercept 
evidence, for example, intercept evidence obtained illegally.104   
Thirdly, the European Court in Natunen105 found that there had been 
a breach of  the right to a fair trial because of  the destruction of  
intercepted material prior to Mr Natunen’s trial on drug trafficking 
charges.   This made it extremely difficult (if  not impossible) for 
Mr Natunen to have his claim of  innocence verified.106   The real 
issue that this case raises is not whether the admission of  intercept 
evidence is consistent with the European Convention; but rather 
whether the failure to disclose this evidence to the defence violates 
the “equality of  arms” principle. 
The above quotation suggests that it would be impossible to 
design a model for admitting intercept evidence in court proceedings 
that complied with this principle.   This is because of  the purported 
need to keep intercepted information – which may contain infor-
mation about the operations of  MI5 or information which may 
present a risk to national security if  disclosed – secret from the public 
and especially the defence.   As argued above, intercept evidence will 
only rarely contain information that should not be disclosed.   In any 
event, the UK has already developed techniques in the control order 
context, such as the requirement that a person should be provided 
with the “gist” of  the case against them107 and the provision for 
special advocates,108 to protect the right to a fair trial as well as 
national security. 
It is difficult to compare the Australian and UK experiences in 
relation to this issue.   This is because Australia does not have either a 
statutory or constitutional charter of  rights.   While the High Court 
of  Australia has recognised that there are rights deriving from the 
separation of  powers in the Australian Constitution (for example,  
to be free from punitive detention except as a result of  a judicial  
 
 
103  See, for example, France, Netherlands, Ireland and Spain:  Privy Council (n.27), 31-35. 
104  Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, “Decision on the Defence 
‘Objection to Intercept Evidence’” (October 3, 2003) (International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia). 
105  (n.102.) 
106  ibid., [18]. 
107  Secretary of State for the Home Department v. A.F. (No. 3);  Same v. A.N.;  Same v. A.E. 
[2009] UKHL 28, [2010] 2 A.C. 269. 
108  Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (UK), Sched., para. 7. 
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finding of  criminal guilt),109 the obligations imposed on the UK  
by the European Convention on Human Rights are significantly  
more rigorous.   The only aspect of  the intercept regime which  
has been the subject of  constitutional challenge in Australia is the  
National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth).   
In Lodhi v. R.,110 the New South Wales Court of  Criminal Appeal held 
that the requirement in section 31(8) that the court must give greater 
weight to the risk to national security than the defendant’s right to a 
fair trial was constitutional. 
 
H.   Overuse of  telecommunications intercepts 
In the interest of  comprehensiveness, there is one further argument 
that might be made against the use of  intercept evidence.    
This argument has not, however, been explored in any detail in  
the UK.   This argument is that admitting intercept evidence may 
result in the overuse of  intercept warrants.   The consequence is that 
the individual’s right to privacy would be disproportionately infringed.   
There is some evidence to bear this argument out in the  
Australian context.   In the 2010/2011 financial year, applications 
were made for 3,495 interception warrants in Australia.111   It is worth 
noting that, despite Canada’s population being more than one and a 
half  times that of  Australia, there were only 397 telecommunications 
intercepts in that jurisdiction in the same period.112 
However, two points should be made.   First, Canada, like 
Australia, allows for intercept material to be used as evidence in 
terrorism proceedings.   Therefore, even if  the interception power is 
being overused in Australia, it is unlikely that the admissibility of  
intercept evidence is to blame for this phenomenon.   Secondly, only 
a small proportion of  the intercept warrants issued in Australia were 
for the investigation of  terrorism offences (104).   In contrast, 1,222 
were for drug offences.113   This contrasts sharply with ASIO’s 
comments about the number of  counter-terrorism investigations in 
which it is involved.   In May 2011, the Director-General of  ASIO 
stated that:  “[E]ach year ASIO responds to literally thousands of  
counter-terrorism leads … we are currently involved in several hundred 
counter-terrorism investigations and inquiries.”114   A comparison of  
 
 
109  The Hon. Michael McHugh, “Does Chapter III of the Constitution Protect 
Substantive as Well as Procedural Rights?” (2001-2002) Bar News:  The Journal of 
the New South Wales Bar Association 34. 
110  (n.59.) 
111  Attorney-General’s Department, Australian Government (n.99), 18. 
112  Public Safety Canada, Canadian Government, “Annual Report on the Use of 
Electronic Surveillance” (2010), 12.    
113  Attorney-General’s Department (n.111), 36. 
114  ibid. 
J.C.C.L. Listening and Hearings 281 
 
© 2012 Association of Commonwealth Criminal Lawyers and contributors. 
the number of  interception warrants sought with the number of  
counter-terrorism investigations in which ASIO is involved suggests 
that far from overusing these warrants, ASIO is, in fact, exercising 
considerable restraint in this field. 
 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
This article commenced by making the claim that Australia and the 
UK have taken a pre-emptive approach to countering terrorism in the 
decade since 9/11.   However, the UK’s prohibition on the use of  
intercept evidence has, in practice, led to quite different pre-emptive 
strategies being adopted in Australia and the UK.   Australia has,  
with only a couple of  exceptions, relied upon traditional criminal 
prosecutions to pre-empt the threat of  terrorism.   Intercept evidence 
has been relied upon heavily by the prosecution in these cases.    
The Commonwealth Director of  Public Prosecutions, Chris Craigie S.C., 
has stated: 
“I should note the importance that telephone-intercept and 
listening device evidence plays in many of  our large CT 
prosecutions.   The product of  intercepts under warrants  
is admissible in Australian courts.   We have used such 
material for many years, most significantly in major drug 
importation cases and to great effect.   Our state and territory 
counterparts are also very experienced in their value at trial.   
Similarly in CT prosecutions it can and has provided 
extremely persuasive evidence of  the guilt of  the alleged 
offenders and in our two most recent multi accused trials in 
Victoria and New South Wales, such evidence was the 
essential core of  the Crown case.”115 
In contrast, in the UK, considerably more control orders have been 
made and TPIMs imposed.   This is in large part because the 
prohibition on the use of  intercept evidence often makes criminal 
prosecutions unsustainable.   Therefore, the UK has been forced to 
resort to executive detention and civil orders to prevent suspected 
terrorists from carrying out attacks. 
There are, of  course, normative concerns about Australia’s reliance 
on preparatory offences that capture conduct well in advance of  the 
commission of  a terrorist act.   In particular, such offences might be 
regarded as involving the criminalisation of  talk or even thought.   
However, it is nevertheless preferable for persons to be prosecuted 
for criminal offences than to be made the subject of  civil orders 
imposing serious restrictions upon their liberty.   Control orders are 
“a second-best solution”.116   As Lynch and Williams point out: 
 
 
115  Christopher Craigie (n.86). 
116  David Anderson Q.C. (n.65), 31. 
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“[Control orders and preventative detention orders] illustrate 
the tension in employing the law as a tool of  preventive policy.   
They challenge the traditional purpose of  legal regulation.   
Under neither order is there a need for a person to have been 
found guilty of, or even be suspected of  committing a crime.   
Yet both orders enable significant restrictions on individual 
liberty.   This is more than a breach of  the old ‘innocent until 
proven guilty’ maxim:  it ignores the notion of  guilt 
altogether.”117 
The criminal trial process carries with it safeguards that the process 
for issuing preventative orders lacks.   These safeguards include:   
the presumption of  innocence;  the criminal standard of  proof  
(beyond reasonable doubt);  the right to silence;  and the privilege 
against self-incrimination. 
The Australian experience, as discussed in this article, also 
undermines the UK’s argument that the disclosure of  intercepted 
material in court proceedings would have adverse consequences on 
both investigations and the trial process.   Australian interception 
agencies have not identified any such consequences.   Nor has there 
been any suggestion in Australia that the use of  intercepted material 
has reduced the willingness of  intelligence agencies to share 
information with law enforcement agencies and prosecutors.    
The Australian system has managed to overcome a range of   
practical problems, such as language issues or the vast quantity of  
material created by intercepting agencies, with practical responses.   
These include the use of  interpreters and written aids, such as charts, 
in the courtroom, and by sharing the burden of  transcription between 
the State and the defence.   Australia has also attempted to find a 
middle ground between the protection of  national security, including 
the secrecy of  the techniques by which intelligence agencies gather 
material, and the defendant’s right to a fair trial. 
These factors, as well as the clear advantages of  criminal over 
executive proceedings, provide a strong case for the UK to abandon 
its prohibition on the use of  intercept evidence.   At the very least, 
the UK should allow such evidence to be used in terrorism-related 
prosecutions. 
 
 
 
117  Andrew Lynch and George Williams, What Price Security? Taking Stock of Australia’s 
Anti-Terror Laws (UNSW Press 2006), 42. 
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ABSTRACT 
In the common law world trial by jury has a totemic position.    
In many countries, including the jurisdictions under consideration, it is 
perceived to be the norm for criminal trials.   However, trial by jury is 
repeatedly undermined:  characterised as arbitrary and susceptible to bias 
and intimidation.   That process is all the more acute in the context of 
counter-terrorism where limitations on jury trial have become common 
even in states where there is a general commitment to the criminal jury.   
This article will examine the retrenchment of trial by jury for cases of 
suspected terrorism in Ireland and New Zealand.   It will compare  
the legal histories and legislative provisions to determine if any discernible 
pattern emerges common to both jurisdictions – particularly focusing  
on a blurring of the distinction between gang crime and terrorism.    
The potential for this to impact on the wider viability of the institution  
of trial by jury will be considered.  
 
 
The right to trial by jury enjoys an exalted place within the pantheon 
of human rights.   It is often (wrongly) said to be derived from the 
Magna Carta.1   Blackstone declared it to be the bulwark of liberty;2  
Devlin stated that: 
“The first object of any tyrant … would be to make 
parliament utterly subservient to his will;  and the next to 
overthrow or diminish trial by jury, for no tyrant could afford 
to leave a subject’s freedom in the hands of twelve of his 
countrymen.   So that trial by jury is more than an instrument 
of justice and more than one wheel of the constitution:  it is 
the lamp that shows that freedom lives.”3 
 
 
*  Senior Lecturer in law and member of the Australian Research Council Laureate 
Fellowship:  Anti-terror laws and democracy project, at the Gilbert + Tobin Centre 
of Public Law, University of New South Wales.   The author is grateful for the input of:  
Dr Vicky Conway, University of Kent;  Dr Shane Kilcommins, University College 
Cork;  and Professor George Williams and the staff of the Gilbert + Tobin Centre.   
He is also indebted to the anonymous reviewers and the editorial team of the JCCL. 
1  Penny Darbyshire, “The Lamp That Shows That Freedom Lives – is it worth  
the candle?” [1991] Crim.L.R. 740, 742. 
2  William Rodolph (W.R.) Cornish, The Jury (Allen Lane 1968), 126. 
3  Sir Patrick Devlin, Trial by Jury (Methuen 1966) 164. 
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To emphasise the hallowed position of the jury, a number of 
countries have recently adopted or re-adopted trial by jury for 
criminal trials.4   Despite this apparently totemic status, the jury is 
something of a legal enigma.   The European sociologist Max Weber 
struggled with the inherent irrationality of jury trial.   On the one 
hand, the emergence of trial by jury signified a departure from 
“charismatic legal revelation – from law prophet – to something  
more rational”;;  on the other, the jury retains the power arbitrarily to 
disregard the law.5   That arbitrariness has led some to describe trial 
by jury as “Khadi justice”.6   Others, adopting a more measured tone, 
present jury trial as “an anti-democratic, irrational and haphazard 
legislator”.7   In addition to such criticisms, research has identified 
some apparent structural problems with trial by jury.   In particular, 
evidence has emerged suggesting that juries fail to comprehend 
complex and complicated evidence,8 and concerns persist about the 
potential for juror bias to undermine the right to a fair trial.9   
Combined, these concerns contribute to a general undermining of the 
institution of trial by jury. 
Counter-terrorism provides a particularly difficult context for trial 
by jury, and Ireland and New Zealand are not alone in their partial 
rejection of jury trial in that situation.   The United States has 
employed jury trial in a number of high profile terrorism cases, but 
policy makers seem to feel that the creation of a regime of exception 
at Guantánamo Bay precludes jury trial from playing an active role in 
that context.10   Kent Roach has argued that the avoidance of 
ordinary criminal trial processes (including jury trial) in the case of 
 
 
4  For example, variations of trial by jury have been adopted in Argentina,  
Japan, Russia and Spain:  Gregory W. O’Reilly, “Opening up Argentina’s courts” 
(1997) 80(5) Judicature 237;;  Robert M. Bloom, “Jury trials in Japan”  
(Boston College Law School research paper no. 66, 2005), 3, <http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=688185> accessed November 5, 2012;   
Stephen C. Thaman, “Europe’s New Jury Systems: the cases of Spain and Russia”  
(1999) 62(3) Law and Contemporary Problems, 233-259. 
5  Paul Walton, “Max Weber’s Sociology of Law: a Critique”, in Peter Hamilton (ed.) 
Max Weber:  Critical Assessments 1 (Routledge 1991) 287, 293-94. 
6  Julius Paul, “Jerome Frank’s Views on Trial by Jury” (1957) 22 Missouri  
Law Review 28, 36. 
7  Darbyshire (n.1), 750. 
8  Roger Matthews, Lynn Hancock, Daniel Briggs, Jurors’ Perceptions, Understanding, 
Confidence and Satisfaction in the Jury System: a Study in Six Courts, Home office Online 
Report 05/04 (2004) <http://library.npia.police.uk/docs/hordsolr/rdsolr0504.pdf> 
accessed September 11, 2012. 
9  Laura McGowan, “Trial by Jury:  Still a Lamp in the Dark?” (2005) 69 Journal of 
Criminal Law 518. 
10  Fiona de Londras, “Guantánamo Bay, the Rise of the Courts and the Revenge of 
Politics” in David Jenkins, Anders Henriksen, Amanda Jacobsen (eds), The Long Decade:  
How 9/11 has Changed the Law (forthcoming, Oxford University Press 2012) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1968127> accessed November 5, 2012. 
J.C.C.L. Trial by Jury, Terrorism and Gangs 285 
 
© 2012 Association of Commonwealth Criminal Lawyers and contributors. 
Khalid Sheik Mohammed is a “symbolic rejection of criminal justice 
norms”.11   In Northern Ireland, the United Kingdom government 
abandoned jury trial for terrorism cases as far back as 1973.12    
Even countries that have adopted the jury system fairly recently  
have seen fit to restrict access to jury trial for terrorism suspects.    
Russia readopted jury trial in 1991 as part of wider attempts to 
humanize the legal system in the post-Soviet era.13   However, by 2008, 
the legislation providing for jury trial had been amended to exclude 
terrorism cases.14   This internationally observable trend away from 
jury trial in cases of suspected terrorism provides the context for the 
retrenchment of jury trial in Ireland and New Zealand.    The 
experiences of terrorism and counter-terrorism in Ireland and New 
Zealand are very different, and the history of non-jury trial for 
subversive or terrorist cases is significantly longer in Ireland.   
However, despite the differences, there is a discernible pattern 
common to both jurisdictions.   In particular, that pattern has 
involved a blurring of the distinction between gang-related and 
terrorist offences, and an attendant attempt to reduce access to trial 
by jury for both kinds of cases. 
This article will seek to establish the existence of such a pattern 
and examine its implications for the right to trial by jury.   This will be 
of particular interest to Ireland and New Zealand, but there is 
potential for other jurisdictions to draw lessons from these experiences.   
The article will begin by justifying the selection of Ireland and New 
Zealand as comparator countries.   It will then outline the legislative 
measures limiting the right to trial by jury in those jurisdictions.    
The commonalities of legislative approaches will be explored.    
The broader socio-legal justifications which have been advanced to 
limit the right, and the general context within which the right exists in 
both states, will be identified.   The potential of these measures for a 
broader impact on the right to trial by jury in the two jurisdictions  
will be considered.   Ultimately, the article will discuss whether there 
is anything that the experience of Ireland and New Zealand can teach 
each other and add to our understanding of the role of the jury in the 
criminal justice system. 
 
 
 
11  Kent Roach, “The Criminal Law and its Less Restrained Alternatives” in  
Victor V. Ramraj, Michael Hor, Kent Roach, George Williams (eds),  
Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy (Cambridge University Press 2012) 91-121, 108. 
12  Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973. 
13  Stephen C. Thaman, “The Nullification of the Russian Jury:  Lessons for  
Jury-Inspired Reform in Eurasia and Beyond” (1997) 40 Cornell International  
Law Journal 355, 357 
14  Federal Law 321 – FZ on Amendments of Legislative Acts Concerning 
Counterterrorism, adopted December 30, 2008. 
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I.   SAINTS, SCHOLARS AND LONG WHITE CLOUDS  
The comparator countries 
Ireland and New Zealand make ideal 
comparators.   The two states are English-
speaking, and have a shared history of British 
imperial rule.   This past has influenced the 
legal system of both states, which have 
adopted the common law legal tradition – 
including a general commitment to trial by jury.   
Furthermore, both states have supplemented 
the common law with Bills of Rights;   
and the right to trial by jury is given some  
level of protection within both legal systems.15    
The jury is the norm for serious criminal trials, 
and deviation from it the exception  
(the relevant provisions in both states will  
be analysed, post).   Thus, from a legal culture 
point of view, the jury occupies a central 
position in both states. 
It has been argued that population size and 
dispersal are relevant to discussion about trial 
by jury, because it is more feasible to maintain 
jury anonymity in “a vast country with a huge 
population such as the United States”, whereas 
“the small and dispersed nature of Irish society 
means that the risk of jury-tampering and 
intimidation will remain a significant one”.16   
The populations of both states are similar, as 
Table 1 (left) outlines.17 
There are acknowledged population 
differences.   Population density is not similar 
 
 
15  Bunreacht na hÉireann (Constitution of Ireland),  
Art. 38.5;  Juries Act 1981 (New Zealand);  Neil Cameron,  
Susan Potter, Warren Young, “The New Zealand Jury”  
(1999) 62(2) Law and Contemporary Problems 103. 
16  Report of the Committee to Review the Offences Against the 
State Acts, 1939-1998 and Related Matters (Hederman Report) 
(Government Publications 2002), para.9.29 <http://bit.ly/ 
IE-Hederman-Report> accessed 5 November 2012. 
17  The figures for Ireland’s population, population density and urban agglomeration 
for this table are at <http://bit.ly/UNdata-IE>;  comparable figures for New Zealand 
are at <http://bit.ly/UNdata-NZ> accessed November 5, 2012;  the figures for rural 
population are derived from the United Nations Department of Economic and  
Social Affairs, World Urbanization Prospects:  the 2009 Revision <http://esa.un.org/ 
unpd/wup/index.htm> accessed November 5, 2012. 
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and, despite being more densely populated, Ireland has a larger rural 
population than New Zealand.   Population density may have 
potential consequences for jury anonymity and thus contribute to jury 
intimidation, though it has not been possible to quantify that risk. 
The similarities between the two states provide some basis for 
comparison, but there are significant differences which will allow for 
potentially fruitful discussion.   On the face of it, both states have a 
significant history of anti-terrorism legislation, but this is only true in 
the sense that both states have a history of legislating against terrorism.18   
Ireland has a long history of domestic terrorism and insurgence – the 
Irish Free State was born out of a war of independence fought using 
guerrilla tactics19 – and Ireland has repeatedly employed exceptional 
powers since independence in 1921.   The activities of the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA) throughout the 1920s and ’30s generated 
draconian responses from the government of the Irish Free State and, 
after the adoption of the 1937 Constitution, terrorist activity remained 
a significant threat to the stability of the state – most notably during 
“the Troubles”, the period of violence between 1969 and 1996 
associated with political violence in Northern Ireland.   The history of 
anti-terrorism in New Zealand was more pre-emptory – being 
predominantly influenced by concerns regarding anticipated external 
terrorism such as hostage taking and aeroplane hijacking, rather than an 
existent domestic threat, or a threat to New Zealand interests abroad.   
Thus, although New Zealand has had anti-terror measures on the 
statute books since 1956, it arguably did not experience terrorism until 
the mid-1980s:  the first terrorist incident in New Zealand was the 1985 
sinking of the Rainbow Warrior in Auckland Harbour;  and this was 
followed in 1987 by the attempted hijacking of an Air New Zealand 
plane in Fiji, following a coup d’état there.   So both states have a history 
of anti-terrorism legislation, although Ireland has had significantly 
greater experience of enforcing those measures.   The different 
justifications for promulgation of these measures as well as the 
different context within which they operated help to explain the 
 
 
18  This record of legislating against terrorism can be contrasted with, for example, 
Australia.   Prior to September, 2001, Australia did not have any general anti-
terrorism powers, but it did have legislation criminalising specific acts that could 
amount to terrorism – such as the Crimes (Aviation) Act 1991 (Cth), Pt 2, dealing with 
offences relating to the hijacking of aircraft.   George Williams calculates that  
there have been 54 pieces of anti-terrorism legislation in Australia since 2001.   
George Williams, “A Decade of Australian Anti-Terror Laws” (2011) 35 Melbourne 
University Law Review, 1136.   For a history of terrorism laws in Australia, see  
Jenny Hocking, Terror Laws:  ASIO, Counter-Terrorism and the Threat to Democracy 
(UNSW Press 2003). 
19  See Michael Hopkison, The Irish War of Independence (McGill-Queens University 
Press 2004);  or, for a firsthand account, Tom Barry, Guerilla days in Ireland:  a firsthand 
account of the Black and Tan war (1919-1921) (Devin-Adair Co. 1956). 
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apparently different focus:  Irish measures, including restriction on trial 
by jury, were focused on the detention or prosecution of terrorist 
offenders;  in New Zealand the focus was on security and intelligence 
measures and the prohibition of hijacking and hostage taking. 
In recent years, Ireland has experienced something of a shift in the 
focus of its criminal justice system, towards what might best be 
described as a criminal control model.20   The focus is no longer 
directed towards terrorism but towards organised criminal gangs.21   
In that context, the seamless transition in Ireland from non-jury  
trial for subversive offences towards non-jury trial for gang-related  
activity can be contrasted with New Zealand.   As will be discussed, 
one of the justifications for the introduction of the New Zealand  
Crimes Amendment Act (No. 2) 2008 – which allows for non-jury trial – 
was the potential for jury intimidation in gang-related cases.22   
Terrorism was not a primary motivation for the introduction of  
non-jury trial in New Zealand;  however, as we shall see, the  
first use of those provisions arose in the context of terrorism.    
These developments provide an almost mirror image of each other, 
and are worthy of discussion on that basis alone. 
 
II.   ERODING THE RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL 
The history of trial by jury in the common law world can be traced 
back to King Henry II of England (1154-1189).   At that time parties 
to land disputes were given the option of resolving their disputes 
through a judicial duel or having the matter determined by a jury of 
twelve knights.23   Early juries were selected not for their impartiality 
but because of their local knowledge as an “evidentiary and 
investigative rather than a decision making body”.24   Given the view 
of the jury as the “bulwark of liberty”25 which later emerged, it is 
noteworthy that early juries were susceptible to pressure and 
intimidation from the Crown and the judiciary.26   By the mid-
 
 
20  Vicky Conway, Michael Mulqueen, “The 2009 Anti-Gangland package:   
Ireland’s new security blanket?” (2009) 19(4) Irish Criminal Law Journal 106. 
21  Patrick A. McInerney, “Do we need a Jury? – Composition and Function of  
the Jury and the Trend Away from Jury Trials in Serious Criminal Cases”  
(2009) 19(1) Irish Criminal Law Journal 9. 
22  As debated in the context of a proposed Criminal Procedure Bill:  Judith Collins 
M.P., N.Z. Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) June 29, 2004, vol. 618, 14223. 
23  Ann Lyons, Constitutional History of the United Kingdom (Cavendish 2003), 33. 
24  ibid.   For a broad-ranging exposition of the history of jury trial – and especially 
of the jury as an investigative body – see Peter Lowe, “Challenges for the Jury System 
and a Fair Trial in the Twenty-First Century” [2011] J.C.C.L. 175, 178-180. 
25  Cornish (n.2), 126. 
26  ibid., 128-29. 
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nineteenth century, something approximating the modern jury had 
emerged, and Alexis de Tocqueville declared that: 
“Using juries for the suppression of crime appears to me the 
introduction of a predominantly republican institution into 
government … The jury may be aristocratic or democratic 
according to the class which supplies the juries, but it always 
retains a republican character in that it entrusts the actual 
control of society into the hands of the ruled, or some of 
them, rather than into those of the rulers.”27 
In the rhetoric of Lord Devlin the jury is idealised as a “little 
parliament”.28   Despite the chequered history of the institution, the 
beguiling rhetoric of Blackstone, de Tocqueville and Devlin has held 
sway over the popular imagination and, where it has been employed, 
trial by jury has secured an exalted position for itself.  
 
A.   Trial by jury in Ireland  
There is insufficient scope within this article to consider the history 
of coercive anti-terror legislation in Ireland29 – for example, between 
the Act of Union 1801 and 1882, there were 57 special Acts of the 
United Kingdom Parliament aimed at addressing disaffection in 
Ireland.30   There is not even sufficient space to outline the history of 
non-jury trial in Ireland.31   However, before we can begin an 
examination of the Irish legislative provisions we must first take 
account of some key points.   Following a protracted war of 
independence with Great Britain, the Irish Free State emerged in 1921 
as a Dominion of the British Empire with the same constitutional 
status as the Dominion of Canada.32   The Irish Free State was not 
universally popular, and the new state faced an immediate existential 
threat in the form of civil war between “Free Staters” who supported 
the Anglo-Irish Treaty, and “Die-hards” who opposed anything less 
than a full republic.33   At this point, “there was no state and 
organized forces.   The provisional government was simply eight 
young men in the City Hall standing amidst the ruins of one 
administration, with the foundations of another not yet laid, and with 
 
 
27  Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America and two essays on America, (Gerald E. 
Bevan trans., Penguin Books 2003), 317-18. 
28  Devlin (n.3), 164. 
29  See Lewis Perry Curtis, Coercion and Conciliation in Ireland, 1880-1892:   
a Study in Conservative Unionism (Princeton University Press 1963). 
30  Dorothy Macardle, The Irish Republic (Corgi Books 1968), 49. 
31 For a detailed examination of these issues, see Fergal F. Davis, The History and 
Development of the Special Criminal Court 1922-2005 (Four Courts Press 2007). 
32  <http://www.nationalarchives.ie/topics/anglo_irish/dfaexhib2.html> accessed 
November 5, 2012. 
33  J.J. Lee, Ireland 1912-1985:  Politics and Society (Cambridge University Press 1989), 56-69. 
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wild men screaming through the keyhole”.34   In response to the chaos, 
the Provisional Government brutally suppressed the opposition of 
their former comrades.35 
Despite the tumultuous background, the Constitution of the Irish  
Free State was an incredibly liberal document – in the mode of the 
Constitution of the Weimar Republic.36   Although the British authorities had 
regularly employed martial law and special trial processes and the 
Provisional Government had resorted to execution by executive act, 
Article 70 of the Constitution of the Irish Free State expressly provided that 
“extraordinary courts shall not be established”.37   Although the 
adoption of such liberal principles may have been commendable, it left 
the Constitution of the Irish Free State incapable of resisting the continuing 
threat posed by republican paramilitaries in the 1920s and 1930s.   On 
July 10, 1927, Kevin O’Higgins, Vice-President, Minister for Justice and 
lead negotiator for the Irish Free State delegation at the Imperial Con-
ference of 1926, was assassinated by the IRA on his way to church.38   
The government response was to introduce the Public Safety Act 1927 
which provided for non-jury trial.   The fact that this provision clearly 
contravened Article 70 of the Constitution was resolved by section 3 
of the Act which provided that any provisions of the Act which were 
repugnant to the Constitution should operate as amendments to that 
Constitution – a quite extraordinary measure!   The special court 
anticipated by the Public Safety Act 1927 was never actually established.   
However, it provided a template for the later non-jury court,  
which was a more express amendment to the Constitution of the Irish 
Free State – Article 2A.   This emergency court operated from 1931 
through to 1937.39   These models of non-jury trial were influential 
upon the drafting of the later Offences Against the State Act 1939. 
In 1937, the Irish state adopted a new constitution by plebiscite.   
This constitution, Bunreacht na hÉireann, the Constitution of Ireland, 
expunged all references to the British Crown – more significantly, for 
our purposes, it created a new constitutional regime for trial by jury.   
Article 38.5 provides that a criminal trial shall be conducted before  
a jury;  Article 38.2 allows that minor offences may be tried by courts 
of summary jurisdiction (which is understood to mean a court 
without a jury).   Unlike Article 70 of the Constitution of the Irish Free 
State, Article 38.3 specifically allows for the creation of special courts, 
 
 
34  Tom Garvin, 1922:  the Birth of Irish Democracy (St. Martin’s Press 1966), 94, citing 
Kevin O’Higgins. 
35  Davis (n.31), 34-39. 
36  Leo Kohn, The Constitution of the Irish Free State (Allen & Unwin 1932). 
37  Constitution of the Irish Free State, Art. 70 <http://www.ucc.ie/celt/online/ 
E900003-004/> accessed November 5, 2012. 
38  Davis (n.31), 39. 
39  ibid. 
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when the “ordinary courts are inadequate to secure the effective 
administration of justice”.40   With the demise of the that Constitution, 
the military tribunal created by Article 2A ceased to function, but, 
despite constitutional authorisation for the creation of special courts 
by Article 38.5, and to the consternation of the civil servants in the 
Ministry for Justice, no legislation was brought forward to provide for 
the creation of such courts until 1939.41   The immediate impetus for 
legislative action was both local and geo-political.   The IRA engaged 
in a bombing campaign on mainland Britain in the summer of 1939.42   
They purported to exercise the foreign policy of the state and 
declared war on Britain in the name of the state.43   Moreover, 
employing the old adage that “my enemy’s enemy is my friend”, the 
IRA were seeking support for their campaign from Nazi Germany.44   
The Irish government feared that such actions would imperil their 
desired policy of neutrality in any European war and would provoke  
a British invasion.   Despite a lengthy history of anti-terrorism 
measures, the Irish government legislated in haste – the result was the 
Offences Against the State Act 1939 which, in essence, gave legislative 
effect to the constitutional provisions contained in Article 38.5. 
Part V of the Offences Against the State Act 1939 provides for the 
creation of Special Criminal Courts – recycling a title which had first 
been employed in the Public Safety Act 1927.   Under the terms of the 
Act, the government must issue a proclamation, declaring the 
ordinary courts to be inadequate, in order to bring Part V into 
effect.45   Such a proclamation was made in 1939 and continued in 
force even after the end of the “emergency” associated with World 
War II.46   In fact, when the Special Criminal Court was re-constituted 
in 1961 in response to a cross-border campaign of violence by the 
IRA, the government simply announced that the Special Criminal 
Court was to start hearing cases again – there was no need for 
another proclamation.47   A further proclamation was issued in 1972 
when the court was re-established to deal with cases emanating from 
the “troubles” in Northern Ireland.48   The court continues to function 
until the present day, despite the Northern Irish peace process and a 
significant reduction in terrorist violence on the island of Ireland. 
 
 
40  Bunreacht na hÉireann (Constitution of Ireland), Art. 38.3. 
41  Davis (n.31), 64. 
42  Tim Pat Coogan, De Valera:  Long Fellow, Long Shadow (Random House 1993), 
p.523. 
43  Davis (n.31), 63. 
44  Joseph T. Carroll, Ireland in the War Years (David and Charles 1975), p.61. 
45  Offences Against the State Act 1939, s.35. 
46  Davis (n.31), 71-96. 
47  John Bowyer Bell, The Secret Army:  the IRA (Transaction Publisher 1997), p.333. 
48  Davis (n.31), 131-132. 
292 Journal of Commonwealth Criminal Law [2012] 
 
© 2012 Association of Commonwealth Criminal Lawyers and contributors. 
The Special Criminal Court is a distinct and separate court in the 
Irish criminal justice system – it operates when the ordinary courts are 
deemed inadequate.   To be appointed to sit on the Special Criminal 
Court one must be a “judge of the High Court or the Circuit Court, 
or a justice of the District Court, or a barrister of not less than seven 
years standing, or a solicitor of not less than seven years standing, or 
an officer of the Defence Forces not below the rank of 
commandant”.49   The inclusion of members of the Defence Forces 
can be traced back to the Public Safety Act 1927.   When the Bill was 
being drafted at least two members of the Supreme Court let the 
government know that they would resign if asked to sit on a special 
court.   As a result, the Bill was redrafted to exclude members of the 
judiciary from sitting on this special court:  they were replaced by 
members of the Defence Forces.50   In fact, members of the defence 
forces have not sat on the Special Criminal Court since its re-
introduction in 1972, and there have been calls for the amendment of 
section 39 to make the legislation reflect the practice.51 
Appointment to and removal from the Special Criminal Court is at 
the will of the government.52   These provisions give rise to concerns 
about the independence of the court, particularly when combined 
with the potential for members of the defence forces and officers of 
the executive to sit upon the court.   However, in Eccles v. Ireland, the 
Supreme Court held that the executive could not interfere with the 
judicial functioning of the Special Criminal Court.   It stated that, 
“whilst … the Special Criminal Court does not attract the express 
guarantees of judicial independence contained in Article 35, it does 
have, derived from the Constitution, a guarantee of independence in 
the carrying out of its function”.53 
The justification for introducing the Special Criminal Court has 
always rested upon the threat posed by subversive organisations.   In 
1939, the Minister for Justice, Patrick Routledge, stated clearly that 
the cases envisaged to be dealt with by the Special Criminal Court 
were “offences related to armed intimidation and to violent means”.54   
Despite this, the Special Criminal Court was augmented by a military 
tribunal which was used throughout the “emergency” (1939-1946) for 
the trial of black market cases.   Between 1939 and 1946, there were 
42 prosecutions for “security offences” before the Special Criminal 
Court, resulting in 34 convictions.   During the same period, there 
were 200 prosecutions for breaches of “various orders concerned 
 
 
49  Offences Against the State Act 1939, s.39(3). 
50  Donal O’Sullivan, The Irish Free State and its Senate (Arno Press 1972) p.261. 
51  Hederman Report (n.16), 54;  pp.231-32. 
52  Offences Against the State Act 1939, s.39(2). 
53  Eccles v. Ireland [1985] I.R. 545, 549.  
54  Dáil Éireann, Parliamentary Debates, March 2, 1939, vol. 74, col. 1290.   
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with the maintenance of essential supplies and services” and offences 
relating to the unlawful trade in gold, currency, watches and similar 
items.55   Throughout this period, the military tribunal operated 
separately from the Special Criminal Court – although it was staffed 
by the same personnel.56 
The Special Criminal Court is bound by the ordinary rules of 
evidence pertaining to the High Court;57  the military tribunal was 
not.   Thus the executive felt the need to augment the Special 
Criminal Court with a military tribunal because it was these rules of 
evidence which appeared problematic to government.   The military 
tribunal has been termed a “curious and sinister” court.58   It “made 
huge inroads on the ordinary laws of evidence:  unsigned statements 
by persons who were not called to give evidence in court were 
admissible;;  and the court, if it considered it ‘proper that it should not 
be bound by any rule of evidence, whether statutory or at common 
law’, was not to be bound by any such rule”.59 
There are three points of interest here:  firstly, the Special Criminal 
Court was being used in non-subversive cases within years of its 
initial establishment;  secondly, the ordinary courts were deemed 
inadequate to deal with black market offences because those offences 
lacked popular support;;  and, thirdly, the Special Criminal Court’s use 
was augmented by a military tribunal because that tribunal was 
unbound by the ordinary rules of evidence.   Two of these points are 
indicative of a normalisation of an emergency power – to which we 
will return in relation to the New Zealand experience.   The latter 
issue indicates that the absence of the jury is not sufficient for 
untrammelled executive power. 
The German political philosopher Carl Schmitt has argued that 
the “state of exception” (e.g. a state of emergency) and the manner of 
its disposal cannot be specified in advance – the very nature of the 
exception is that it is unpredictable and therefore it is futile for a 
constitutional order to attempt to prescribe a response in advance.   
At most, the constitution should stipulate who should deal with any 
emergencies that arise.60   Article 28.3.3⁰ is the very essence of 
 
 
55  Dáil Éireann, Parliamentary Debates,  October 23, 1946, vol. 103, Table I, cols. 163-64. 
56  Gerard Hogan, Gerry Whyte, J.M. Kelly:  the Irish Constitution (Lexis Nexis 
Butterworths 2003), para. 6.5.351. 
57  Offences Against the State Act 1939, s.41(4). 
58  J.M. Kelly, Fundamental Rights in the Irish law and Constitution (Allen Figgis & Co. 
1961), p.274. 
59  Hogan, Whyte (n.56), para. 6.5.352. 
60  David Dyzenhaus, Legality and Legitimacy:  Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen, and Hermann 
Heller in Weimar (Clarendon Press 1997). 
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Schmitt’s “state of exception”,61 providing, as it does, that “nothing in 
this Constitution shall be invoked to invalidate any law enacted by the 
Oireachtas which is expressed to be for the purpose of securing the 
public safety and preservation of the state in time of war or armed 
rebellion…”62   The Special Criminal Court was constitutionally 
anticipated but also constitutionally restricted.   As an emergency 
power enacted by the Oireachtas during a time of war – although 
Ireland was not an actual party to that war – the military tribunal was 
immune from constitutional review and therefore, from a positive law 
perspective, this curious and sinister tribunal was legal. 
When the Special Criminal Court was re-established in 1972,  
the Taoiseach, Jack Lynch, overtly linked the necessity for special 
courts with the political violence emanating from Northern Ireland:  
“we want to make sure that we can continue to control any 
subversive activities here …   But these activities were, of 
course, related to the situation in the North of Ireland and as 
soon as that situation will have eased … then there wouldn’t 
seem to be any need for the continuation of the special courts 
and therefore we would have to look at the situation again.”63 
Ireland remained in a legal state of emergency from 1939 to 1976,64 
with a new state of emergency being declared in 1976 which continued 
until 1995.65   The Special Criminal Court established in 1972 continued 
despite the end of the official state of emergency in 1995.   Moreover, 
despite the unequivocal association of the court with subversive cases 
at the time of its establishment, it has been used periodically in non-
subversive cases – and, since 1996, used mainly in the fight against 
organised crime.66   Thus an exceptional power has become part of 
the regular criminal justice system – and the ordinary courts are 
deemed inadequate in “gang-related” cases.   This has been 
characterised by a broader shift in Irish criminal justice from due 
process to crime control over the past decade.67   Organised and gang-
related crime in Ireland is “now being handled as a security issue, in a 
way which undeniably compares to the handling of paramilitary activity 
 
 
61  Fergal Davis, Christopher Thornhill, “Article 28.3.3⁰:  Terrorism, Democracy, 
Supra-Legality and the ‘State of Emergency’ in the Irish Constitution”, in  
Eoin Carolan (ed.), The Constitution of Ireland: Perspectives and Prospects 
(forthcoming, Bloomsbury Professional 2012) 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2092294> accessed November 5, 2012. 
62  Bunreacht na hÉireann (Constitution of Ireland), Art. 28.3.3⁰. 
63  Davis (n.31), 149. 
64  Hederman Report (n.16), 58, fn.111. 
65  ibid., 24. 
66  Conway, Mulqueen (n.20), 106-07. 
67  Liz Campbell, “The Criminal Justice Act 2007 – a Theoretical Perspective”  
(2007) 17(3) Irish Criminal Law Journal 8. 
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in the 1970s and 80s”.68   This overlap between terrorist and gang-
related cases will be explored in further detail in relation to New Zealand. 
Despite the “peace-dividend” and the resulting reduction in 
political violence in Ireland, the post-emergency period (from 1995 to 
the present day) has seen the introduction of a series of crime control 
measures including, for example:  the Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) 
Act 1996;  the Bail Act 1997;  the Proceeds of Crime Acts 1996 and 2005;  
and the Criminal Justice Act 2006.69   The murder of the journalist 
Veronica Guerin was quickly portrayed as an attack on the state.   
Organised criminals became the heirs to the terrorists, and gang-land 
violence is conflated with the threat of organised crime and the threat 
of the IRA.   This period was characterised by a hollowing out of due 
process rights as “extraordinary laws” were normalized:70  notably, for 
the purposes of this article, this climate has enabled successive Irish 
governments to employ the Special Criminal Court in the organized 
crime context in a relatively unthinking manner.   The most striking 
aspect of the normalization of that “special” non-jury court is that it 
occurred without any significant debate or reflection.71   It was too 
convenient to portray organised crime as the “new terrorism,” 
thereby justifying the extension of these exceptional powers creating 
an all-enveloping “security blanket”.72 
 One of the most significant problems with the operation of the 
Special Criminal Court in non-subversive cases is the practical 
impossibility of reviewing a certificate by the Director of Public 
Prosecutions (DPP) to the effect that the ordinary courts are 
inadequate.73   In a series of cases, the Irish courts have reached the 
conclusion that the decision of the DPP is not amenable to review74 
on the basis that the Irish parliament left the issue of determining the 
inadequacy of the courts to the DPP.75   The Supreme Court has held 
that “if … it can be demonstrated that he [the DPP] reaches his 
decision mala fides or influenced by an improper motive or improper 
policy then his decision would be reviewable by a court”.76   
Problematically, the DPP does not give reasons for his decisions, so it 
 
 
68  Conway, Mulqueen (n.20), 112. 
69  Liz Campbell, “The Culture of Crime Control in Ireland:  Theorising Recent 
Developments in Criminal Justice” (2008) 1 Web Journal of Current Legal Issues 
<http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2008/issue1/pdf/campbell1.pdf> accessed November 5, 2012.  
70  Shane Kilcommins, Barry Vaughan, “Reconfiguring State-Accused Relations  
in Ireland” (2006) Irish Jurist 90. 
71  Davis (n.31), 192. 
72  Conway, Mulqueen (n.20). 
73  Offences Against the State Act 1939, s.46. 
74  In re the Criminal Law (Jurisdiction) Bill 1975 [1977] I.R. 129;  Savage and McOwen v. 
D.P.P. [1982] 1 I.L.R.M. 385;  and O’Reilly and Judge v. D.P.P. [1984] I.L.R.M. 224. 
75  O’Reilly and Judge v. D.P.P. [1984] I.L.R.M. 224, 229. 
76  The State (McCormack) v. the DPP [1987] I.L.R.M. 225, 232. 
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is impossible to determine if they have been influenced by an 
improper motive.   The United Nations Human Rights Committee 
(UNHRC) has criticised this state of affairs.   In Kavanagh v. Ireland  
the committee held that the failure of the DPP to give reasons 
violates Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights – which guarantees equality before the law.   The decision in  
Kavanagh rests on the fact that the failure of the DPP to give reasons 
for a decision to issue a certificate restricts judicial review “to the 
most exceptional and virtually undemonstrable circumstances”.77    
The inability to secure effective judicial review of the decision 
facilitates the overlap of subversive and non-subversive cases by 
preventing scrutiny of the basis for the decision to treat non-
subversive, gang-related, cases as if they are analogous to the former 
terrorist threat associated with the IRA and the Northern Irish 
troubles.   In direct contrast with this unwillingness to give reasons in 
the context of the Special Criminal Court, James Hamilton, the Irish 
Director of Public Prosecutions for 12 years to 2011, demonstrated 
considerable enthusiasm for giving “reasons in relation to decisions 
not to prosecute in cases involving death”.78   Giving reasons for 
non-prosecution renders the decision susceptible to judicial review.   
Despite this shift in policy and the criticism of the UNHRC, the 
Office of the DPP in Ireland has confirmed that they continue not to 
give reasons for the decision to certify the ordinary courts inadequate 
under section 46 of the Offences Against the State Act 1939.79 
 
B.   Trial by jury in New Zealand 
“Jury trial in New Zealand dates back to the earliest years of 
colonisation and initially represented an uninterrupted transmission 
of the English legal heritage”.80   Captain William Hobson, on behalf 
of the British Empire, and the independent Chiefs of New Zealand, 
on behalf of the Māori, signed the Treaty of Waitangi on  
February 6, 1840.81   On May 21, 1840, Captain Hobson declared 
 
 
77  Kavanagh v. Ireland, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/71/D/819/1998 (April 26, 2001), para. 10.2. 
78  James Hamilton, Director of Public Prosecutions, “The Prosecutor and the 
Victim” (Centre for Criminal Justice and Human Rights 4th Annual Conference, 
Cork, June 11, 2010 <http://www.dppireland.ie/filestore/documents/THE_ 
PROSECUTOR_AND_THE_VICTIM_110610.pdf> accessed November 5, 2012. 
79  “Further to my earlier e-mail and our subsequent telephone conversation,  
I would like to confirm that the Director does not provide reasons when issuing a 
certificate to send a case for trial before the Special Criminal Court.   We have no 
difficulty in your attributing this confirmation to this Office in your book if you  
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British sovereignty over all of New Zealand.   Almost immediately, 
jury trial was established:  the Supreme Court Ordinance 1841 provided 
for a criminal jury of twelve men for all cases tried on indictment.    
It should be acknowledged that, over time, the criminal jurisdiction of 
the magistrates’ courts was expanded, which limited access to trial  
by jury.   For example, section 4 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1952 
limited trial by jury to those offences with a maximum permissible 
sentence of three months’ imprisonment or more.   In addition, 
section 43 of the Summary Offences Act 1981 excluded the right to trial 
by jury for the offence of common assault – despite the fact that that 
offence attracted a sentence of up to six months’ imprisonment.    
As a result, as recently as the 1970s, the number of jury trials was 
increasing, but the proportion of defendants opting for jury trials  
was decreasing.82   The right to trial by jury is guaranteed by section 
24 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.   A recent proposal to 
amend that Act to limit trial by jury to offences attracting a sentence 
of three years’ imprisonment, rather than the current three months, 
was ultimately not included in the Criminal Procedure Act 2011.   As the 
Attorney-General noted, the proposal would have been only the 
second amendment to the Bill of Rights Act and, unlike the previous 
successful amendment, would have had the effect of limiting rather 
than expanding a right.83   It is fair to conclude that jury trial is  
an embedded feature of the New Zealand criminal justice system:   
it has been described as “central in New Zealand criminal law”.84 
As was noted previously, New Zealand has a history of anti-
terrorism legislation.   The New Zealand Security Service was 
established in 1956 following pressure from the British government, 
and was modelled on the British MI5.85   The New Zealand Security and 
Intelligence Service Act 1969 renamed the organisation and placed it on a 
statutory footing.   The organisation was specifically tasked with 
protecting New Zealand from espionage, sabotage and subversion;  
by 1977, the definition of security was amended to take account of 
international terrorism.86   The Crimes Act 1961 “was enacted ... not 
only to cover generic aspects of criminal activity but also to mindfully 
target possible terrorist scenarios including sabotage, seditious 
offences, arson, and wilful damage (plus damage or attempted 
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damage by fire or explosives)”.87   It can be surmised that much of 
New Zealand’s anti-terrorism legislation was primarily a response to 
international conventions to which New Zealand was a signatory and 
specific incidents of international terrorism.88   Whereas Irish anti-
terrorism was forged in the heat of domestic terrorist-induced crises 
and insurrection, New Zealand was legislating in anticipation of 
international events being replicated at home – it had, as a result,  
a more outward looking stance.   In 1985, New Zealand suffered, 
arguably, its first terrorist attack, when the Greenpeace flagship, the 
Rainbow Warrior, was sunk by French military agents while it was 
docked in the port of Auckland.89   This incident was followed in 
1987 by the attempted hijacking of an Air New Zealand aeroplane in 
Fiji.90   The legislative response to these events came in the form of 
the International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act 1987 – this Act is said 
to have been modelled on the United Kingdom’s Prevention of Terrorism 
(Temporary Provisions) Act 1984.91   It is predominantly designed to 
allow the authorities to respond to an emergency by, for example, 
requisitioning property,92 and to intercept private communications in 
an area where an emergency is occurring.93 
It is clear, therefore, that New Zealand’s anti-terror laws have 
generally been influenced by events overseas, and that legislative 
responses to terror attacks in New Zealand or acts of terror directed 
at New Zealand targets abroad have been influenced by international 
experience.   It is unsurprising, therefore, that in the period since 
September 11, 2001, New Zealand’s anti-terrorism law has undergone 
a change:  “whereas New Zealand’s counter-terrorist measures were 
once configured to the containment and control of international 
terrorist ‘spill overs’ on to New Zealand soil, they are now geared 
more towards the potential for a domestically focused terrorist attack 
as well”.94   This shift in focus can be seen in the legislative 
restrictions which have been placed upon the right to trial by jury in 
New Zealand and by the utilisation of those new powers in the so-
called “terror-raid trials”. 
The New Zealand Crimes Act 1961 was amended by section 4(1) of 
the Crimes Amendment Act (No. 2) 2008 to allow for trial without jury in 
two circumstances.   The new section 361D allows for non-jury trial 
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where the trial is likely to be long and complex.   For this section to 
apply an accused must face less than 14 years’ imprisonment95 and the 
trial must be likely to last longer than 20 days.96   The trial judge must 
be satisfied that “in the circumstances of the case, the accused person’s 
right to trial by jury is outweighed by the likelihood that potential jurors 
will not be able to perform their duties effectively”.97   In a formal 
sense, section 361D is similar to the Irish Offences Against the State Act 
1939, in that both are designed to remove the right to trial by jury when 
jury trial is deemed inadequate to function effectively.   As with the 
Irish legislation, there is no direct mention of terrorism in the 
legislation – although the title of the Irish legislation does imply a 
national security context.   However, whereas in Ireland the intro-
duction of the Special Criminal Court and the legislation providing for 
it has always been justified on the basis of a terrorist or subversive 
threat, in New Zealand the justification relied on the jury’s inability to 
function when faced with complex evidence or with a trial that is likely 
to be lengthy.   The removal of trial by jury in circumstances of 
complex trials is not novel, and this justification has, for example, been 
employed in the context of serious fraud trials in England and Wales.98 
In contrast with New Zealand, Ireland has demonstrated some 
commitment to maintaining the jury in complex trials.   A proposal  
to create specialist juries has recently re-emerged in Ireland –  
the argument being that if regular juries are incapable of compre-
hending certain evidence an alteration to the jury system is required.99   
Thus, despite using non-jury trials in terrorist and gang-related cases, 
Ireland is willing to consider redesigning the jury – rather than 
scrapping it – to resolve other potential weaknesses in the jury system.   
Specialist juries and the removal of trial by jury through measures like 
section 361D can be presented as alternative attempts at balancing the 
right to trial by jury against the right to a fair trial.   In some circum-
stances, a jury may not be in a position to interpret the information 
presented to them, and, as such, trial by jury would be unfair.   
Doubts about the ability of laypersons to understand complicated 
legal proceedings have been suggested as grounds for restricting trial 
by jury in numerous jurisdictions, and attempts have been made to 
assess juror comprehension.   In 2010, Cheryl Thomas asked jurors to 
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identify the two questions the judge had directed them to answer.   
Only 31 per cent of jurors accurately identified both questions.100    
In mitigation, Thomas noted that 20 of the 21 juries examined 
contained at least one juror who correctly identified the questions.101   
More alarmingly, when 277 New South Wales jurors from 25 real 
cases were asked:  “what was the verdict in this case?”, the vast 
majority were mistaken as to the outcome of the case they had 
themselves determined.   In only six cases did all participating jurors 
report the same verdict.102   This demonstrates a significant problem 
with juror understanding of legal proceedings.   Juror comprehension 
of complicated scientific evidence has also been seen as problematic.103   
There is evidence that jurors believe that they have understood the 
evidence presented,104 but it remains difficult to assess their actual level 
of comprehension.105   If juries cannot understand the proceedings and 
the complicated evidence presented in court, then they cannot be 
relied upon.   Such arguments apply to all cases, including cases of 
suspected terrorism.   The 2008 amendment of the Crimes Act was 
based upon a 2001 New Zealand Law Commission report which 
advocated the removal of jury trial in lengthy and complex cases.106   
That report specifically referred to the use of single judge, non-jury 
courts in Northern Ireland (Diplock Courts) but did not mention the 
Republic of Ireland’s Special Criminal Court model.107 
The second relevant provision of the Crimes Act 1961, as amended, 
is section 361E which allows the prosecutor to apply for a non-jury 
trial where there is a risk of jury tampering.   The judge may only 
make such an order if: 
“satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe— 
(a)  that intimidation of any person or persons who 
may be selected as a juror or jurors has occurred, is 
occurring, or may occur; and 
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(b)  that the effects of that intimidation can be avoided 
effectively only by making an order.”108 
While the issue of jury intimidation was raised in the 2001 
New Zealand Law Commission report, it was not relied on as a 
justification for removing the right to trial by jury, but was rather 
discussed in the context of jury vetting.109   In fact, the evidence of 
jury intimidation in New Zealand was not forthcoming during the 
Parliamentary debates on the proposals.   At the first reading of the 
Criminal Procedure Bill, the Associate Minister simply asserted that 
judge-only trial was necessary because “from time to time there has 
been an issue in gang-related cases”.110   Some Members of Parliament 
did refer to cases where an individual had “got away with murder” 
due to intimidation, but no firm evidence was advanced to support 
these claims.   The closest example was when Judith Collins M.P., 
stated that: 
“We understand that there is a concern over gang-related crime.   
I can recall at least one crime that occurred in Taranaki where a 
person literally got away with murder because of intimidation 
of witnesses and a jury.   Of course, that one instance does 
not mean to say that this happens all the time, so therefore we 
need to tread very, very carefully with that issue.”111 
Of course, the inability to sustain justifications based upon jury 
intimidation is not unique to New Zealand.   Twining criticised the 
Diplock Commission in Northern Ireland for adducing “very little 
evidence, statistical or otherwise ... of widespread intimidation  
of jurors”.112   In the Republic of Ireland, Desmond O’Malley, the 
Minister of Justice responsible for re-introducing the Special Criminal 
Court in 1972 stated:  “I am precluded from referring to individual 
cases in which persons have been acquitted ...   The possible threat of 
retaliation assumes new proportions when court-houses are picketed 
by persons in a barely veiled atmosphere of intimidation”.113 
The issue of gangs in New Zealand has been explored elsewhere.114   
It should be acknowledged that the existence of these gangs is not 
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new,115 and has given rise to a classic moral panic.116   The ability of 
the jury system to guarantee a fair trial for “outsiders” is often 
contentious.117   It might be argued that some defendants’ right to a 
fair trial trumps their right to trial by jury and that, in such cases, we 
ought to suspend trial by jury to ensure a fair trial.   However, the 
predominant justification for section 361E was not based on such 
analysis, but rather on the belief that gangs pose a peculiar risk  
of intimidation.   In New Zealand, as in Ireland, the twin issues of 
gangs and terrorism converged in the so-called “terror-raid trials”.118   
In this case, there was a protracted, and ultimately unsuccessful, 
attempt to employ the non-jury trial procedures laid down in the 
Crimes Act 1961 (as amended).   “In bush, on Tuhoe-owned lands in 
the Urewera Ranges, it is alleged that [individuals] participated 
between November 2006 and October 2007 in military-style  
exercises using firearms, live ammunition, and Molotov cocktails”.119    
Police investigations initially treated these activities as suspected 
terrorism.120   On October 17, 2007, a series of early morning raids 
were conducted across New Zealand resulting in the arrests of 18 
people.121   Initially, the consent of the Solicitor-General to bring 
charges under the Terrorism Suppression Act 2000 was sought, but this 
was not granted.   Ultimately, the individuals were charged with 
participation in an organised criminal group contrary to section 98A 
of the Crimes Act 1961 and offences under the Arms Act 1983.122   
There was a blurring of the boundary between a criminal gang and a 
terrorist gang in the case.   There were a number of legal proceedings 
relating to these trials.   Initially, the courts held that the criteria for 
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suspension of trial by jury were met, and that a “likelihood that 
potential jurors will not be able to perform their duties effectively”123 
existed.124   However, there was a change in circumstances.125    
It is safe to assume that the change was related to the withdrawal of 
the charges against 11 of the 15 suspects.126   Thereafter, all parties 
agreed that the criteria set out in section 361D of the Crimes Act were 
no longer satisfied,127 and a date for an ordinary trial by jury was set.   
The remaining four defendants, Tame Iti, Te Rangikaiwhiria Kemara, 
Urs Signer and Emily Bailey, were convicted of various charges under 
the Arms Act 1983.   They were not convicted on charges of 
participating in an organised criminal group under section 98A of the 
Crimes Act 1961.   On October 29, 2012, the New Zealand Court  
of Appeal upheld sentences of two years’ imprisonment for Iti  
and Kemara.   The Court of Appeal also upheld the convictions of 
Signer and Bailey, who had served seven months of their nine month 
home detention sentences.128   The circumstances surrounding these 
police investigations is the subject of a review by the Independent 
Police Conduct Authority.129 
The provisions adopted in New Zealand are, in form, substantially 
similar to those adopted in Ireland.   Neither statute formally requires 
a subversive element in order to invoke the non-jury mechanism.   
While in Ireland the introduction of the Special Criminal Court has 
always been justified on the basis of the terrorist threat, the measure 
has gradually come to be used predominantly in gang-related 
offences.   On the other hand in New Zealand the justifications  
for introducing the measures did not rely on any supposed  
terror threat and referred to the risk of gang-related jury intimidation.   
The attempted use of the non-jury power in the so-called “terror-raid 
trials” was justified on the basis of an alleged terrorist plot which 
subsequently morphed into an ordinary trial.   The pliability of  
the distinction between terrorism and gang violence in both states  
is notable.   In contrast to the unreviewable decision of the Irish DPP 
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as to the inadequacy of the ordinary courts, however, it is interesting 
to note that, in New Zealand, section 361D(2) vests the power to 
determine whether or not to apply section 361D(3)(b) in the court 
and not in the prosecutor – and this decision was reviewed in the 
“terror-raid trials”.130   The determination of what “likelihood” 
means, in the context of section 361D(3)(b) has been the subject of 
judicial debate:  Winkelmann J. in the High Court held that it required 
there to be an “appreciable risk”;;  whereas the Court of Appeal felt 
that substituting one synonym for another was unhelpful.131    
The Supreme Court of New Zealand concluded that section 361D 
“depends on a balance between different objectives of public interest 
(the right to jury trial and the right to a fair trial). …  It is preferable 
that any further consideration of the approach required should be 
undertaken by this court … in application in a live controversy”.132 
 
III.   DISCUSSION 
This process of undermining jury trial must be set within the context 
of a prolonged and sustained attack on trial by jury internationally.   
Historically seen as the “bulwark of liberty”133 and the “lamp that 
shows that freedom lives”,134 more recently it has been dismissed as 
an ineffective method of administering justice.   In 1991, Darbyshire 
poured scorn on those who heap “unquestioning praise on the jury” 
and “deceive themselves and the public into thinking that jury trial is 
the ‘centrepiece’ of the criminal justice system”.135   A decade later, 
Lord Justice Auld was, at best, unenthusiastic about juries in  
criminal trials.136   The issue of jury bias – particularly juror racism – 
has been examined by the domestic courts137 and the European Court 
of Human Rights.138   Finally, by 2011, concerns were emerging about 
the ability of juries to function in an age of ubiquitous access to the 
internet and social networks.139 
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The pattern of a sustained undermining of the jury as an 
institution resulting in legislative amendment is not unique to Ireland 
and New Zealand.   In England, Wales and Northern Ireland, for 
example, Part 7 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 provides for trials on 
indictment without a jury.   Initially the non-jury provisions of that 
Act went unused.   Nevertheless, populist rhetoric was often 
employed against the institution of the jury.   For example, in 2004 
the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, affirmed his commitment to 
non-jury trial when he told the Labour Party conference “those 
believed to be part of organised crime will have their assets 
confiscated, their bank accounts opened up and if they intimidate 
juries, face trial without a jury”.140   Finally, in 2010, a non-jury trial 
for a serious indictable offence was conducted in England for the first 
time in over 350 years.141 
This article does not overtly engage with the legitimacy of 
abandoning trial by jury.   As was noted in the introduction, from a 
Weberian rationalist point of view there are good grounds for arguing 
that jury trial is arbitrary and irrational.   This author would contend 
that such arguments do not pay sufficient attention to the non-legal 
functions of the jury.   The jury can provide political legitimacy 
through its involvement of the governed in the process of governing.142   
Leaving those arguments aside, it is important to note that Ireland 
and New Zealand have not abandoned jury trial on the basis that  
it is substantively irrational – both states maintain trial by jury.    
Rather, they have restricted the jury in certain contexts while 
maintaining an apparent commitment to the jury more generally. 
Historically, the threat of terrorism has provided momentum for 
those seeking to limit access to jury trial.   For example, section 3  
of the Northern Irish Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act 1922  
allowed for trial by courts of summary jurisdiction for offences 
against the regulations.   Most famously, in Northern Ireland the 
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Diplock Commission preferred trial without a jury to internment.143    
The recommendations of the Diplock Commission were given 
legislative form in the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973.   
The “Diplock” model of the Crown Court sitting without juries has 
been employed to hear terrorist-related indictable offences in 
Northern Ireland ever since,144 and arguably provided the model for 
Part 7 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.   At present, terrorism trials in 
England and Wales are conducted with a jury.   However, given the 
general undermining of the institution, the historic tendency to 
remove the jury in the context of terrorism, and the possibility of the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 being employed in terrorism cases, it seems 
apposite to consider once again the role of trial by jury in the context 
of terrorism. 
The Irish experience demonstrates that once jury trial is limited in 
the counter-terrorism context it becomes very easy to extend that 
restriction to other “analogous” groups – such as gang-related 
offences.   The portrayal of organised crime as the “new terrorism” 
allowed for a gradual erosion of the right.145   The comfort of the 
“security blanket” was easily extended from the context of national 
security to that of organised crime.   By drafting the legislation widely 
and granting the DPP the discretion to determine when the Special 
Criminal Court should be used, the Dáil can avoid overtly 
acknowledging that it has facilitated a broad abolition of the right to 
jury trial.   In New Zealand, the legislation does not rely on a national 
security threat for its justification.   However, the first attempts  
at utilising the broad powers contained in the Crimes Act 1961  
(as amended) were justified on the basis of the threat of terrorism, 
this being seen as the most compelling context within which these 
provisions could be used.   In both Ireland and New Zealand, the 
interference with the right to trial by jury has been presented as 
necessary in a limited set of circumstances but the legislation is 
drafted in such a manner that a more extensive restriction on jury  
trial is possible.   It is also interesting that both states have seen  
a conflation of the threat of terrorism and gang-related crime.    
It is contended that in such circumstances it is likely that the  
“security blanket” of non-jury trial will be employed in a widening set 
of circumstances.146 
 
 
 
143  Lord Diplock, Report of the Commission to Consider Legal Procedures to Deal With 
Terrorist Activities in Northern Ireland, (Cmnd 5185, 1972). 
144  Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973. 
145  Conway, Mulqueen (n.20). 
146  ibid. 
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IV.   CONCLUSION 
Ireland and New Zealand have both determined that the right to trial 
by jury is potentially problematic.   In Ireland, there is a long history 
of the Special Criminal Court being employed in the context of 
terrorism, and that court’s use has always been justified on the basis 
of an existing terrorist threat.   In New Zealand, terrorism has not 
been employed as a justification for removing the right to trial by jury;  
instead a risk of juror intimidation in gang-related cases was asserted.   
In both jurisdictions, the risk to trial by jury in the context of 
terrorism and gang-related cases has been treated as identical, on the 
apparent basis of a world-view which sees terrorism and gang-crime 
as analogous. 
Both states maintain a commitment to trial by jury in principle, 
but their widely drafted legislation facilitates the growing 
abandonment of jury trial, without an attendant debate on the 
desirability of doing so.   This debate is not moot.   Juries may be 
arbitrary, may not understand the evidence before them, or may be 
biased.   The importance of trial by jury has often been overstated;  its 
historical significance has been overplayed;  and its removal is 
potentially justifiable. 
However, if wholesale reform were proposed, and both states 
opted to have non-jury trial on a principled basis, one would expect 
wide ranging reform of the rules of evidence and court procedure to 
account for the fact that the arbiter of fact and law was now unified 
in a single body – the judge.   It is important that the erosion of the 
right to trial by jury is not simply the result of the gradual stretching 
of the security state.   By purporting to remove the jury for a select 
number of cases, but in fact facilitating an ever widening use of non-
jury procedures, states can find that they have abandoned the jury, 
without adequately reflecting on the significance of such reforms.   
The abolition of so ancient an institution ought to be justified – it 
should not be the result of normalisation or creep. 
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ABSTRACT 
In all Commonwealth Caribbean States, independence led to an age of 
Constitutionalism, marked by governing principles contained in the new 
states’ respective Bills of Rights.   These states’ criminal justice systems 
have faced a number of challenges since the end of the colonial era.    
They are currently confronted by a drive to reform the substantive 
criminal law, and the rules of procedure and evidence, with a view to 
curtailing rising crime rates and thwarting the funding of criminal and 
terrorist organisations.   This spotlight:  (i) examines developments 
regarding the death penalty, (ii) considers reforms to the right to bail and 
to the substantive law relating to financial crime, along with proposals to 
abolish preliminary enquiries;  (iii) ponders the vexed question why so 
many Commonwealth Caribbean states retain the Privy Council as their 
final court of appeal;  and (iv) gives a brief overview of the right to 
practise in Commonwealth Caribbean States. 
 
 
I.   OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT STATE OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEMS IN THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN 
The social context shapes any discussion of the current state of criminal 
justice systems in the Commonwealth Caribbean.   Spiralling crime rates 
provide the social context that is now operating.  In all Commonwealth 
Caribbean1 states, the substantive criminal law and the law of criminal 
procedure are in a state of substantial change.   In Jamaica, The Bahamas, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Belize, and many of the territories that comprise 
the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States2 (OECS), legislatures are 
rushing to embark on far-reaching, radical reforms that, without the bene-
fit of much empirical evidence, it is hoped, will curb spiralling crime rates. 
As the Caribbean struggles to preserve the reputation for tranquillity 
that is critical to the economic lifeline of tourism that now keeps 
many Caribbean states afloat, legislation has been generally perceived 
 
 
* John S. Jeremie S.C. is the former Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago and 
a Senior Lecturer at the Faculty of Law, University of the West Indies, St Augustine. 
1  For the purposes of this article the Commonwealth Caribbean means Antigua 
and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, 
Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad 
and Tobago, which are the independent Commonwealth Caribbean states. 
2  The Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States includes many of the 
Commonwealth Caribbean states which have attained independence and which are 
referred to in n.1.   They include Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Saint 
Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.  
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to be a “quick fix” to all that ails creaking criminal justice systems.   
There is a continuing and largely unresolved question concerning the 
use of the death penalty.   In most Commonwealth Caribbean states this 
penalty remains popular but its use has been curtailed by a host of 
decisions of the Privy Council.   There have been controversial (perhaps 
unconstitutional) legislative amendments in certain territories that 
have restricted the right to be granted bail in certain circumstances.   
There has been piecemeal amendment of the rules of evidence, particu-
larly in relation to the use of bad character evidence, in certain territories.   
In some of the territories anti-gang legislation has been enacted.   
Penalties with respect to the possession of unlawful firearms have 
been dramatically toughened.   In respect of financial crime, many states 
have enacted measures to ensure that they are removed from, or kept 
off, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) blacklist.3   In many states, 
extensive reforms that have had the effect of eroding the common 
law rules relating to bank secrecy have, as a consequence, been 
enacted, as have a raft of provisions characteristically demanded by 
the FATF in order to combat money laundering and terrorist 
financing and to allow for the freezing of assets in defined 
circumstances in respect of certain predicate offences. 
In the face of rapidly escalating crime rates many of those 
territories that “survive or die” on the basis of tourist revenue seem 
prepared to try anything that might help to make the task of prose-
cutors easier.   The ancien regime of colonial legislation and traditional 
common law rules, which were underpinned by the familiar adage,  
“It is better that 99 guilty men go free than one innocent man be 
convicted”, has been firmly consigned to the dustbins of colonial lore.   
While the emphasis is on short-term, political gains to be won by  
“get tough on crime” legislation, too little work is being devoted to 
the cause of holistic reform of the criminal justice system. 
The states of the Commonwealth Caribbean seem unable even to 
take concrete action on the necessity for a single final court of appeal.   
The result is that, of the fourteen states in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean, only three have subscribed to the Caribbean Court of Justice 
in its final appeal jurisdiction.4   For the rest, the Privy Council remains 
the final port of call for all final appeals, including criminal appeals.   
Likewise, the hard work that is required to be done to reform courts, 
to provide for specialist drug courts, to train prosecutors, to staff 
courts with well-qualified judges, to reform rules of procedure, 
including the abolition of preliminary inquiries, and rules of evidence, 
to embark on meaningful police service reform, and to provide 
 
 
3  The FATF is an inter-governmental body, established in 1989 with the aim to 
develop and promote policies to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. 
4  They are Barbados, Belize and Guyana. 
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alternative solutions to a life of crime for the increasing number of 
unemployed youths, as necessary as it is, seems to be neglected for 
short-term, and perhaps illusory, political gains. 
 
II.   CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS IN THE CARIBBEAN –  
THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW 
At the outset, it must be borne in mind that the description “the 
Caribbean” is no more helpful as a definition of the laws of any of 
the independent states that comprise the Caribbean than is the 
description “Africa”.   Unlike Canada and the United States, there is 
in the Caribbean no federation of states united by a common 
constitution, a common legislature, a common executive, or for that 
matter a common judiciary.   There is not, as in Europe, a common 
legislative body, or a common constitutional instrument such as a 
declaration of human rights.   Caribbean political and judicial 
institutions are only now maturing.   The Caribbean (as is so in 
Africa) is in truth nothing but a number of independent states, each 
with its own executive, its own legislature, its own constitution and 
Bill of Rights, its own integrated systems of laws and generally its 
own judicial system. 
 
A.   The “Four Pillars” of Commonwealth Caribbean Law 
The substantive criminal law in the Commonwealth Caribbean 
customarily comprises four elements.   These are laid out largely in 
chronological order.   They are the law preceding each state’s consti-
tution;  the constitution itself;  laws enacted after the constitutions 
were adopted;  and case law.   The chronological ordering is significant:  
the “savings laws clauses”5 present in various Caribbean constitutions 
largely protect preceding laws from invalidity;  therefore the consti-
tutions create a “watershed” of earlier laws (pillar one), which remain 
in force even though incompatible with the constitution, and laws 
enacted under the constitution (pillar three), which must abide by its 
strong guarantees of civil and political freedoms.6 
 
1.   Pre-constitutional law 
This first category of laws includes the common law and statutes of 
general application of England and Wales on a particular date, as 
incorporated in each state largely by local legislation.   It also includes 
laws passed by local legislatures of each Caribbean colony before the 
adoption of their respective Constitutions. 
 
 
5  See further Part II.A.2., post. 
6  See further Part II.B. post. 
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In this context, it is necessary to attempt to trace briefly the 
historical sources of the law in each territory.   That is because 
varying historical developments, and a lack of a mature integration 
process, are reflected in important differences in the present day 
substantive law of the territories in the Caribbean.   In some territories, 
there is a provision in legislation that deems that the common law in 
force in England and Wales, and statutes of general application 
enacted by the Westminster Parliament, are incorporated into the law 
of the state with effect from a date certain7.   In Trinidad and Tobago, 
by virtue of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 19628, “the common law, 
doctrines of equity, and statutes of general application of the Parliament 
of the United Kingdom that were in force in England [on 1 March 
1848] [are] deemed to have been enacted and to have been in force in 
Trinidad as from that date and in Tobago as from 1 January 1889”.   
In Jamaica, by virtue of the Interpretation Act 1968,9 “all such laws and 
statutes and statutes of England as were, prior to the commencement 
of 1 Geo. II Cap. 1 [that is, prior to 1727], introduced, used, accepted 
or received, as laws of this Island, shall continue to be laws in the 
Island, save in so far as any such laws or statutes have been or may be 
repealed or amended by a Law of the Island”.   In Barbados, Antigua, 
and St Kitts and Nevis, the original settlers are deemed to have  
taken with them English law in force in the seventeenth century.    
In The Bahamas, Dominica and Grenada, various statutes, a 
declaratory Act and two proclamations incorporated the common 
law by various formulae in the eighteenth century.10 
 
2.   The constitution 
Each Caribbean state’s constitution serves as a bedrock for 
individual rights guaranteed in that jurisdiction, and against which all 
law falls to be tested.   These constitutions formed a symbolic “break” 
with the colonial powers – the United Kingdom retains an “unwritten 
constitution” – though enacted by Parliament at Westminster.11    
The effect of specific constitutions, and in particular, of the  
savings provisions enacted therein, is examined in Part II.B., post.    
Most Caribbean constitutions follow the same model, and include a 
preamble (with the exception of Jamaica) and chapters on: 
 
 
7  This is the position in Dominica, Grenada, and Jamaica.  
8  Ch. 4:01 (Trinidad and Tobago). 
9  Cap. 165 (Jamaica).  
10  The position is somewhat complicated but is succinctly set out in Gilbert 
Kodilinye, Commonwealth Caribbean Tort Law (4th edn, Routledge 2009), ch. 1. 
11  The autonomy, or otherwise, of such Constitutions, and philosophical questions 
of the legitimacy of such constitutions, are outside the scope of this article.    
On this point, see, for example, Rose-Marie Belle Antoine, Commonwealth Caribbean 
Law And Legal Systems (2nd edn, Routledge 2008), ch. 7. 
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a) citizenship; 
b) a Bill of Rights, laying out the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of citizens; 
c) the appointment and powers of the Head of State; 
d) the establishment and powers of the Legislature (including a 
standard statutory formula that Parliament may “make laws 
for the peace, order and good government” of the state);; 
e) Executive powers; 
f) the Judicature; 
g) finance;  and 
h) the Public Service.12 
In addition, each constitution contains a powerful “savings law clause.”   
For example, the Constitution of Jamaica 1962, sub-sections 26(8)  
and (9), provide: 
(8) Nothing contained in any law in force immediately 
before the appointed day shall be held to be inconsistent with 
any of the provisions of this Chapter;  and nothing done 
under the authority of any such law shall be held to be done 
in contravention of any of these provisions. 
(9) For the purposes of subsection (8) of this section a law 
in force immediately before the appointed day [August 6, 
1962,] shall be deemed not to have ceased to be such a law by 
reason only of- 
a. any adaptations or modifications made thereto by or 
under section 4 of the Jamaica (Constitution) Order in 
Council 1962 [which enacted the Constitution], or 
b. its reproduction in identical form in any 
consolidation or revision of laws with only such 
adaptations or modifications as are necessary or 
expedient by reason of its inclusion in such 
consolidation or revision. 
Thus, criminal statutes which violate the Constitution, but which were 
passed before its enactment on August 6, 1962, will generally be 
protected;  whereas modern reforms enacted thereafter will need to 
pass strict constitutional muster.   This has raised interesting legal 
problems, as will be outlined in Part II.B., post. 
 
3.   Legislation enacted under the constitution 
Legislation as specifically enacted in each state (the Caribbean States 
all possess independent legislatures) after the enactment of the 
respective constitutions is bound by the provisions of each constitution.   
This is known as the “principle of constitutionality.”   Thereby, any 
 
 
12  The ordering of each constitution will vary;  this is that of the Constitution of 
Jamaica 1962. 
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legislation deemed not to abide by the Constitution is automatically 
invalidated.   The significance of this principle is examined in  
Part II.B., post. 
 
4.   Case Law 
Finally, there is the case law as it has developed in England and 
Wales, and in the Caribbean.   This pervades the other three pillars, 
forming part of the common law adopted .   As will be seen,13 British 
courts have played a fundamental role in Caribbean criminal law, and 
the colonial legacy of the Privy Council’s appellate jurisdiction has 
continued to be fundamental in the development of case law after the 
enactment of Caribbean states’ constitutions. 
 
B.   Laws Divided by Constitutions 
In Caribbean criminal law, the Constitution – the single most 
important pillar – often becomes intertwined with the three other 
substantive pillars of the law, raising particularly complex legal questions.   
In all Commonwealth Caribbean states, there are written constitu-
tions that contain a Bill of Rights.   The constitutions all provide that 
they are the supreme law, and as a necessary inference the courts will 
ensure that any law that is inconsistent with the constitution is 
invalidated by reason of such inconsistency.   This can be described as 
the principle of constitutionality. 
The principle of constitutionality has been applied by Caribbean 
courts and the Privy Council to strike down substantive criminal 
legislation that either impinges on the separation of powers or derogates 
from the rights secured to the individual by relevant Bills of Rights. 
Insofar as the separation of powers is concerned, the celebrated 
case of Hinds v. The Queen14 decided that an attempt by the 
Government of Jamaica to deal with an epidemic of gun-related 
homicides by the establishment of a special “Gun Court,” conflicted, 
to an extent, with the Constitution of Jamaica.   The Gun Court Act 1974 
established the Gun Court and provided that it should have  
three divisions.   The Full Court Division was to be constituted by 
three resident magistrates, and its jurisdiction was to cover any 
firearms offence, or other offence committed by a person detained 
for a firearms offence (except capital offences), and was to cover the 
whole island of Jamaica.   When the Constitution came into force, such 
jurisdiction had only been exercisable by a Supreme Court judge in 
the Circuit Court.   The Privy Council held (by a majority) that 
Parliament was not entitled to vest in a new court composed of 
 
 
13  Especially in Part II.B., post. 
14  Hinds [1977] A.C. 195 (Privy Council). 
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members of the lower judiciary a jurisdiction that was characteristic of 
a “Supreme Court”.   However, the court also held that the other two 
divisions of the Gun Court only geographically extended the 
jurisdiction of a Supreme Court judge sitting in a Circuit Court and 
were, therefore, not contrary to the Constitution.   The ratio of the 
case was followed and applied by the Privy Council in DPP of Jamaica 
v. Mollison,15 where it was held that legislation that provided for a 
juvenile to be detained “during the Governor General’s pleasure” (i.e. 
the executive) was incompatible with the separation of powers and 
was, accordingly, unconstitutional.   All Commonwealth Caribbean 
states have a similar constitutional structure, and Hinds and Mollison 
are to be regarded as good law throughout the Caribbean. 
As far as the death penalty is concerned, the position is more 
complex.   As a general rule, in the Commonwealth Caribbean the 
death penalty is provided for by colonial legislation as the mandatory 
sentence for murder.   In Matthew v. State of Trinidad and Tobago,16 the 
mandatory sentence of death for murder was upheld by the Privy 
Council for the purposes of Trinidad and Tobago by a nine-member 
board of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council which 
essentially reversed (by a bare majority of 5:4 which included Zacca J., 
who was Chief Justice of Jamaica for 11 years to 1996) its earlier 
decision in Roodal v. State of Trinidad and Tobago17 decided in early 2003.   
The Privy Council had, in deciding Roodal, unexpectedly quashed a 
closely reasoned decision of a particularly strong Trinidad and 
Tobago Court of Appeal18) which was delivered by De La Bastide C.J. 
(as he then was19).   The court in Matthew upheld the mandatory 
sentence of death for murder in Trinidad and Tobago, and held, inter 
alia, that the sentence was provided for in a written law which had 
been in existence prior to the enactment of the 1976 constitution, 
specifically section 4 of the Offences against the Persons Act 1925 
(Trinidad and Tobago).   Since the Constitution of Trinidad and 
Tobago contained a particularly robust form of “savings law clause”, 
the court held the sentence of death to be saved and, therefore, valid 
law in Trinidad and Tobago, even though the court accepted that the 
sentence itself was in violation of the protections afforded to the 
individual by the Bill of Rights provisions in the constitution. 
The position in Trinidad and Tobago with respect to the death 
penalty is the same as it is in Barbados for, on the very day that 
Matthew was decided, the Privy Council, constituted as in Matthew  
 
 
15  Mollison [2003] UKPC 6, [2003] 2 A.C. 411. 
16  Matthew [2004] UKPC 33, [2005] 1 A.C. 433. 
17  Roodal [2003] UKPC 78, [2005] 1 A.C. 328. 
18  Roodal v. State of Trinidad and Tobago, unreported, July 17, 2002 (Court of Appeal 
of Trinidad and Tobago). 
19  Michael de La Bastide became President of the Caribbean Court of Justice, 2004-11. 
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and split as in Matthew, declared this to be so in Boyce v. The Queen20  
(argued at the same time as Matthew and decided on the same basis).    
In the smaller Commonwealth Caribbean States that comprise the 
OECS and Belize, the Privy Council (in the so-called trilogy of cases 
of Reyes v. The Queen21, R. v. Hughes22 and Fox v. The Queen23) has held 
the mandatory sentence to be unconstitutional on the ground that the 
savings law clauses in those territories are less robust.  
In Jamaica, death sentences were ruled to be unconstitutional 
because they are contained in a law enacted after the passage of the 
Constitution,24 in violation thereof.   Accordingly, no question of death 
sentences being saved by the constitution arose.   This was decided in 
Watson v. The Queen (Att.-Gen. for Jamaica intervening),25 the appeal from 
the Court of Appeal of Jamaica which was argued together with 
Matthew and Boyce.   More recently, the Privy Council, in Nimrod Miguel 
v. State of Trinidad and Tobago,26 has used the same reasoning to strike 
down legislation in Trinidad and Tobago which was enacted after the 
constitution and which provided for the imposition of the death 
penalty for a class of murder which can be described as similar to the 
felony murder category at common law.27   The Criminal Law Act 1997 
provided that killing another during the course of committing  
an “arrestable offence” was punishable by the death penalty.   
Although the constitutionality of the Act was not the subject of 
argument in the Trinidad and Tobago Court of Appeal, the Privy 
Council expressly ruled the legislation unconstitutional on the same 
basis that the legislation in Watson was held to be unconstitutional, 
and that the legislation was not saved by the constitution from 
invalidity as a law in being at the time the constitution was enacted. 
 
C.   Key Developments 
1.   Financial crime 
In all Commonwealth Caribbean States there has been 
considerable effort expended on the enactment of legislation for the 
purpose of ensuring that states comply with the forty recommen-
dations (on money laundering) and nine special recommendations (on 
 
 
20  Boyce [2004] UKPC 32, [2005] 1 A.C. 400. 
21  Reyes [2002] UKPC 11, [2002] 2 A.C. 235. 
22  Hughes [2002] UKPC 12, [2002] 2 A.C. 259. 
23  Fox [2002] UKPC 13, [2002] 2 A.C. 284. 
24  By the Offences Against the Persons Act 1992 (Jamaica). 
25  Watson [2004] UKPC 34, [2005] 1 A.C. 472.  
26  Nimrod Miguel [2011] UKPC 14, [2012] A.C. 361. 
27  The law with respect to the mandatory death penalty is addressed by the author 
in two case notes:  John Jeremie, “The Caribbean death penalty saga” (2012) 128 Law 
Quarterly Review 31;;  “The Final Act of the Caribbean Death Penalty Saga”,  
(2012) 128 Law Quarterly Review 485. 
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terrorist financing) of the FATF.   The domestic criminal law of many 
states has been heavily shaped by attempts to thwart the funding of 
terrorist organisations through offshore finance.   This focus has grown 
keener since the events of September 11, 2001, but the FATF had for 
some time been working actively with certain states on law reform.   
The common themes were defined at the core by anti-money 
laundering and counter terrorist financing strategies.   The focus of 
attention in the Caribbean was not limited to independent Common-
wealth states, but has extended also to the British Overseas Territories 
of the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, and Bermuda.   
States such Antigua and Barbuda and the Bahamas have attracted 
particular attention – in the latter, a raft of enactments were 
introduced in 2000, including the Banks and Trust Companies Regulation 
Act 2000, the Central Bank of the Bahamas Act 2000, the Proceeds of Crime 
Act 2000, the Financial Intelligence Unit Act 2000, the Financial 
Transactions Reporting Act 2000, the International Business Companies Act 
2000, the Evidence (Proceedings in other Jurisdictions) Act 2000 and the 
Criminal Justice (International Cooperation) Act 2000.   Other Common-
wealth Caribbean States were encouraged to move with varying 
degrees of alacrity after the events of September 11 to enact 
legislation which met the anti-money laundering and countering of 
terrorist financing objectives through the accepted “3D” strategies – 
detect, disrupt and deter.28 
The legislation has given rise to, and thus far survived, consti-
tutional challenges in the Commonwealth Caribbean.   In particular, 
there were challenges before the Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal,29 
in Antigua Commercial Bank v. Humphreys,30 to mandatory disclosure 
requirements, and before the Court of Appeal of the Bahamas, in 
Att.-Gen. v. Financial Clearing Corporation,31 in relation to certain powers 
of the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU).   In the Financial Clearing 
Corporation case the powers in question related to the ability of the 
unit to restrain transactions of an account holder for defined periods.   
Although the powers were provided for without court authorisation, 
an aggrieved account holder could move the court to have the 
restraint order discharged.   There were two bases of challenge.    
 
 
28  See generally (2011) 36(2) West Indian Law Journal, a special issue on “Financial 
Crime in Jamaica”. 
29  Established by the members of the OECS in 1967. 
30  ACB v. Humphreys, 75 W.I.R. 237 (Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal):  “the 
bank was not entitled to disclose any information whatsoever in relation to the 
customer’s account unless the procedures specified by the statute for disclosure were 
met” – i.e. they had the customer’s consent or a court order. 
31  Financial Clearing Corporation, unreported, October 8, 2002 (Court of Appeal of the 
Bahamas):  the right to privacy in the Constitution of the Bahamas, art. 21, did not 
include a “right not to have one’s personal banking information disclosed”. 
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The first was that the powers breached the prohibition against the 
unlawful deprivation of property, which exists in all territories in 
Commonwealth Caribbean constitutions.   The second was that the 
powers violated the separation of powers doctrine in that they were in 
substance powers typically reserved to the judiciary.   A majority of 
the Court of Appeal decided that the legislation was in fact 
constitutionally proper. 
It is submitted that the minority judgment of Osadebay J.A. in the 
Bahamas Court of Appeal32 is probably stronger in relation to both 
bases of challenge in respect of which the judge held that the provisions 
of the Constitution of the Bahamas had in fact been breached, and 
that the FIU had used powers typically reserved to the judiciary.    
In so finding, the minority relied heavily on the decision in Att.-Gen. 
of the Gambia v. Momodou Jobe,33 in which the Privy Council examined 
powers exercised by a state functionary against the structure and the 
rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the Gambia. 
Certain of the powers insisted on by the FATF may well 
encounter difficulty in surviving a concerted constitutional challenge:  
in particular, the provision for pre-trial extra-judicial civil restraint  
on dealing with property probably contravenes the prohibitions 
against unlawful deprivation of property which exists in all states.   
The restraint powers are also vulnerable on the orthodox separation 
of powers doctrine, insofar as they attempt to allow for persons other 
than judicial officers to exercise restraint powers which are typically 
judicial powers.   It is likely that, on orthodox Hinds34 principles,  
the latter class of powers, if entrusted to ordinary technocrats subject 
to ministerial control, will be held to be unconstitutional35. 
 
2.   Bail 
The right of accused persons to bail is an inherent aspect of the 
criminal justice system in any democratic society.   In the Common-
wealth Caribbean, given the social context described above, govern-
ments have increasingly sought to curtail this right as they have 
become progressively frustrated at the lengthy delays between arrest 
and conviction, and the tendency of persons to commit further 
offences whilst on bail. 
In Trinidad and Tobago a series of Bail (Amendment) Acts that 
abridged the right to bail were passed by the Parliament with the 
requisite constitutional majority each of which contained a “sunset” 
clause of increasing duration.   Finally, the Bail (Amendment) Act 2008 
 
 
32  In Financial Clearing Corporation, ibid. 
33  Momodou Jobe [1984] A.C. 689 (Privy Council). 
34  (n.14.) 
35  ibid. 
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(Trinidad and Tobago)36 was enacted by the legislature.   The Act was 
passed with a “special majority” and it sought to curtail the right to 
bail of persons accused of scheduled offences for varying periods  
of time.   Subsequent to its enactment, yet another amendment 
sought to restrict the right to bail of accused persons who were 
members of a “gang” as defined by the Anti-Gang Act 2011  
(Trinidad and Tobago).37 
Both pieces of legislation are still on the statute books and are 
being enforced.   Both are clearly unconstitutional.   In State of Mauritius 
v. Khoyratty,38 the Privy Council struck down an amendment to the 
Bail Act 1999 (Mauritius) that limited the grant of bail to persons 
charged in respect of certain drug offences.   The relevant amendment 
was deeply entrenched in the constitution having been made by way 
of a constitutional amendment that was then passed by the Parlia-
ment with the prescribed majority.   The Privy Council, however, 
upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal of Mauritius to strike 
down the enactment on the ground that it was inconsistent with the 
principle of the separation of powers.   The board held that the right 
to bail was a matter for control by the judiciary and, by analogy with 
the decision in Hinds,39 the executive could not, however great the 
legislative effort to curtail the right, properly exercise a judicial power 
in a democratic society as defined by the separation of powers 
doctrine.   There is no reason to believe that a similar result will not 
occur if the Bail (Amendment) Act of Trinidad and Tobago is tested. 
 
III.   CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS –  
THE COURT STRUCTURE 
The court system in much of the Caribbean, as with the substantive 
law, reflects the colonial past of the territories.   It is depicted in the 
diagram opposite. 
In the Commonwealth Caribbean, as a general rule, it is the 
magistrates’ courts that absorb the greater portion of the flow of 
criminal matters40.   All matters are dealt with by a magistrate, 
whether in the form of a complete trial where the offence is one that 
can be lawfully dealt with by a magistrate or, where it is not, in the 
form of a preliminary enquiry when it falls to be tried before a judge  
 
 
 
36  Act No. 7 of 2008. 
37   Act No. 10 of 2011. 
38  Khoyratty [2006] UKPC 13, [2007] 1 A.C. 80. 
39  (n.14.) 
40  The law on Criminal Procedure in the territories of the Commonwealth 
Caribbean is comprehensively set out in meticulous and admirable detail by  
Dana Seetahal in her authoritative text, Commonwealth Caribbean Criminal Practice and Procedure 
(3rd edn, Routledge,2010), 172-173. 
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TYPICAL CARIBBEAN CRIMINAL COURT SYSTEM 
 
 
and jury.   In respect of the latter, the magistrate conducts a full 
preliminary enquiry during which evidence is led, submissions are 
made, and inevitably there is cross-examination of the witnesses. 
Two territories, St Lucia and Antigua, have abolished preliminary 
enquiries.   In St Lucia this was done by an amendment to the 
criminal code41 that created one single Criminal Division of the High 
Court of St Lucia.42   There is an initial hearing before a magistrate 
and a sufficiency hearing before a judge.   All criminal proceedings, be 
they summary or indictable, are started by way of a complaint filed in 
the Criminal Division.   The amendment allows for rules to be made 
for the procedure governing indictable offences.   Criminal Procedure Rules 
provide for the magistrate to hold only an initial hearing at which 
formalities are attended to:  these will include the making of a schedu-
ling order stipulating the dates by which various matters such as disclo-
sure are to take place and the fixing of a date for a sufficiency hearing.   
The judge at the sufficiency hearing examines the written evidence 
and makes a determination as to whether a prima facie case has been 
made out.   In Antigua the full “preliminary enquiry” has been abolished 
by the Antigua Magistrates’ Code of Procedure (Amendment) Act 2004.43   
However, the magistrate now conducts the committal proceedings, 
 
 
41  Effected by the Criminal Code Amendment Act 2008, (St Lucia), Act no. 11 of 2008. 
42  Administratively, this is part of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court. 
43  Act No. 13 of 2004 (Antigua). 
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and the decision to commit is made by him on the basis of written 
statements and exhibits of the parties.44   
One territory, Trinidad and Tobago, is about to embark on similar 
reforms.   The Administration of Justice (Indictable Proceedings) Act 201145 
will abolish the full “preliminary enquiry” and provide for committal 
proceedings before a master of the High Court.   The master will 
have a sufficiency hearing where he will review the papers and make a 
determination as to whether to commit or to discharge the accused.   
Summary trials will be conducted before magistrates in accordance 
with the normal protocols. 
In all of the territories in the Commonwealth Caribbean, the more 
serious offences are tried on indictment and so are tried before a 
judge and jury.   The relatively speaking less serious offences may be 
dealt with summarily by a trial in a magistrates’ court.   Certain 
offences are described as “triable either way:”  what this means in 
practice is that the matter might be dealt with in the form of a trial 
before either a magistrate or a judge and jury, at the option of the 
parties or, in some cases, at the direction of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions. 
 
IV.   THE PRIVY COUNCIL AND THE CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 
In 2009, upon his installation as first President of the Supreme Court 
of England and Wales, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, made a 
number of remarks on the continuing drain on his judicial resources 
which was caused by having Britain’s “top judges” assigned to hear 
appeals from the Caribbean in the Privy Council46.   These statements 
were widely disseminated in the international press.   What was not 
mentioned, and has not been pointed out since, is the presence in the 
Caribbean of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ), a court 
established by agreement of the heads of state of the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM) in 2005 for the very purpose of hearing 
final appeals which had, before its establishment, been exclusively 
directed to the Privy Council from all Caribbean territories.  
 
 
44  The Antigua Law abolishing the preliminary enquiry was upheld by the  
Privy Council in Humphreys v. Att.-Gen. of Antigua and Barbuda [2008] UKPC 61,  
[2009] 4 L.R.C. 405;  the Board considered that the preliminary enquiry was not 
indispensable to the system of justice.   What the constitution required was a system 
of laws that was fair.  
45  Act No. 20 of 2011 (Trinidad and Tobago]). 
46  As reported in the on Michael Peel, Jane Croft, “Privy Council hampers Supreme 
Court”, Financial Times (London, September 21, 2009).   Lord Phillips is quoted as 
saying, of the time spent by Supreme Court Justices on Privy Council appeals:   
“It is a huge amount of time.   I personally would like to see it reduced.    
It’s disproportionate.”. 
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No one can provide a convincing answer to the question why 
Caribbean governments have not embraced the Caribbean Court of 
Justice.   So far only Barbados, Belize and Guyana have incorporated 
the court into the structure of their court systems.   In an 
impassioned plea made in Port of Spain, former Secretary-General of 
the Commonwealth, Sir Shridath Ramphal remarked that: 
“It is almost axiomatic that the Caribbean Community should 
have its own final court of appeal in all matters.   A century-
old tradition of erudition and excellence in the legal 
profession of the region leaves no room for hesitancy.   
Ending the jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council was actually treated as consequential on Guyana 
becoming a Republic 39 years ago.   I am frankly ashamed 
when I see the small list of Commonwealth countries that still 
cling to that jurisdiction – a list dominated by the Caribbean.   
Now that we have created our Caribbean Court of Justice in a 
manner that has won the respect and admiration of the 
common law world, it is an act of abysmal contrariety that we 
have withheld so substantially its appellate jurisdiction in 
favour of that of the Privy Council – we who have sent judges 
to the International Court of Justice, to the International 
Criminal Court and to the International Court for the former 
Yugoslavia, to the presidency of the United Nations Tribunal 
on the Law of the Sea;  we from whose Caribbean shores 
have sprung in lineal descent the current Attorneys-General 
of Britain and of the United States.47 
“This paradox of heritage and hesitancy must be 
repudiated by action – action of the kind Belize has just taken 
to embrace the appellate jurisdiction of the CCJ and abolish 
appeals to the Privy Council.   It is enlightened action taken 
by way of constitutional amendment, and Belize deserves the 
applause of the Caribbean Community – not just its legal 
fraternity.   Those countries still hesitant must find the will 
and the way to follow Belize – and perhaps it will be easier if 
they act as one.   The truth is that the alternative to such 
action is too self-destructive to contemplate.   If we remain 
casual and complacent about such anomalies much longer we 
will end up making a virtue of them and lose all we have 
built.”48 
The court boasts impressive mechanisms to secure judicial 
independence.   Judges are appointed by an independent commission, 
the Regional Judicial and Legal Services Commission.   They enjoy  
 
 
47  Sir Shridath refers to Baroness Scotland and Eric Holder, Jr, respectively; 
48  Sir Shridath Ramphal, “Caribbean Judiciaries in an era of Globalization: The 
Paradox of Heritage and Hesitancy” (public lecture, Hyatt Regency Hotel, Port of 
Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, June 25, 2009).  
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a tenure that is as secure from interference as any that is guaranteed 
by the constitutions of the Commonwealth Caribbean states.    
In Independent Jamaica Council for Human Rights (1998) Ltd v.  
Marshall-Burnett,49 the Privy Council struck down legislation in 
Jamaica, which was designed to replace the Privy Council with the 
Caribbean Court of Justice, on the ground that the court did not 
contain mechanisms for securing judicial independence which was 
consistent with the Constitution of Jamaica.   The decision was 
unfortunate and represents a narrow view as to the nature of what is 
required to maintain judicial independence.   The Jamaica Parliament 
now has before it for debate a host of enactments that, if passed, will 
have the effect of replacing the Privy Council with the Caribbean 
Court of Justice.   It is to be hoped that the legislation will garner the 
necessary support.   In Trinidad and Tobago, a proposal by the Prime 
Minister to replace the Privy Council with the Caribbean Court of 
Justice, but only in respect of criminal matters (whatever that might 
be taken to mean), has found favour with neither the opposition in 
Parliament, nor with the Prime Minister’s fellow heads of state.    
The approval of the latter was required because the proposal in effect 
amounted to a breach of the treaty commitment made in 2005  
to introduce the court as a final court of appeal in all matters.    
The point was forcefully made that not only would this amount to a 
breach of the treaty by which the court was established, but that the 
proposal was unworkable as criminal appeals could not properly be 
distinguished from constitutional appeals, the more so given the 
analysis undertaken in cases such as Miguel. 50 
It certainly cannot be the case that there are legitimate concerns 
about the quality of the judges of the Caribbean Court of Justice.    
Sir Shridath’s comments put that issue firmly to rest.   The early fears 
expressed by some that the court would simply be a “hanging court” 
must likewise have been stilled both by the early jurisprudence of the 
court51 and more recently by the appointment to the Presidency of 
 
 
49  [2005] UKPC 3;  [2005] 2 A.C. 356. 
50  (n.26.) 
51   In Attorney-General and Superintendent of Prisons v Joseph and Boyce [2006] CCJ 1, the 
court dismissed an appeal by the Government of Barbados which had been 
prevented from carrying out a sentence of death in circumstances where the 
prisoners had petitions pending before the Inter American Commission.   The Court 
held that the decision of the Barbados Privy Council (a mercy committee) was 
amenable to review, and that if the Committee proceeded to make a determination as 
to the exercise or denial of pardon in circumstances where there was a legitimate 
expectation that the State of Barbados would, consistent with its treaty obligations, 
await the determination of the condemned prisoners petition by the Inter American 
Commission, that would amount to a reviewable breach of procedure of the 
Barbados Privy Council.   The Caribbean Court of Justice also approved and applied 
the five-year limit established by the Privy Council in Pratt and Morgan v. Att.-Gen.  
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the Court of Sir Dennis Byron, the Chief Justice of the Eastern 
Caribbean Court of Appeal at the time Fox52 and Hughes,53 which 
curtailed the use of the death penalty in the OECS, were decided 54.  
Of course it is by no means certain that the adoption of the 
Caribbean Court of Justice will automatically translate itself into an 
improvement in the delivery of criminal justice in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean.   What is certain, however, is that the patriating of the 
court will reflect Caribbean values because the court is necessarily a 
creation of, and patriated in the Caribbean.   In this sense, the 
adoption of the court as a final court of appeal in the region is an 
urgent necessity for the proper dispensation of justice and punish-
ment that is of the Caribbean and for the Caribbean in a way that 
cannot perhaps be achieved by a foreign court. 
The court structure in Barbados, Belize and Guyana with the 
Caribbean Court of Justice at the pinnacle, is depicted hereunder.   
The proposal is that this should become the structure as a general 
principle for all of the territories that have signed the Agreement 
Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice. 
 
CARIBBEAN CRIMINAL COURT SYSTEM:   
BARBADOS, BELIZE AND GUYANA 
 
                                                                                                             
of Jamaica [1994] 2 A.C. 1.   The CCJ in Joseph and Boyce denied the appeal, and the life 
sentences imposed by the Barbados Court of Appeal were affirmed.  
52  (n.23.) 
53  (n. 22.)  
54  In any event the first president of the court, De La Bastide, J.C.C.J. could hardly 
be described as a champion of the death penalty, having delivered a strong judgement 
in Joseph and Boyce (n.51) in the Caribbean Court of Justice.   
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While this structure is arguably preferable to that which currently 
exists, in that the Privy Council is replaced as the final court of 
appeal, it is possible that it does not meet the challenges set by the 
soaring crime rates described ante. 
What is required is not merely the replacement of the Privy Council, 
which by unhappy coincidence of history was formed at the time 
slavery was abolished and is perhaps not the ideal vehicle from the 
viewpoint of history and culture, it being associated so closely in time 
with slavery itself,55
55
  to pronounce on punishment including the death 
penalty for Commonwealth Caribbean citizens many of whom are the 
descendants of slaves, but a complete overhaul of the criminal justice 
system to allow for expedition such as that being undertaken in  
St Lucia and Antigua and soon to be attempted in Trinidad and 
Tobago as has been described above.   Such a court structure will 
resemble that which is contained in the following diagram. 
 
PROPOSED CARIBBEAN CRIMINAL COURT SYSTEM 
 
 
If Commonwealth Caribbean states remain wedded to the idea 
that the Privy Council is the ideal vehicle for dispensing justice to 
 
 
    It is not here suggested that the Privy Council has been an imperialistic Court.   
Few will argue that the decisions of the Privy Council in fact have served to enhance 
individual rights in the Commonwealth Caribbean.  The argument is purely one of 
symbolism. 
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them notwithstanding the arguments set out by Sir Shridath Ramphal56 
then, at the minimum, it is time to move away from a structure which 
now quite obviously causes gridlock in the criminal justice system, to 
a more modern one which allows for the swift dispensation of justice 
along the lines of the structure now being attempted in Antigua and 
Barbuda, St Lucia and Trinidad and Tobago.   Such a structure will 
resemble the proposed structure (depicted ante), save that the  
Privy Council would be retained in the place of the Caribbean  
Court of Justice. 
 
V.   OPPORTUNITIES FOR OVERSEAS LAWYERS TO  
PRACTISE LAW IN THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN 
There is a fused legal profession in the Commonwealth Caribbean.   
Attorneys-at-law are admitted to practise once they have completed 
the Certificate of Legal Education from one of the Caribbean’s three 
law schools.   One is located in Jamaica (the Norman Manley Law 
School), another in the Bahamas (the Eugene Dupuch Law School), 
and the third is in Trinidad and Tobago (the Sir Hugh Wooding  
Law School).   By virtue of the Council of Legal Education Treaty, 
entry to the law schools is automatic for holders of an LL.B. awarded 
by the University of the West Indies.   In the case of persons who 
hold an LL.B. other than from the University of the West Indies, an 
entrance examination must be taken to determine eligibility for entry 
to the law schools. 
Where a person is eligible to practise in any part of the Common-
wealth or the United States, special permission to do a conversion 
course that includes Commonwealth Caribbean constitutional law 
must be sought from the law schools.   The conversion course is a 
six-month course with no final examination.   Upon successful 
completion of the conversion course, a person may practise in any 
Commonwealth Caribbean country that is a party to the treaty after 
arranging for formal call to the bar of the respective territory.   
Further information can be obtained from any of the law schools.  
 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
The constitutions in the Commonwealth Caribbean define the people 
of the Caribbean.   While they are amenable to change and amendment, 
they also contain and provide for values and principles which are 
fundamental and immutable.   This is the context through which one 
must view the rulings of our final courts on legislation which, while it 
might be expedient (such as the setting up of special gun courts in 
Jamaica to treat the pressing problem of gun related homicides, or the 
 
 
56  (n.48). 
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curtailment of bail in Trinidad and Tobago to treat the pressing 
problem of offenders who repeatedly offend whilst on bail for 
another offence), violate constitutionally entrenched principles.   
Other pieces of legislation, such as the reforms called forth by 
international bodies such as the FATF to treat the problem of cross-
border international financial crime, might equally not pass the test of 
what the courts (as guardians of the Constitutions that protect 
citizens of the region) deem to be immutable, and so they are 
impermissible intrusions into the rights to individual liberty of 
Caribbean citizens. 
Interestingly, the reforms to our justice system as a whole that  
have been proposed thus far have met the constitutional test of  
immutable values57. 
As many of the island states that comprise the Commonwealth 
Caribbean reach the landmark of fifty years of independence, it is 
hoped that reforms to the justice system which are meaningful can be 
pursued at the expense of reforms which might meet the demands of 
short term political expediency, such as the curtailment of rights to 
bail and the abridgement of the right of the individual to property.    
It is submitted that the latter are not reforms to the system of justice, but 
short-term measures which have as their focus an influence on 
individual behaviour ,but at the unacceptable cost of the curtailment 
of individual rights. 
 
 
 
57  Humphreys v. Att.-Gen. of Antigua and Barbuda (n.44). 
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EXTRADITION FOR WAR CRIMES  
Minister for Home Affairs (Cth) and others v. Zentai and others  
[2012] HCA 28, (2012) 289 A.L.R. 644 (August 15, 2012) 
High Court of Australia 
extradition – surrender determination – war crime  
A.   Introduction 
Justice Dyson Heydon appears well on his way to challenging Michael 
Kirby’s mantle as the biggest outsider in the history of the High 
Court of Australia.1   His dissent rate has been recorded as 45 per 
cent in 2011, just shy of Kirby’s 48.3 per cent in 2006, and he 
currently sits on a dissent rate of 22 per cent for 2012.2  When he 
retires in March 2013, along with an unparalleled legacy, Justice 
Heydon will leave behind a fearless pragmatism most recently 
demonstrated in his dissenting judgment in Minister for Home Affairs 
(Cth) and others v Zentai and others.3   In his opening remarks, Justice 
Heydon boldly went where the majority,4 for whatever reason, 
appeared very reluctant to go: -  
“Counsel for the first respondent referred to the ‘general 
antipathy in international law …  against retrospectivity’ –  
an antipathy which can be somewhat selectively displayed.   
Analysis should not be diverted by that antipathy in this case.   
Nor should analysis be diverted by the characteristic vagueness 
with which war crimes are defined.   Finally, analysis should not 
be diverted by reflections upon the zeal with which the victors at 
the end of the Second World War punished the defeated for 
war crimes.   The victors were animated by the ideals of the 
Atlantic Charter and of the United Nations.   The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights was about to peep over the eastern 
horizon.   But first, they wanted to have a little hanging.”5 
Since a warrant was issued for his arrest in 2005, Australian citizen 
Charles Zentai has mounted several challenges against his extradition 
 
 
1  Michael Pelly, “Heydon The Great Loner pens his legacy”, The Australian (Sydney, 
October 19, 2012), 29.   See also Peter Fitzgerald’s case note on Burns v. The Queen, at 
p.353 of this issue of the JCCL. 
2  ibid.. 
3  Zentai [2012] HCA 28, (2012) 289 A.L.R. 644. 
4  French CJ., Gummow, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ. 
5  Zentai (n.3), [75]. 
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to the Republic of Hungary for an alleged war crime.   The High Court 
of Australia’s decision in Zentai is considered the end of the road for 
Hungary’s quest to extradite him and for some, is “a very sad end to 
the abysmal failure of the Australian government to bring war criminals 
to justice”.6   This case note considers the decision after outlining the 
background to the extradition litigation. 
 
B.   Background 
On March 3, 2005, the Military Division of the Metropolitan Court of 
Budapest issued an arrest warrant for Zentai who resides in Western 
Australia.   On March 23, 2005, the Republic of Hungary wrote to 
Australia requesting the extradition of Zentai for the purposes of his 
prosecution for the offence of “war crime”.   The warrant alleged that 
on November 8, 1944, while stationed in Budapest as a member of 
the Hungarian Royal Army, Zentai recognised Peter Balazs, a young 
man of Jewish origin who was not wearing a mandatory yellow star.   
Zentai was alleged with others to have dragged Balazs to an army 
post, beaten him to death and then to have thrown his body weighted 
with ballast into the Danube river.   At the time of the alleged offence, 
there was no offence of “war crime” on the Hungarian statute book 
but the offence of murder did exist.   The offence of committing a 
“war crime” only came into existence under Hungarian law in 1945. 
On July 8, 2005, acting under section 16 of the Extradition Act 1988 
(Cth) (“the Act”), the former Minister for Justice and Customs for 
Australia, acting as the delegate of the Attorney-General, issued a 
notice confirming receipt of the extradition request.   By section 16(2), 
the Attorney-General may not issue such a notice unless of the opinion 
that the person whose extradition is sought is an “extraditable person” 
in relation to the requesting country.   The existence of such a notice 
is a condition precedent to the conduct of proceedings under section 19 
to determine the person’s “eligibility” for extradition.   On the same 
day, a magistrate issued a provisional arrest warrant for Zentai under 
section 12 of the Act, who was arrested and granted bail.   On August 20, 
2008, a magistrate determined, pursuant to section 19, that Zentai was 
eligible for extradition and issued a warrant committing him to prison.   
Prior to this, Zentai had unsuccessfully challenged the validity of the 
conferral upon state magistrates of the power to determine eligibility 
for surrender under section 19.   The challenge failed at first instance 
in the Federal Court,7 on appeal to the Full Court8 and on further 
appeal to the High Court of Australia.9 
 
 
6  Efraim Zuroff, Director of the Simon Wiesenthal Centre (Jerusalem) as quoted 
in Paige Taylor and Nicholas Perpitch, “War crime case is halted”, The Australian 
(Sydney, August 16, 2012), 11. 
7  Zentai v. Republic of Hungary [2006] FCA 1226, (2006) 153 F.C.R. 104. 
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Zentai applied, under section 21, to the Federal Court for a review 
of the magistrate’s section 19 determination.   The magistrate’s deter-
mination was affirmed by the Federal Court10 and Zentai’s subsequent 
appeal to the Full Federal Court against that decision was dismissed 
on October 8, 2009.11   Section 11(1) of the Act provides that 
regulations may provide that it applies in relation to a specified 
extradition country (Hungary is such a country) subject to such 
limitations, conditions, exceptions or qualifications as are necessary to 
give effect to a bilateral extradition treaty in relation to the country.   
Zentai’s argument (ultimately successful in the decision the subject of 
this note) was that there was such a limitation in the relevant treaty, 
that the relevant regulations gave effect to that limitation, and that it 
was incumbent on the magistrate, at the eligibility hearing, to take 
account of such limitation in deciding whether he was “eligible” for 
extradition.   It was held that the magistrate’s function, under the Act, 
did not extend thus far.   Any limitation on the scope of the Act 
introduced by the particular treaty would only come into the 
reckoning at a later stage (or, possibly, at an earlier stage by way of 
judicial review of the Attorney-General’s decision to issue a notice 
under section 16). 
On November 12, 2009, the Minister for Home Affairs determined, 
pursuant to section 22(2), that Zentai was to be surrendered to the 
Republic of Hungary.   Section 22 requires the minister to determine 
as soon as is reasonably practicable after a person becomes an 
“eligible person” whether the person is to be surrendered in relation 
to a qualifying extradition offence.   It is at this stage that section 11 is 
engaged because section 22(3)(e) stipulates that an eligible person is 
only to be surrendered in respect of an extradition offence where the 
Attorney-General is satisfied as to the non-existence of any relevant 
limitation having effect by virtue of regulations under that section. 
The Extradition (Republic of Hungary) Regulations (1997) (Cth) declare 
the Republic of Hungary to be an extradition country and provide 
that the Act applies in relation to that country subject to the Treaty 
on Extradition between Australia and the Republic of Hungary (“the 
Treaty”) set out in the schedule to the regulations.12   Article 2.5(a) 
states that extradition may be granted irrespective of when the 
offence in relation to which extradition is sought was committed, 
                                                                                                             
8  Zentai v. Republic of Hungary [2007] FCAFC 48, (2007)157 F.C.R. 585. 
9  The respondent’s challenge was heard concurrently with two other matters: 
O’Donoghue v. Ireland;  Zentai v. Republic of Hungary;  Williams v. United States of America 
[2008] HCA 14;  (2008) 234 C.L.R. 599. 
10  Zentai v. Republic of Hungary [2009] FCA 284. 
11  Zentai v. Republic of Hungary [2009] FCAFC 139, (2009) 180 F.C.R. 225. 
12  Regulation 4 of, and Schedule to, the Extradition (Republic of Hungary) Regulations 1997 
(Cth) (S.R. 1997 No. 60), Treaty on Extradition between Australia and the Republic of Hungary. 
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provided that “it was an offence in the Requesting State at the time of 
the acts or omissions constituting the offence.”    
Zentai challenged the minister’s section 22 determination in the 
Federal Court.   At first instance, the court found it had not been 
open to the minister to surrender Zentai because “war crime” was not 
an offence in Hungary at the time the acts alleged to constitute it 
were committed.13   This time, it was the minister who appealed to 
the Full Federal Court which varied the primary judge’s orders but 
otherwise dismissed the appeal.   A majority of the court concluded 
that the judge had been correct in holding that the offence for which 
extradition was sought must have been an offence under Hungarian 
law at the time of the acts alleged to constitute it.   The minister 
appealed to the High Court of Australia. 
 
C.   Appeal to the High Court of Australia 
At issue was the proper interpretation of the Act and the Treaty and 
whether the minister was empowered to comply with the request  
for extradition.   Of particular relevance were Articles 2.2 and 2.5  
of the Treaty, which state: -  
 “2.2. For the purpose of this Article in determining whether 
an offence is an offence against the law of both Contracting 
States: 
(a)  it shall not matter whether the laws of the 
Contracting States place the acts or omissions 
constituting the offence within the same category 
of offence or denominate the offence by the 
same terminology; 
(b)  the totality of the acts or omissions alleged 
against the person whose extradition is sought 
shall be taken into account and it shall not matter 
whether, under the laws of the Contracting 
States, the constituent elements of the offence 
differ. 
2.5. Extradition may be granted pursuant to the provisions of 
this Treaty irrespective of when the offence in relation to 
which extradition is sought was committed, provided that: 
(a)  it was an offence in the Requesting State at the 
time of the acts or omissions constituting the 
offence;  and 
(b)  the acts or omissions alleged would, if they had 
taken place in the territory of the Requested State 
at the time of the making of the request for 
extradition, have constituted an offence against 
the law in force in that State.” 
 
 
13  Zentai v. O’Connor (No. 3) [2010] FCA 691, (2010) 270 A.L.R. 293. 
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Whilst not unanimous in their reasoning, the majority14 dismissed 
the minister’s appeal concluding he was precluded from surrendering 
Zentai unless he was satisfied that the offence of “war crime” was  
an offence against the laws of the Republic of Hungary as at  
November 8, 1944.   French C.J. concluded that the Treaty, and in 
particular Article 2.5(a), should be interpreted in light of Articles 31 
and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, unconstrained by 
technical rules of construction and taking into account all relevant 
facts as a whole.15    Applying this approach, His Honour stated: 
“As a matter of ordinary grammatical construction, the 
proviso in Article 2.5(a) of the treaty requires that the ‘offence 
in relation to which extradition is sought’ was an offence in 
the requesting state at the time of the acts or omissions said 
to constitute the offence.”16 
His Honour rejected a submission by the minister that the term 
“the offence in relation to which extradition is sought” is to be read 
by reference to Article 2.2 of the treaty as meaning the “acts or 
omissions constituting the offence”- 
“The request for the extradition of the respondent for 
commission of a war crime cannot rest simply upon the 
proposition that the alleged conduct would have constituted 
the offence of murder under Hungarian law in 1944.”17 
The minister had submitted that Australia and the Republic of 
Hungary had entered into a “subsequent agreement” regarding the 
correct interpretation of Article 2.5(a) of the Treaty:  such agreement 
was effectively to be implied from the nature of the Hungarian 
request and the fact of it having been acted upon by Australia.    
This agreement, it was contended, should have been given effect 
pursuant to Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention, which requires that 
account be taken, in interpreting a treaty, of any subsequent 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation or the application 
of its provisions.18   A departmental submission advising the minister 
that the “conduct-based” interpretation of Article 2.5(a) appeared to 
be consistent with the view of the Hungarian Government was said 
to reflect this “subsequent agreement”.   His Honour dismissed this 
argument concluding that, as a matter of domestic law, the Treaty was 
to be interpreted in the light of its text, context and purpose as at the 
time of the 1997 regulations;  any subsequent agreement which had 
the effect of varying the terms of the Treaty would not affect the 
 
 
14  French C.J. and Gummow, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ. 
15  Zentai (n.3), [18], [19]. 
16  ibid., [30]. 
17  ibid., [32]. 
18  ibid., [35]. 
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application of the Act unless section 11 were enlivened by way of a 
further regulation or some other statutory means.19 
Reaching the same conclusion as French C.J., the majority20 
differed in its reasoning.   They noted that Article 2.5(a) embodies a 
general objection to retrospectively applied criminal law recognised 
both domestically and internationally including Article 7 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.21   They concluded that ordinary 
principles of statutory interpretation are to be applied to the treaty 
and that its proper interpretation cannot be altered by some common 
understanding between the parties thereto.22 
The majority considered section 22(3)(e) of the Act which, in this 
case, precluded the surrender of the respondent unless the minister 
was satisfied of the existence of the circumstance stated in Article 2.5(a) 
of the Treaty.23   They discussed the interplay between section 22(3)(e) 
and the regulations made under section 11(1) annexing the Treaty, 
and confirmed that the meaning of the limitation in Article 2.5(a)  
is to be interpreted by applying ordinary principles of statutory 
interpretation.24   Their conclusion was that Article 2.5(a) required the 
minister to direct attention to whether the acts or omissions particu-
larised in the request constituted the offence for which extradition 
was sought and not to whether the acts or omissions particularised in 
the request were capable of giving rise to any form of criminal liability 
under the laws of the requesting state at the time they occurred.   
They accordingly held that the minister was precluded from surren-
dering Zentai unless he was satisfied that the offence of “war crime” 
was an offence against Hungarian law in November, 1944.25 
In stark contrast to what, it is submitted, was a somewhat literalist 
approach of the majority, Heydon J.’s approach to the interpretation 
of the Treaty was purposive and compelling.   His Honour’s judgment 
must rank as one of the most remarkable judgments ever delivered by 
a Commonwealth judge.   Hard on the heels of his opening paragraph 
quoted at the beginning of this note, came this: 
“In 1946 the Allies hanged the former German Foreign 
Minister for crimes against peace.   No doubt he was an 
 
 
19  ibid., [36]. 
20  Gummow, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ. 
21  Citing (at [60]) Polyukhovich v. Commonwealth [1991] HCA 32;  (1991) 172 C.L.R. 501, 
609-12 (Deane J.), 642-3 (Dawson J.), 686-90 (Toohey J);  Lipohar v. R. [1999] HCA 65, 
(1999) 200 C.L.R. 485, [142] (Kirby J.);  Haskins v. Commonwealth [2011] HCA 28, 
(2011) 244 C.L.R. 22, [72] (Heydon J.);  and R. v. Miah [1974] 1 W.L.R. 683 (House of 
Lords), 694 (Lord Reid). 
22  Zentai (n.3), [65]. 
23  ibid., [61]. 
24  ibid., [65]. 
25  ibid., [72]. 
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unlovely character.   No doubt other things that he may have 
done were repellent.   But critics find the way he was forced 
to the scaffold unattractive because the existence of crimes 
against peace before 1945 was at best questionable.   They also 
find it unattractive because the prosecution comprised four 
countries with very large empires, significant parts of which 
had been acquired by starting wars.   That was an example of 
behaviour which gave war crimes trials a bad name.”26 
From this, it might have been thought that his Honour would 
have little truck with an extradition request for “war crime”.   Indeed, 
his Honour points out that the Hungarian decree of 1945 that created 
the offence of war crime provided for three categories of offender, 
saying of the first two that they are “replete with indeterminate  
and uncertain phrases.”27   The third category, however, referred to  
“an instigator, perpetrator or accomplice of the unlawful execution or 
torture of persons”, and the case against the respondent put him in 
this category.   His Honour then recited the factual allegation against 
the respondent, including that, whilst on patrol, he had dragged the 
victim from the street to his unit’s army post where, with two 
accomplices, he had “assaulted” the victim so badly that he died of 
his injuries, whereupon the respondent attached ballast to the body 
which was then disposed of in the Danube.   Having acknowledged 
that the 1945 decree purported to be retrospective in effect, his Honour 
pointed out that this was more apparent than real in the context,  
at least, of allegations within the third category because it required 
antecedently “unlawful” conduct, which, in this case, was murder. 
Directing his attention then to Article 2.5 of the Treaty, his Honour 
was of the opinion that the use of the word “offence” where it first 
appears was intended to refer to the factual elements of the alleged 
offence.   The key elements alleged were intentional assault on another 
leading to that person’s death, which would have fallen within the 
third category of the war crime decree of 1945 and which would have 
been murder in 1944.   Therefore, he concluded, “the offence in 
relation to which extradition is sought” was an offence in Hungary in 
1994, as required by Article 2.5(a).   It was not necessary that the 
named offence, “war crime” should have existed in Hungarian law in 
1944;  it was sufficient that the alleged acts which Hungary contended 
amounted to the named offence constituted an existing offence in 
1944, even if it had a different name.28 
 
 
26  ibid., [79]. 
27  ibid., [76]. 
28  ibid., [84]. 
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His Honour recognised that it was possible to mount an argument 
based on the language of the Treaty that led to a different conclusion.   
However, he continued: 
“So far as that type of reasoning has merit, its merit certainly 
depends on context.   The present context concerns a bilateral 
treaty entered by Australia and Hungary and negotiated by 
State representatives who, most probably, did not share 
fluency in a common language.   It is true that the drafting 
might have been better adapted to achieve the result for 
which the appellants contend.   But that fact does not negate 
the conclusion that the drafting actually employed achieved 
that result.”29  
 
D.   Concluding comments 
The High Court’s decision, which may be seen as a victory of a 
black-letter legal literalism over substantive justice, does not 
exonerate Zentai.   A criminal trial would have been the only mecha-
nism by which justice would have been served.   There is nothing 
which technically precludes the Republic of Hungary issuing a fresh 
arrest warrant and extradition request seeking the extradition of 
Zentai in relation to the offence of “murder” rather than “war crime”.   
It remains to be seen whether the Republic of Hungary will determine 
this to be an appropriate course of action.   The family of Peter Balazs, 
who may never receive closure now, and to whom it would have 
mattered not what label was to be attached to the brutality to which 
he was subjected on that evening in November, 1944, must be 
wondering why it did not take that course in the first place.    
Had it done so, legal opinion seems to be united in the view that 
Zentai would have been unable to resist his extradition.  
 
PATRICIA ALOI.*    
 
 
 
29  ibid., [90]. 
*  Barrister and Solicitor (High Court of Australia and Supreme Courts of South 
Australia and Western Australia);  Principal Legal Officer in the General Branch of 
the Perth Office of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions.   The views 
expressed in this Case Note are those of the author and should not be taken as 
representing those of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions or his 
Office. 
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THE PRIVY COUNCIL AND THE  
CARIBBEAN COMMONWEALTH STATES 
Hamilton v. The Queen [2012] UKPC 31, [2012] 1 W.L.R. 2875 
(August 16, 2012) 
Hamilton v. The Queen [2012] UKPC 37 (October 25, 2012) 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
delay – admissions and confessions – Jamaica 
The Jurisdiction Spotlight in this issue of the journal examines the 
current issues pertaining to the criminal justice systems of the 
Caribbean.   One of them, John S. Jeremie writes, is the role of the 
Privy Council as the Caribbean’s final appellate court.   In 2005 the 
Caribbean Court of Justice was created to hear cases that would 
previously have gone before the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council, but to date only Barbados, Belize and Guyana have 
incorporated it into their court systems.   This is despite an 
increasingly strained relationship between the Privy Council and the 
Caribbean Commonwealth States,1 and despite the call by Lord 
Phillips in 2009 (shortly before he was made President of the 
Supreme Court of the United Kingdom) for Commonwealth 
countries to stop using the Privy Council, and to set up their own 
final courts of appeal instead, because Law Lords were spending a 
“disproportionate” amount of time on cases from former colonies, 
mostly the Caribbean.2   The case of Hamilton provides a clear 
example of the need for final appellate courts to have a proper 
understanding of the cultural context of the cases they hear.   It is 
wide open to question whether the Privy Council fulfils that need.    
 
A.   The application for permission to appeal 
In April 2001 the applicants, Carlos Hamilton and Jason Lewis, were 
convicted of murder.   They were sentenced to life imprisonment 
with a minimum period of 25 years.   The Court of Appeal of Jamaica 
refused their application for leave to appeal against their convictions  
 
 
 
1  See Deborah Colbran Espada’s case note discussing this issue at [2011] J.C.C.L. 151. 
2  These comments were made in an interview by Lord Phillips for the Financial Times.   
The article is only available to subscribers but can be accessed via the Supreme 
Court’s website at <http://ukscblog.com/lord-phillips-complains-about-the-privy-
council> accessed November 20, 2012.   For non-subscribers there is a summary in a 
report on the BBC website:  <http://www.bbc.co.uk/caribbean/news/story/2009/ 
09/090922_privyccjphillips.shtml> accessed November 20, 2012. 
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and sentences in March, 2003.   In July, 2003 they contacted a 
solicitor in England who coordinates the Jamaican Pro Bono Panel 
which is responsible for the representation of Jamaican capital 
prisoners who want to apply for special leave to appeal to the Privy 
Council, and sought pro bono assistance for their applications for 
permission to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.   
That solicitor only went on to appoint a firm of solicitors to act for 
them in April, 2010 and their application for permission to appeal 
was eventually lodged in July 2011, eight years and four months after 
the Court of Appeal of Jamaica had made its decision.  
The applicants were undoubtedly in breach of rule 11(2) in 
Schedule 1 to the Judicial Committee (Appellate Jurisdiction) Rules Order 
2009 (S.I. 2009 No. 224) (“the 2009 rules”) which provides that  
“(2) An application for permission to appeal must be filed within 56 
days from the date of the order or decision of the court below or the 
date of the court below refusing permission to appeal (if later).”   
Under rule 5(1) in Schedule 1 to the 2009 rules, the registrar has the 
power to extend or shorten that period of time.   If an extension is 
granted, this does not preclude the respondent from objecting to the 
grant of permission on the ground that the application was made out 
of time.   If an objection is made, the matter will be referred to the 
Judicial Committee. 
The fairly shocking length of the delay in Hamilton is all too 
common in appeals from the Caribbean.   Giving the judgment on 
the application for permission, Lord Hope identified a number of 
reasons for this.3   First, given that criminal legal aid in Jamaica, and 
indeed most, if not all, Caribbean states is very limited at best, and 
theoretical at worst, most prisoners must rely on pro bono assistance 
from either local or English lawyers.   Secondly, there are problems 
with communication.   Prisoners in Jamaica have no access to 
landline telephones, mobile telephones are generally believed to be 
contraband items, and letters sent to and from prisons can take 
months to reach the addressee or they can simply go missing.   
Thirdly, there is no published appeal procedure for prisoners to 
consult and the appeal process is entirely prisoner driven.   Unless a 
prisoner makes inquiries about his appeal rights, he will not be 
informed of them.   The court said that it had no reason to believe 
that the situation was different in Jamaica to the rest of the Caribbean 
states.   
In a letter to the board, the solicitors for the prosecuting 
authorities in Hamilton suggested that such lengthy delays could be 
avoided if “the correct procedure”4 is followed i.e. that the  
 
 
3  At [5-10]. 
4  At [11]. 
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prosecution and the prison authorities are informed of a prisoner’s 
intention to apply for permission to appeal to the Judicial Committee 
as soon as he has indicated that intention.   In Hamilton, the 
authorities were informed just one week before the application was 
eventually made in July, 2011.   By knowing in advance, the 
prosecuting authorities argued that they would be able to assist with 
the progress of the appeal.   There is nothing in the judgment to 
suggest where this “correct procedure” is laid down.   Rule 12 of 
Schedule 1 to the 2009 rules provides that “Before the application is 
filed, a copy must be served on every respondent and, when the 
application is filed, the appellant must file a certificate of service.”   
However, no time period is given for how soon a copy must be 
served before the application is filed.   The solicitors for the 
prosecuting authorities further submitted that, in future cases, 
permission to appeal to the Judicial Committee out of time should 
only be granted where substantial and cogent reasons had been given 
to explain the delay.    
An alternative view was put before the board in the form of oral 
submissions by counsel for the applicants in Hamilton and in letters 
written by solicitors who frequently act as agents in appeals to the 
Privy Council.   They called for the need for a more generous 
approach given the real difficulties already identified by the court 
which lead to these delays.   It was submitted that the board had 
never regarded delay as a critical factor in considering whether or not 
to grant permission to appeal and commended the flexible approach 
which the Privy Council already adopts in practice by balancing the 
problems with the need for expedition.   Further, it was submitted 
that whilst it was clearly preferable that Privy Council agents should 
inform the prosecuting authorities of an intention to make an 
application as soon as they are instructed, there will still be cases 
where Privy Council agents are not instructed and where this cannot 
be done. 
The board considered the 2009 rules and noted that they were 
drafted at the same time as the Supreme Court Rules 2009 (S.I. 2009  
No. 1603) which were made to regulate practice in the Supreme 
Court of the United Kingdom.   During the drafting process it was 
felt that a timetable for appeals to the Judicial Committee should be 
laid down, however the period allowed for filing applications would 
be doubled  as compared to the time allowed for the Supreme Court, 
from 28 days to 56 days.5   The board’s attitude to this time frame is 
rather conflicting.   Giving the judgment, Lord Hope says:  
 
 
5  See r.11(2) of the 2009 rules (ante). 
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 “On the whole the setting of a time limit has proved to be 
salutary, and for the most part it has not given rise to 
difficulty.   Nevertheless it remains commonplace in the case 
of criminal appeals coming before the board from 
jurisdictions in the Caribbean for periods of years rather than 
days to elapse before the application is made. … In no case 
have applications for permission to appeal from these 
jurisdictions been lodged within the time limit set by rule 
11(2) or, indeed, anywhere near the period of days set by that 
time limit.”6    
This is hardly surprising.   As Lord Hope comments earlier in the 
ruling, before the 2009 rules were brought into force, delays in cases 
of capital murder varied from five months to four years and six 
months and, occasionally, much longer, and in non-capital cases the 
delays were always much longer, sometimes in excess of ten years. 
The board in Hamilton said that whilst it had no intention of 
“departing from the direction”7 in rule 11(2), and whilst restricting 
access to the courts by the imposition of time limits is not 
incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights, “the 
question will always be whether, having regard to all the 
circumstances, it is in the interests of justice that the time limit should 
be extended.”8   The board said that whilst cases coming before it 
from the Caribbean “are exceptional”, the same principle would 
apply, but that it would be sympathetic to those sentenced to death or 
long periods of imprisonment who are relying on legal services pro 
bono.   However, it also held that prosecuting authorities should be 
notified as quickly as possible of a prisoner’s intention to apply for 
permission to appeal to the Judicial Committee, that a copy of the 
notification should be available for production to the registrar when 
the application is lodged, and that steps should be taken to inform 
those who act as Privy Council agents for the state concerned.   The 
board granted permission to appeal. 
 
B.   The substantive decision 
A number of grounds of appeal were put before the Privy Council 
in Hamilton, but the most interesting related to a failure to admit into 
evidence the oral and written statements made by the appellant, 
Hamilton, during interviews with the police.    
The appellants, Hamilton and Lewis, were alleged to have 
murdered their neighbour by chopping him to death with a machete 
early one morning.   On the evening of the killing, Hamilton went to 
 
 
6  At [4]. 
7  At [15]. 
8  At [16]. 
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the local police station and told a police officer “A defend me a 
defend myself.   Mi never mean fi kill him.”   After being cautioned, 
Hamilton said “Min uh chop nobody, boss.”   He also said that 
himself and the deceased were alone at the time.   Five days after his 
arrest, Hamilton made a written statement under caution in the 
presence of two police officers which he signed.   In it he said that he 
had known the deceased since they were youths.   The deceased had 
hit him with a stone when he was 13 and the incident had been 
reported to the police.   The deceased had then gone on to bully him 
on more than one occasion and made him “fraid bad.”   A few 
months before the killing, the deceased had “jucked” at him with a 
pointed cutlass and Hamilton had thrown two stones at him in 
retaliation.   That incident had also been reported to the police.   
Finally, he said that the night before the killing the deceased had 
thrown a stone at his head which knocked him unconscious.   In an 
unsworn statement at trial, Hamilton said that on the morning of the 
killing he had been moulding a banana tree root with his cutlass.   
The deceased appeared and walked towards him with a machete 
saying  
“I ketch yuh rass now, this time you alone.”   Believing that the 
deceased had come there to kill him, Hamilton had started to chop 
him.  
The prosecution did not put the written statement made under 
caution to the police in evidence.   The Privy Council noted that it 
was a “mixed statement” given that it contained both inculpatory and 
exculpatory statements, and that, if the prosecution had adduced it, it 
would have been admissible as to the truth of its contents.9   
However, the evidence had been ruled inadmissible at an earlier 
abortive trial presided over by the Chief Justice of Jamaica on the 
basis that it was a self-serving statement.   Given that ruling and the 
indication by the trial judge, counsel for the appellants had tried to 
elicit more of what was said to the police by Hamilton during cross-
examination of the investigating officer at trial.   The trial judge had 
ruled that what was said to the police officer was inadmissible as 
“self-serving” and “also hearsay”. 
The Privy Council considered the English case of R. v. Pearce10 in 
which it was held that a statement that is not an admission is 
admissible to show the attitude of the accused at the time when he 
made it.11   Thus, Sir Anthony Hooper, giving the judgment of the 
board, ruled that what Hamilton said to the police orally and in his 
written statement was admissible to show his attitude when he gave 
 
 
9  R. v. Sharp (Colin) [1988] 1 W.L.R. 7, H.L. 
10  69 Cr.App.R. 365, C.A. 
11  ibid., [369]. 
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himself up to the police on the evening of the killing.   Sir Anthony 
said: 
“In our view the court in Pearce correctly identified an 
exception to the common law rule making self-serving 
statements inadmissible.   The modern practice of case 
management puts an emphasis on the defendant disclosing as 
early as possible the nature of his or her defence.   The 
defendant when cautioned at common law is asked for his 
account and is told that anything he says may be given in 
evidence … .    Entitling defendants to put into evidence 
what they say at the time of arrest, if the prosecution choose 
not to do so, should encourage defendants to give their 
account of the events at the earliest opportunity.   This is 
particularly important, where, as in this case, there is such 
substantial delay between arrest and trial.” 
Despite finding that what Hamilton said to the police should have 
been admitted, that there had been a misdirection to the jury on the 
issue of provocation, and that counsel had failed to adduce the good 
character of the appellants, the board managed to uphold the 
convictions.   In relation to the wrongful exclusion of evidence, the 
board held that the jury knew that Hamilton had claimed from the 
outset to have acted in self-defence and had heard about the 
deceased’s alleged behaviour towards him.   As Hamilton did not give 
evidence, the board also noted that the judge would have been 
entitled to tell the jury, had the evidence been admitted, that the 
prosecution had had no opportunity to cross-examine Hamilton 
about it.   As a result, the board concluded that the jury would 
inevitably have come to the same conclusion if the evidence had been 
admitted. 
 
C.   Comment 
The board notes in its decision on the application for permission to 
appeal that the 2009 rules are based on those drafted for the Supreme 
Court of the United Kingdom.   It goes on to acknowledge that 56 
days to lodge an application to appeal from the date of the decision 
of the court below is an impossible time frame for prisoners from the 
Caribbean to comply with, and it accepts that there are inherent 
problems relating to legal aid, the reliance on pro bono representation 
and communications across the Caribbean which currently make 
substantial delays an inevitability.   However, the only suggestion 
made by the board to tackle these issues is that the prosecuting 
authorities should indeed be notified of a prisoner’s intention to apply 
for permission to appeal promptly, despite there being clear evidence 
before it, presented by those who undertake such pro bono work 
regularly, that that is impossible.   If the prosecuting authorities really 
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want to help to reduce the hefty delays that appellants to the Privy 
Council have to endure, perhaps it would be advisable for them to 
prepare a document setting out appeal rights and possible sources of 
assistance to be given to every prisoner sentenced to a custodial 
sentence.   With that in place, they might then get the early 
notification they wish for. 
In the substantive judgment, Sir Anthony Hooper refers to “the 
modern day practice of case management” when considering the 
admissibility of early statements made by defendants to the police.   
Case management might be a hefty concern for the jurisdiction from 
which he comes, but it is certainly not a burning issue in the 
Caribbean courts.   It is submitted that the Privy Council’s reasoning 
in this case is planted too firmly in the principles that matter in the 
courts of England and Wales and the Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom.   It is perhaps surprising that 11 out of the 14 Caribbean 
Commonwealth States are content to allow their cases to be dictated 
by a group of judges who are so far removed from the issues that 
come before them.   This is particularly so when Lord Phillips has 
made it clear that the view from the Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom is that senior judges would be better off spending their time 
not dealing with cases from former colonies, and particularly the 
Caribbean. 
The website12 for the Caribbean Court of Justice says that its 
vision is: 
“To provide for the Caribbean Community an accessible, fair, 
efficient, innovative and impartial justice system built on a 
jurisprudence reflective of our history, values and traditions 
while maintaining an inspirational, independent institution 
worthy of emulation by the courts of the region and the trust 
and confidence of its people.” 
Only time will tell whether or not that vision can be realised, but 
for now cases such as Hamilton suggest that the legislators, judiciary, 
legal profession and defendants of the Caribbean Commonwealth 
States need to look elsewhere than the Privy Council if that is what 
they want from their highest appellate court. 
 
LYDIA WAINE.*    
 
 
 
 
12  <http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/about-the-ccj/mission-vision> 
accessed November 20, 2012. 
*  LL.B. (Nottingham), Barrister (Lincoln’s Inn), Tenant at One Paper Buildings 
Chambers, London. 
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A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO MISCONDUCT IN PUBLIC OFFICE  
HKSAR v. Wong Lin Kay 
(2012) FACC No. 3 of 2011, [2012] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 898 
Court of Final Appeal, Hong Kong S.A.R. 
(April 2, 2012) 
misconduct in public office – definition of “public office” 
In Wong Lin Kay, the Court of Final Appeal considered whether a 
truck driver, employed by the government, who continues to drive 
without disclosing to his employer that he has been convicted of 
driving offences committed other than in the course of his 
employment and also whilst disqualified from driving, may thereby be 
liable for the common law offence of misconduct in public office 
(“the offence of misconduct”).   The certified question for the court 
concerned the definition of “public official” as an element of the 
offence of misconduct, and required the court specifically to 
determine whether Wong, the truck driver, was a “public official”. 
Eschewing a status-based test, that is, one which looks primarily at 
whether a person “holds a public office”, the court instead adopted a 
“functional” test, with the focus on whether a person is invested with 
powers and duties of a public nature, in the discharge of which the 
public is interested.   Applied to Wong, the court unsurprisingly 
concluded that Wong was not a “public official”, and, accordingly, was 
not liable therefore for the offence of misconduct. 
 
A.   The common law offence of misconduct in public office 
Described in Wong as an “integrity offence” ([at 15]), the offence of 
misconduct is, like its companion, the common law offence of 
bribery, of considerable antiquity.   In some common law 
jurisdictions, it has been superseded by a statutory version, but in 
others, including England, some Australian states, the United States 
and Hong Kong, it remains part of the common law, standing 
alongside more specific statutory offences of corruption and bribery.   
The offence of misconduct criminalises the conduct of those holding 
“public office”, or “public officials”, who abuse the powers, duties or 
responsibilities entrusted to, or vested in, them either at common law 
or by statute, and exercisable in the public interest.   The misconduct 
may be by act, or omission;  it may arise in the course of carrying out 
public office, or “in relation to” such public office;;  this latter 
expression captures misconduct committed not in the course of 
carrying out public office, but which brings that office into disrepute.   
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The misconduct must be “wilful”, and in some instances, may have to 
be actuated by dishonest, corrupt or other improper motives.   The 
public office in question may be unremunerated, as was recently 
confirmed in R. v. Belton [2010] EWCA Crim. 2857, [2011] Q.B. 934. 
However, until the last few decades of the twentieth century, the 
common law offence was rarely prosecuted and, in the words of 
Professor Paul Finn in a short commentary in the late 1970s entitled 
“Public Officers:  Some Personal Liabilities” (1977) 51 A.L.J. 313, 
one of several such commentaries by him at that time, the offence 
was in danger of “passing into oblivion”.   Professor Finn described 
the “kernel” of the common law offence as being “an officer, having 
been entrusted with powers and duties for the public benefit, has in 
some way abused them, or has abused his official position.”   But in 
so describing the offence, Professor Finn also acknowledged that the 
long-standing body of law concerning the common law offence “is 
often obscure.   Often ill defined.   Its central difficulty lies in the 
question, to whom does it apply?   Who is a public officer?”  
In the ensuing three decades, the offence of misconduct has been 
re-invigorated.   Amongst various explanations for this revival, two 
identified by the authors of one leading English text (Colin Nicholls 
Q.C., Timothy Daniel, Alan Bacarese & John Hatchard, Corruption and 
Misuse of Public Office (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2011), 154), are 
its ability to reflect a course of conduct in a single charge, and its 
ability to reflect “truly criminal” conduct which cannot be 
satisfactorily charged as any other offence. 
 
B.   Misconduct in public office in Hong Kong 
In Hong Kong, the offence of misconduct has become a favoured 
charge of Hong Kong’s dedicated anti-corruption agency, the 
Independent Commission Against Corruption (“ICAC”).   The 
offence has been used to prosecute a variety of persons holding 
“public office”, including civil servants and police officers, who have 
allegedly “misconducted” themselves in ways which do not clearly 
involve the offer, solicitation or payment of bribes, and thus fall 
outside the already broad reach of Hong Kong’s existing statutory 
bribery offences. 
Given its common law origins and the uncertainty about its 
elements and scope, various constitutionally based challenges have 
been made to the validity of the offence in Hong Kong.   The offence 
has largely withstood such challenges, but along the way it has 
undergone judicial reformulation and refinement of its elements in an 
attempt to make the offence sufficiently precise to pass constitutional 
scrutiny.   Prior to Wong, the Court of Final Appeal was twice asked 
to review the validity of the offence of misconduct, first in HKSAR v. 
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Shum Kwok Sher (2002) 5 H.K.C.F.A.R. 381, and then, three years 
later, in Sin Kam-wah v. HKSAR (2005) 8 H.K.C.F.A.R. 192. 
 
1.   HKSAR v. Shum Kwok Sher (2002) 
In Shum the constitutional validity of the offence of misconduct was 
challenged on the grounds that it was too vague and uncertain to 
satisfy the principle of legal certainty.   Rejecting this challenge, the 
Court of Final Appeal, after reviewing the offence’s history and 
scope, affirmed the constitutional validity of the offence.   In doing 
so, Sir Anthony Mason N.P.J., former Chief Justice of the High Court 
of Australia, sitting as a non-permanent judge of the court, 
reformulated the offence, identifying “public official” as the first of 
four elements.   Drawing on Professor Finn’s writing, Sir Anthony 
repeatedly used the language of “public office” in further elaborating 
the elements of the offence.   Thus, speaking of the need for “serious 
misconduct”, rather than mere disciplinary breaches, he stated (at 
[87]), “Whether it is serious misconduct in this context is to be 
determined having regard to the responsibilities of the office and the 
officeholder, the importance of the public objects which they serve and 
the nature and extent of the departure from those responsibilities” 
(emphasis added).   And again, in relation to the mens rea element of 
the offence, he stated (at [84]), “A public official culpably misconducts 
himself if he wilfully and intentionally neglects or fails to perform a 
duty to which he is subject by virtue of his office or employment without 
reasonable excuse or justification.   A public official also culpably 
misconducts himself if, with an improper motive, he wilfully and 
intentionally exercises a power or discretion which he has by virtue of 
his office or employment without reasonable excuse or justification” 
(emphasis added). 
In so doing, Sir Anthony understood that the meaning of “public 
office” was uncertain, but Shum was the Chief Property Manager of 
the Government Property Agency, and there was no issue about his 
qualifying as a “public official.”   “Just how far [public office] 
extends”, stated Sir Anthony (at [99]), “may perhaps be a question for 
the future”.   Significantly, use of the term “employment” in addition 
to “office” suggested perhaps a wider scope for the offence than 
might have previously been thought acceptable. 
 
2.   Sin Kam-wah v. HKSAR (2005) 
In Sin, its second major consideration of the offence of 
misconduct, the Court of Final Appeal, noting the then recent 
reconsideration and reformulation of the elements of the offence of 
misconduct under English law by the English Court of Appeal in 
Att.-Gen.’s Reference (No. 3 of 2003) ([2004] EWCA 868, [2005] Q.B. 73), 
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itself restated the elements of the offence under Hong Kong law.   
Sin was a Senior Superintendent in the Hong Kong Police Force, and, 
as in Shum, there was no issue as to his being a “public official”.   
Whether a status or functional test was applied, Sin clearly qualified.   
Sin’s misconduct allegedly lay in his acceptance of free sexual services 
from prostitutes provided by another defendant who was convicted 
on related charges of exercising control over other persons with a 
view to their prostitution, and of offering advantages to a government 
servant.   Sir Anthony Mason N.P.J., again delivering the principal 
judgment of the court, expressly retained “public official” as the first 
element of the reformulated offence of misconduct:  
“The offence is committed where:  (1) a public official;  (2) in 
the course of or in relation to his public office;  (3) wilfully 
misconducts himself;  by act or omission, for example, by 
wilfully neglecting or failing to perform his duty;  (4) without 
reasonable excuse or justification;  and (5) where such 
misconduct is serious, not trivial, having regard to the 
responsibilities of the office and the officeholder, the importance of 
the public objects which they serve and the nature and extent 
of the departure from those responsibilities” (at [210-211], 
emphasis added). 
As can be seen, the language of “public office” is repeated by Sir 
Anthony, as it was in Shum, in elaborating the necessary misconduct 
element, but its meaning was not directly in issue.   As McWalters 
observed (in Bribery and Corruption Law in Hong Kong (2nd edn, 
LexisNexis 2009), 691), “the question whether [a person] need hold 
an office in order to be a public officer, and if so what is meant by 
“an office” still remains to be definitively answered by an appellate 
court in Hong Kong.”   In Wong, this issue finally came squarely 
before Hong Kong’s highest appellate court. 
 
C.   HKSAR v. Wong Lin Kay (2012) 
1.   The facts 
Wong was employed as a government driver in the Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Conservation Department of the Hong Kong 
Government.   His duties were to drive other employees of the 
department to various places of work in Hong Kong’s country parks, 
usually in a small truck.   In March, 2009, Wong was convicted of 
driving a motor vehicle whilst he had a concentration of alcohol in 
his blood above the prescribed limit and was disqualified from driving 
for six months.   The offence was not committed in the course of his 
employment, but he did not disclose the conviction to his employer 
and thereafter continued with his driving duties.   When his 
conviction and disqualification were later discovered, Wong was 
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charged with, and convicted of, six offences of driving whilst 
disqualified.   In addition, a single charge of misconduct in public 
office, contrary to common law was laid against Wong, essentially 
based on the fact he was a government employee, and had breached 
the duties owed by him as an employee to his employer.   At trial, 
Wong was convicted on this latter charge, and sentenced to 15 
months’ imprisonment.   That sentence was substantially greater than 
the term of six months’ imprisonment concurrently imposed for the 
driving offences. 
On appeal to the High Court, McMahon J. in the Court of First 
Instance (January 28, 2011, HCMA 633/2010) quashed Wong’s 
conviction for the offence of misconduct, ruling that the offence of 
misconduct was not engaged, since Wong was “just a truck driver” 
and not a “public official”.   The government appealed to the Court 
of Final Appeal, pursuant to the following certified question:   “What 
is the definition of ‘public official’ for the purposes of the common 
law offence of misconduct in public office?” 
Before the Court of Final Appeal, counsel for the prosecution 
submitted (at [12]-[15]) that the appeal judge had erred by conflating 
the issue of whether someone is a “public officer”, the first element 
of misconduct, with the question of what conduct amounts to 
relevant “misconduct”.   The question “who is a public officer?”, it 
was submitted, is an independent question, standing apart from the 
other elements of the offence, and extends to, but is not restricted to, 
every government employee based on their “duty of loyalty” to their 
employer;;  and, in this case, Wong’s employer was the HKSAR 
Government.   “Misconduct”, it was submitted, arises when a 
government employee commits a “serious breach” of this duty, which 
it was alleged Wong did by driving whilst disqualified and by 
concealing his disqualification.   Such breaches, it was submitted, 
constitute “a breach of the public trust placed in civil servants that 
they will properly discharge their duties”, and expose the employee to 
liability for the offence of misconduct. 
 
2.   The decision of the Court of Final Appeal 
The Court of Final Appeal gave this argument short shrift.   Rejecting 
the attempt to separate the question whether Wong was a “public 
official” from the question of what conduct amounts to relevant 
misconduct, Ribeiro P.J., delivering the principal judgment, 
responded (at [22]):   
“The correct approach is … not to attempt somehow to 
decide in the abstract or in isolation whether a person is or is 
not a ‘public officer’.   One must examine what, if any, 
powers, discretions or duties have been entrusted to the 
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defendant in his official position for the public benefit, asking 
how, if at all, the misconduct alleged involves an abuse of 
those powers in any of the ways identified in Shum Kwok Sher.   
If the defendant occupies a position which confers no such 
powers on him, he is not a candidate for prosecution for the 
offence, even if he is employed by a government department 
or by an analogous public body.” 
And (at [34]):   
“Of course, in ordinary speech, every employee in the public 
sector might be termed a ‘public officer’.   However, for the 
purposes of determining who is potentially liable for 
misconduct in public office, the authorities examined above 
show that not every public employee is susceptible to such 
liability.   His job may not vest him with any relevant powers 
or discretions to be exercised for the benefit of the public.   
The misconduct he is accused of may not involve any abuse 
of, or have any relevant relationship with, the official position 
which he occupies.” 
 Ribeiro P.J. concluded (at [37]):   
“[Wong] falls into the excluded category of government 
employees.   He did not occupy a public office entrusting him 
with powers and discretions to be exercised for the public 
benefit;  nor, it follows, did his misconduct consist of any 
abuse of such non-existent powers.   He was, as the judge 
pointed out, simply a truck driver.” 
This conclusion also enabled the court to reject a claim that the 
offence of misconduct applied in an unequal or discriminatory 
manner by permitting the prosecution of a truck driver such as Wong 
employed in the public sector, but not his private sector equivalent.   
Since Wong was not a “public officer”, he was not liable.   “The right 
to equal treatment under the law,” observed Ribeiro P.J. (at [36]), 
“highlights the public dimension of the offence. …  A public officer’s 
potential liability involved no discrimination.” 
Lord Millett N.P.J. fully agreed with Ribeiro P.J., but added a few 
words of his own which, while reiterating the need for a defendant to 
be a “public official”, made clear this characterisation depends on a 
defendant being “invested with powers, duties, responsibilities or 
discretions” exercisable in the public interest, and not merely on 
status (at [44]-[45]):   
“The offence can be committed only by a public official.   It 
cannot be committed by an ordinary member of the general 
public.   But it does not discriminate against government 
employees.   The reason it does not do so is that the core 
concept is abuse of official power.   It can therefore be 
committed only by persons who are invested with powers, 
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duties, responsibilities or discretions which they are obliged to 
exercise or discharge for the benefit of the general public.   
Such persons may or may not be employed by the 
government;  they may or may not be paid.   They may be 
high officers of state or lowly employees;  the offence may be 
committed as well by a police or customs officer as by a 
government minister.   The common element is that the 
accused must have abused some power, duty or responsibility 
entrusted to or invested in him or her and exercisable in the 
public interest. 
Every such power, duty, discretion or responsibility is 
granted for the benefit of the public and for a public purpose.   
For the person having such a power, duty or responsibility to 
exercise it or refrain from exercising it for his or her own 
private purposes, whether out of malice, revenge, friendship 
or hostility, or for pecuniary advantage is an abuse of power 
and amounts to the offence of misconduct in public office.” 
Two further points of significance emerge from Lord Millett 
N.P.J.’s judgment.   The first concerns how to approach the offence 
of misconduct.   Counsel for the appellant submitted that McMahon 
J. had wrongly conflated the issue of whether someone is a public 
officer with the question of what conduct amounts to relevant 
misconduct.   Not so, observed Lord Millett N.P.J. (at [46]): 
“The expression ‘misconduct in public office’ is a compound 
one.   It is a mistake to treat it as involving two distinct 
questions:  (i) was the accused the holder of a public office 
and (ii) did the conduct of which he or she stands accused 
consist of misconduct in the performance of that office?   
There is in reality only one question: did the conduct with 
which the accused is charged consist of an abuse of a power, 
duty or responsibility entrusted to him or her and exercisable 
for the public good?   Splitting the question into two gives 
rise to two dangers:  (i) that the question whether the accused 
was the holder of a public office may be directed to the status 
of the accused when it should be directed to his or her 
functions;  and (ii) that it may overlook the fact that the 
misconduct with which the accused is charged must consist of 
an abuse of the powers, duties and responsibilities involved in 
the performance of those functions.” 
This emphasises not only the adoption of a functional test, but 
also the connection that must exist between the functions performed 
by a public official and the alleged misconduct. 
This connection is reflected in the second point, which is that not 
all “misconduct” by a person invested with powers, duties and 
responsibilities entrusted to him or her, and exercisable for the public 
good, will amount to the offence of misconduct.   Wong, observed 
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Lord Millett N.P.J. (at [47]), by continuing to drive, and concealing 
his disqualification, was guilty of “serious and deliberate misconduct 
in the course of his employment by the government”, something of 
which, he supposed, many employees, in both the private and public 
sectors, might be guilty.   But such misconduct, were it committed 
“by a public official who is entrusted with powers and duties 
exercisable in the public interest” would not constitute the offence of 
misconduct “because it does not amount to an abuse of those powers 
and duties.” 
Applied to Wong, this functional test made all the difference.   
Although Wong was undoubtedly a government employee, and 
arguably held “public office” if this were a matter of status or title, 
the only duties he was subject to were the duties owed by him as 
employee to his employer.   Beyond that, Wong was not entrusted 
with any relevant powers, discretions or duties exercisable for the 
public benefit.   Accordingly, he was not, applying this functional test, 
a “public official”, and was not, therefore, liable to prosecution for 
the offence of misconduct;  his conviction was correctly quashed. 
 
D.   Implications for “public office” 
In Hong Kong, it is now clear that the determination of whether a 
person is a “public official”, and amenable to prosecution for the 
offence of misconduct, depends on the application of a “functional” 
test.   What matters is whether the alleged public official was 
entrusted with powers, discretions or duties to be exercised for the 
public benefit, being powers which are potentially open to abuse in a 
manner which may amount to misconduct.   It is this that determines 
the potential application of the offence of misconduct, not the fact a 
person has the status or title of being a “public official” or “public 
office holder” “in the abstract or in isolation” (ibid., at [22]).   Of 
course, those holding “public office” in a traditional sense will 
generally remain liable for the offence of misconduct, because 
appointment to a “public office” of any gravity will generally bring 
with it powers, discretions or duties to be exercised for the public 
benefit and which are open to abuse.   But it is the existence of the 
latter, not the position itself, that exposes the public office holder to 
liability for misconduct.  
This view of “public office” and “public official”, with the 
emphasis on function and not status or title, has been relied on in 
practice elsewhere, particularly in extending the scope of the offence 
of misconduct to persons holding positions falling outside traditional 
categories of public office.   It was, for example, referred to nearly a 
century ago in R. v. Boston [1923] HCA 59, (1923) 33 C.L.R. 386, 
where the High Court of Australia held that parliamentarians are 
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amenable to prosecution for the offence of misconduct.   But rarely 
have courts been so explicit in adopting a functional test of “public 
office” and “public official”.   Often the fact that a person is 
entrusted with powers, discretions or duties has appeared in the guise 
of the underlying reason for the offence of misconduct, justifying its 
application to persons not holding traditional “public office” 
positions, rather than as the test itself of “public office”.   And 
inevitably, given that the offence of misconduct was formulated at 
common law as “misconduct in public office”, the necessity of 
proving that a defendant held “public office”, or was a “public 
official”, has expressly remained part of the law.   As a result, despite 
its appearance and use, the correctness of a “functional” test or 
approach to “public office” has remained somewhat moot.   As the 
authors of Corruption and Misuse of Public Office, ante, put it (at p.158): 
“[S]hould the test of ‘public office’ be a purely functional 
one? …   [S]hould public policy confine the criminal offence 
to individuals holding high offices of public trust who owe a 
duty to the Crown?   Alternatively, is a ‘third way’ to be 
preferred:  with a functional test being applied, but 
accompanied by a public policy limitation that the criminal 
offence will extend only to those whose roles are such that a 
breach of trust will significantly damage or disadvantage the 
wider public?” 
In Wong, the Court of Final Appeal clearly rejected the second, 
status-based or “titular” approach in favour of a functional approach 
under the law of Hong Kong.   In doing so, it has laid down a clear 
marker for the future:  no longer will government employees be liable 
to prosecution for the offence of misconduct merely because they 
may have breached the duties owed by them as an employee.   This is 
a welcome development, and one which places a necessary constraint 
on the over-zealous use of the offence of misconduct to pursue those 
civil servants who, like Wong, are “just an employee.” 
A second, potentially significant implication concerns the 
application of the offence of misconduct to non-civil servants 
invested with powers, duties and responsibilities of a public nature.   
Such persons, assessed by status, are not obviously “public officials”, 
and yet, as McWalters in Bribery and Corruption Law in Hong Kong, ante, 
observes (at p. 691), we live “in an age where many public functions 
are carried out by independent statutory bodies, some of which may 
operate in the guise of corporations intended to be run as profit-
making enterprises.”   Are such persons amenable to prosecution for 
the offence of misconduct?   A functional test, such as that adopted 
in Wong may offer at least a partial solution to this question.   But, as 
observed by McWalters (ibid.), a functional test, while welcome and to 
be preferred over a status-based test, is usually “generic” in nature, 
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with the possible consequence that “its very generality limits its 
usefulness outside of those situations where there can be no dispute 
that a person is a public officer.”   McWalters had in mind in 
particular the development of a “principled approach by which to 
determine the issue of whether a non-civil servant discharging public 
duties is a common law public officer.”   He went on to suggest  
(at pp.699-702) that such a principled approach might take account of 
a range of matters including, in particular, the nature of the duty and 
the nature of the body discharging the duty (or the body employing 
the person discharging the duty).   With a functional test for “public 
office” now in place in Hong Kong, it is almost certainly only a 
matter of time before the prosecuting authorities attempt to expand 
the operation of the offence of misconduct to cover cases of non-
civil servants discharging public duties, enabling the courts of Hong 
Kong to begin developing McWalters’ “principled approach” 
(perhaps facilitated by the fact McWalters is now a judge of the Court 
of First Instance of the High Court of Hong Kong).   
A third, more speculative implication concerns the possibility that 
Wong may provide a basis for the development of the “third way” 
identified above, which proposes the adoption of a “public policy” 
limitation on a functional test, resulting in a more limited scope for 
the offence of misconduct.   How might this evolve?   Perhaps as 
follows:  (i) as stated by Lord Millett N.P.J. in Wong, determining 
whether there is a basis for charging a person with misconduct in 
public office involves one question, not two:   whether the accused 
has abused powers, duties or responsibilities entrusted to him and 
exercisable for the public benefit;  but (ii) it is also now clear, at least 
in Hong Kong, applying Sin Kam Wah, that the misconduct (or abuse) 
alleged must be “serious, not trivial, having regard to the 
responsibilities of the office and the officeholder, the importance of 
the public objects which they serve and the nature and extent of the 
departure from those responsibilities”;;  (iii) accordingly, if the nature 
of the powers, duties and responsibilities entrusted to a person are 
such that their abuse could not be characterised as “serious”, then 
such person should not (even could not) be charged.   If accepted, 
this argument would seemingly have the effect of removing from the 
pool of possible defendants those with only “trivial” powers, duties 
or responsibilities, on the basis that abuse of those powers, duties or 
responsibilities does not involve a loss of confidence in public 
administration or in the integrity of the government.   Three 
objections readily come to mind:  first, it is illusory to speak of “trivial 
powers”, and there is always the potential for serious abuse, even of 
low level powers, duties and responsibilities;  secondly, that this might 
operate to exclude some of the persons currently successfully 
prosecuted for the offence of misconduct (for examples, see the 
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recent spate of English prosecutions for misconduct in public office 
which include:  R. v. Stubbs and Arnold [2011] EWCA Crim. 926, 
[2011] 2 Cr.App.R.(S.) 648(113) (civilian employee of a police force 
working as a control room operator passed on information gleaned 
from a police computer to persons outside the police service), R. v. 
Ratcliffe [2009] EWCA Crim. 1468, [2010] 1 Cr.App.R.(S.) 326(51) 
(prison officer became involved in a relationship with a serving 
prisoner, with whom she communicated by mobile telephone), and R. 
v. Wilkie [2012] EWCA Crim. 247, [2012] 2 Cr.App.R.(S.) 393(68) 
(police constable searched local internal computer systems and 
contacted at least 20 women, using the information he found, with 
phone calls (some silent) and sexually explicit text messages);  and 
thirdly, that this confuses, or conflates, the discrete elements of the 
offence of misconduct, as formulated in Hong Kong by the Court of 
Final Appeal in Shum Kwok Sher, Sin Kam Wah, and of course, Wong 
itself.   On the other hand, Wong provides an example of overreaching 
by the prosecution, so perhaps the courts will be willing to 
countenance a further restriction on the scope of the offence of 
misconduct. 
For the time being, Wong is a welcome confirmation that a 
functional approach is now to be adopted in Hong Kong to the 
characterisation of a person as a “public official” for the purposes of 
the offence of misconduct in public office.   Only time will tell what 
further implications the adoption of this functional approach may 
have. 
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THE SUPPLY OF DRUGS WHICH CAUSE DEATH –  
CAN A DEALER BE GUILTY OF MANSLAUGHTER? 
Burns v. The Queen [2012] HCA 35, (2012) 290 A.L.R. 713 
High Court of Australia 
manslaughter – unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter – gross negligence 
A.   Background 
The appellant, Natalie Burns, and her husband, Brian Burns, were 
drug addicts on a methadone treatment programme who each 
received methadone prescriptions.   They would pool their drugs and 
sell them to other drug addicts from their flat in a suburb of Sydney, 
the purchasers either taking the methadone away or administering it 
whilst in the flat.   On February 9, 2007, an inexperienced methadone 
user, David Hay, bought methadone from the appellant and her 
husband and took it (probably by injection) in their flat.   The 
appellant and her husband may have assisted him in doing so, or one 
of them may have injected it for him.   Although Mr Hay appeared to 
have been badly affected by the drug, he refused the offer of an 
ambulance being called, and the appellant insisted that he leave the 
flat.   He did so, and was found dead in a public lavatory at the rear of 
the block of flats the next day. 
The appellant was charged with four counts of supplying 
methadone and one count of manslaughter.   She pleaded guilty to 
three of the supply counts, but stood trial on the remaining counts at 
the District Court of New South Wales (H.H. Judge Woods Q.C. and 
a jury) and was convicted of both.   She was sentenced to five years 
and eight months’ imprisonment (her husband was convicted of the 
same offences, but died in prison shortly after sentence was passed).   
The appellant appealed against her manslaughter conviction to the 
Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales (McClellan C.J. at 
C.L., Howie A.J., Schmidt J.), but her appeal was dismissed and her 
conviction upheld ((2011) 205 A.Crim.R. 240).   She was, however, 
granted leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia (French C.J., 
Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ.). 
 
B.   Law 
The manslaughter charge was put, and left to the jury, on two distinct 
bases:  (i) that the appellant had carried out an unlawful and 
dangerous act which had caused the death of Mr Hay;  and (ii) that 
she had been grossly negligent in failing to seek medical attention for 
him after he had ingested the methadone. 
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As to (i), the Australian common law defines unlawful and 
dangerous act manslaughter as the carrying out of an unlawful  
(i.e. criminal) act which has an objectively appreciable risk of exposing 
another to serious injury (as distinct from the law in, e.g., England and 
Wales, where only a risk of “injury”, rather than “serious injury”, is 
required), death being caused thereby. 
As to (ii), gross negligence manslaughter requires a defendant to 
have breached, through gross (or “criminal”) negligence, a duty of 
care which he owes to another, that breach causing death;  there can 
be no liability without such a duty, which can arise through statute, 
certain status relationships, contract, the voluntary assumption of the 
care of another and so secluding that person as to prevent others 
from rendering aid, or where the defendant has played a causative 
role in the sequence of events which have given rise to a risk of injury 
such that he acquires a duty to take reasonable steps to avert or lessen 
that risk. 
 
C.   Discussion 
The case against the appellant on unlawful and dangerous act 
manslaughter had initially been put on the basis that the supply by her 
of methadone to Mr Hay was an unlawful and dangerous act which 
had caused his death.   However, by the end of the trial, the 
prosecution had altered their case such that the act relied on was not 
the supply of the methadone but the appellant’s role (whether solely 
or together with her husband) in administering it to Mr Hay or in 
assisting him in administering it to himself.   In spite of this, the trial 
judge directed the jury that they could convict the appellant on the 
basis of her supply being an unlawful and dangerous act. 
Contrary to their position at trial and on appeal to the state 
appellate court, the prosecution conceded before the High Court, and 
that court unanimously held, that the simple supply of an unlawful 
drug to an informed adult of sound mind who subsequently takes that 
drug is not a dangerous act:  it is the taking of the drug, rather than its 
supply, that is dangerous, and the voluntary and informed choice of 
the adult negates causal connection.   Since, given the trial judge’s 
directions, the possibility that the jury had convicted on this unsound 
basis could not be ruled out, the court held that the appellant’s 
manslaughter conviction could not stand. 
The issue then arose of the appropriate order on quashing that 
conviction.   The prosecution submitted that the court should order a 
retrial.   First, they argued that there was sufficient evidence to put 
the manslaughter charge before a new jury on the alternative higher 
basis, which had developed during the trial, that the appellant had 
carried out an unlawful and dangerous act by administering the 
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methadone or assisting Mr Hay in administering it.   However, the 
court held (by a majority of six to one, Heydon J. dissenting) that the 
evidence could not sustain such a course, as the possibility could not 
be discounted beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Hay had 
administered the methadone to himself without the assistance of the 
appellant. 
Secondly, they argued that the case against the appellant on gross 
negligence manslaughter could still be maintained.   The court, 
though, rejected the trial judge’s approach of a voluntary assumption 
of care, holding that it could not be said that the appellant had 
voluntarily assumed the care of Mr Hay and so secluded him as to 
prevent others rendering aid.   It also rejected the approach of the 
state appellate court, holding that the suppliers of drugs owed no 
existing duty of care towards those to whom they have supplied, even 
if they take the drugs whilst still in their presence, and that if such a 
duty were to be introduced that was a matter for the relevant 
legislature and not for the courts.   As the joint judgment put it (at 
[106])- 
“The supply of prohibited drugs is visited by severe criminal 
punishment in recognition of the harm associated with their 
use.   The notion that at the same time the law might seek to 
regulate the relationship between supplier and user, by 
imposing a duty on the former to take reasonable care for the 
latter, is incongruous.   What measures would reasonable care 
require?   Should suppliers of prohibited drugs be required to 
supply clean needles and accurate information about safe 
levels of use?” 
The High Court was accordingly unanimous that the appellant had 
owed no duty of care towards Mr Hay that she could have breached. 
 
D.   Outcome 
The appellant’s appeal was allowed, and her conviction for 
manslaughter was quashed.   The court declining to order a retrial (by 
a majority of six to one), a verdict of acquittal was entered. 
 
E.   Comment 
In deciding the question on which the appeal in fact turned, the court 
followed the approach of the House of Lords (Lord Bingham of 
Cornhill, Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, Baroness Hale of Richmond, 
Lord Carswell and Lord Mance) in the English case of R. v. Kennedy 
(No. 2) [2008] 1 A.C. 269 ([2007] UKHL 38), in which their 
Lordships reached the same conclusion by similarly reasoning that  
(i) the act of supplying a drug is not in itself harmful, (ii) in any event, 
the informed voluntary choice of the person to whom the drug has 
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been supplied to administer it to himself breaks the chain of 
causation, (iii) the only unlawful act on which a charge might be 
founded in such circumstances (viz. an offence contrary to section 23 
of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 (unlawfully and maliciously 
administering, etc., a poison, etc., so as to endanger life or inflict 
grievous bodily harm)) could not meaningfully be applied to a case of 
self-administration, and (iv) the self-administration of a drug by the 
person to whom it has been supplied can only properly be regarded 
as such, and not as joint administration by the supplier and the 
person supplied acting together. 
The High Court rejected the contrary approach of the Scottish 
High Court of Justiciary (Lord Hamilton (Lord Justice General), Lord 
Osborne, Lord Nimmo Smith, Lord Kingarth and Lord Mackay of 
Drumadoon) in Kane v. H.M. Advocate;  MacAngus v. H.M. Advocate, 
The Times, February 6, 2009, in which their Lordships held it was 
necessary for the law to adopt a compromise with the doctrine of 
causation, and that although the adult status and deliberate conduct 
of a person to whom a drug was recklessly supplied by another would 
be important and, in some cases, crucial factors in determining 
whether the other’s act was or was not a cause of death following 
upon ingestion of the drug, there might be cases short of duress, 
deception or mistake, where the vulnerability of the drug user to the 
actions of the supplier would be relevant to whether a direct causal 
link was made out.   It is submitted that the approach of the House of 
Lords and the High Court of Australia is to be preferred. 
One notable aspect of the majority’s reasoning, in particular as to 
the break in causation occasioned by the informed voluntary choice 
of a drug user, is the distinction it maintains between legal and moral 
duty.   As the New Zealand criminal lawyer Don Mathias notes in his 
blog <http://www.nzcriminallaw.blogspot.co.uk/>, there can be 
difficulties in establishing a legal duty of care in circumstances where 
most people would think that a person owes a moral duty towards the 
safety of another.   This difficulty was evident here, and exemplified 
by the practical difficulties the court identified in discussing how such 
a duty owed by a drug dealer to his customers would be discharged.   
(The interaction between morality and the law has of course long 
been a crucial factor in the general consideration of criminal liability 
for omissions, as discussed in Andrew Ashworth Q.C.’s article in the 
inaugural issue of this publication (“Public Duties and Criminal 
Omissions:  Some Unresolved Questions” [2011] J.C.C.L. 1)). 
The one issue conclusively addressed neither by the British cases 
nor by the judgments of the majority in this case (viz. the joint 
judgment of Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ. (at [49]-
[109]) and the concurring judgment of French C.J. (at [1]-[48])) is 
whether a defendant could ever be guilty of unlawful and dangerous 
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act manslaughter by virtue of administering a drug to another or 
assisting another in administering it;  in this case the question was 
avoided simply by holding that the evidence could not make out such 
circumstances to the criminal standard in any event.   However, in the 
lone dissenting judgment (at [110]-[134]), Heydon J. answered that 
question in the affirmative (although agreeing with the majority on 
the other issues):  he held that the evidence was sufficient for the 
appellant to be properly convicted of manslaughter on that basis at a 
retrial. 
Yet the principal difficulty with such an approach is one that his 
Honour himself raised:  is the distinction between the supplier who 
lets his customer inject himself and the supplier who helps his 
customer to do so a sound one?   Indeed, would it be just for the 
supplier who assists his customer (who may be an inexperienced and 
unskilful drug user who would be at greater risk if left to his own 
devices) to be liable for his death but for the supplier who simply says 
“you’re on your own” to escape liability?   That is doubtless an issue 
that courts in many jurisdictions will at some point be compelled to 
address. 
 
PETER FITZGERALD.*    
 
 
 
ATTEMPTS LIABILITY IN NEW ZEALAND  
R. v. Harpur [2010] NZCA 319 (July 23, 2010) 
Court of Appeal of New Zealand 
attempted sexual violation – impossibility – proximate acts 
A.   The threshold for attempts 
The question of how to determine the threshold between acts of 
mere preparation and a consummated criminal attempt has bedevilled 
the courts in common law jurisdictions for many generations.    
The use of nouns like “proximity”, “remoteness”, “immediacy”, 
“preparation”, “unequivocality” have come to define the boundaries 
of the discourse constituting attempts theory, yet none has been able 
to provide a clear conceptual means of determining when an attempt 
has occurred, as a matter of law.   The problem with attempts liability, 
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as it seems, has been in calculating the point at which merely prepara-
tory conduct acquires the gravitas of acts sufficiently proximate to the 
intended offence to be deemed an attempt to achieve it. 
The issue was reconsidered by the New Zealand Court of Appeal 
in R. v. Harpur.   The case is important because, first, it overturns 
previous case law which guided New Zealand courts in this area  
for over 30 years and, secondly, it is a case of factual impossibility.    
In Harpur, the Court of Appeal declined to endorse any particular test 
of proximity, preferring to focus on the efficacy of preparatory acts 
accompanied by a clear intention to commit the offence aimed at as 
being evidence of a criminal attempt. 
 
B.   The facts of Harpur 
H, using the name “Adam” had begun texting a young woman (B) 
making sexually explicit suggestions.   He sent her a video depicting a 
man raping a young girl.   He bragged about his sexual exploits  
with children.   In disgust, B went to the police and, under their 
guidance, made arrangements to meet H the next day.   She said she 
would bring her 10-year-old sister and four-year-old niece.   Neither 
child existed in fact.   They were invented for the purposes of the 
police operation.   H then described graphically his intentions with 
respect to the four-year-old and asked if the 10-year-old “would fuck”.   
B’s intention with the four-year-old was to lick and touch her 
genitalia and then masturbate himself over her.   His intention with 
the 10-year-old had been to have intercourse with her, but only if she 
wanted it.   B described the girls as “keen” and arranged a place to 
meet with H.   In due course, a car fitting the description of B’s car 
pulled up to H, with a female police officer inside.   H was arrested.   
He ultimately faced 19 charges, as a result of boasts made in text 
messages and material on his computer.   These included raping, 
sexually violating, indecently assaulting and intimately photographing 
a five-year-old girl.   He eventually pleaded guilty to all but two 
charges.   He pleaded not guilty to attempting to violate sexually a  
10-year-old girl by raping her and attempting to violate sexually a 
four-year-old girl by unlawful sexual connection.  
The district court judge discharged H on those counts and the 
Crown appealed on a question of law which asked whether the 
district court judge was correct in finding, as a matter of law, that the 
acts done with intent to commit offences of sexual violation were 
only preparation for the commission of those offences and too 
remote to constitute attempts to commit them under section 72(2) of 
the Crimes Act 1961.   The Crown applied for a full court on the basis 
that they wished to challenge the correctness of R. v. Wilcox 
[1982] 1 N.Z.L.R. 191 (Court of Appeal), which had been the 
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principal authority on criminal attempts and which had been relied on 
by the district court judge in determining that H’s acts had not gone 
beyond mere preparation.  
In considering whether the judge was correct in finding that H’s 
acts were mere preparation the court in Harpur re-examined the 
statutory language in section 72, which sets out the law of criminal 
attempts in New Zealand.   It states: 
“Attempts 
72.-(1) Every one who, having an intent to commit an 
offence, does or omits an act for the purpose of 
accomplishing his object, is guilty of an attempt to commit 
the offence intended, whether in the circumstances it was 
possible to commit the offence or not. 
(2) The question whether an act done or omitted with 
intent to commit an offence is or is not only preparation for 
the commission of that offence, and too remote to constitute 
an attempt to commit it, is a question of law. 
(3) An act done or omitted with intent to commit an 
offence may constitute an attempt if it is immediately or 
proximately connected with the intended offence, whether or 
not there was any act unequivocally showing the intent to 
commit that offence.” 
In considering section 72, the Court of Appeal made a number of 
general observations about the provision.   First, it pointed out that 
subsection (1), the key subsection, is in very broad terms.   While at 
first blush it does suggest, as noted above, that any act done for the 
purpose of accomplishing the intended offence will suffice, the court 
considered that Parliament cannot have meant that.   This is made 
clear by subsection (2).   The law since the middle of the nineteenth 
century has been clear that “acts remotely leading towards the 
commission of the offence are not to be considered as attempts to 
commit it, but acts immediately connected with it are” (R. v. Eagleton 
(1855) Dears C.C. 515, 538;  169 E.R. 826, 835).   The court considered 
that the breadth of section 72(1) and the looseness of the language 
employed suggest that it was the intention of Parliament that the 
courts apply the provision flexibly and in accordance with the justice 
of the case, without undue constraint from the legislature (at [13]). 
Secondly, as regards subsection (2), the court held that its purpose 
was to clarify, in jury trials, the separate functions of judge and jury.    
It found that the subsection does not of itself determine that mere 
preparation for the commission of an offence does not constitute  
an attempt.   Nor does it, of itself, prescribe that “too remote” acts 
cannot constitute attempts.   The purpose of subsection (2), the court 
found, was to define roles and make it clear that a judge should 
withdraw an attempt charge from the jury if the judge considers, on 
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the basis of the Crown evidence, even if accepted, that the offender 
never got beyond merely preparing to commit an offence, or that his 
acts were otherwise too remote (at [14]). 
The third point made by way of an overview of the section was that 
subsection (3) was first introduced in 1961, when the Crimes Act was re-
enacted.   It was intended to reverse the “equivocality test” formulated 
and applied in R. v. Barker [1924] N.Z.L.R. 865 (Court of Appeal).   
This means that, under New Zealand law, an act may amount to  
an attempt even if there is no act unequivocally showing intent.   
However, as this note will demonstrate, the strength of the evidence of 
an intent to commit the substantive offence will go a long way towards 
establishing an attempt where sufficiently proximate acts are present. 
 The court held that Parliament has painted “on a very broad 
canvas”, leaving the courts to apply underlying concepts on a case-by-
case basis, as justice demands.   Because Parliament has chosen not to 
lay down detailed criteria for determining whether conduct amounts 
to an attempt, neither should the court be prescriptive.   In the 
court’s view, the law was not working badly, despite the continuing 
judicial debate about where the line between preparation and attempt 
is to be drawn.   This was well-illustrated, the court found, in  
recent attempts by the Law Commission for England and Wales  
(see Conspiracy and Attempts (Law Com. no. 318, TSO, 2009)) to 
reconcile the widely divergent views adopted by English courts, so as 
to achieve law that was “neither under- nor over-inclusive” (at [17]). 
The court found that whereas the English search “for the Holy 
Grail” had been prompted by the decision in R. v. Geddes, 160 J.P. 697 
(Court of Appeal), in New Zealand that quest was prompted by  
R. v. Wilcox, which was the most frequently cited case on attempts, 
despite being only one of a number of appellate authorities.   It was 
also a decision that had been the subject of both academic and 
judicial criticism. 
 
C.   The facts of Wilcox 
In order to better understand the way in which the law has evolved, it 
is necessary to outline briefly the facts of Wilcox.   The accused had 
admitted that he had purchased air rifles and balaclavas for the 
purpose of robbing a suburban post office, that he had arranged with 
an associate for transportation and that he had commenced the 
journey towards the post office.   But he claimed that in the course of 
the journey he had changed his mind and decided not to go through 
with the robbery.   In the event, the police had received a warning 
and apprehended the car carrying the defendant and his associates as 
it was due to arrive in the suburb, albeit about one kilometre from the 
post office.   On appeal against a conviction for attempted robbery, it 
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was held the defendant could not be guilty of attempted robbery, 
because no part of his activity had gone beyond mere preparation.   
At the time the car was stopped by the police, the defendant and his 
associates were, it was held, doing no more than “getting themselves 
into a physical position” close to the post office from which an 
attempt at robbery could be launched.   As a matter of law it was  
held that the defendant’s conduct did not amount to an attempt.    
The broad defence was that at no stage had anything been done that 
had got beyond mere preparation for a robbery yet to be attempted.   
Importantly, the defence depended simply upon an assessment of 
conduct.   The Court of Appeal held that whatever his state of mind 
at the time, the defendant could not be found guilty if his activity had 
in fact gone no further than preparation.   
While this approach has served the interests of law and policy in 
this area, it has not been without its difficulties.   These have centred, 
in particular, around the fact that Wilcox requires the court to identify 
a discrete act, or acts, sufficiently proximate to the intended offence 
while prohibiting consideration of the character of conduct as a whole, 
and in particular, the defendant’s state of mind. 
 
D.   Reassessing R. v. Wilcox 
In R. v. Harpur the Court of Appeal reconsidered its decision in 
Wilcox, and concluded that in some significant respects the decision 
was wrong.   In particular, the court responded to four specific 
criticisms of the decision advanced by counsel for the Crown.    
They usefully identify what are now considered to be the  
principal weaknesses in the court’s reasoning in Wilcox, warranting a 
reassessment of the Court of Appeal’s evaluation of the conduct 
displayed in that case. 
 
1.   Considering acts in context of evidence of intention 
Criticism was made of a passage in Wilcox where the court suggested 
that there was a need for “independent and careful attention”  
to be given to the mens rea and actus reus ingredients deriving from  
section 72(1) to (3).   In particular, it was argued that the suggestion 
that the acts should not be considered in the context of evidence  
as to intention was artificial and wrong (at [24]).   Rather, the court,  
in determining whether acts are proximate, should be able to take into 
account all the circumstances in which the acts occurred, including 
evidence as to intent, since evidence as to intent “gives the acts 
meaning” (at [24]).   The Court of Appeal, while not fully satisfied 
that the Wilcox court had intended to imply that each element of  
actus reus and mens rea had to be considered completely separately, 
nevertheless held that if that had been the court’s suggestion, then  
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it was wrong.   The court agreed with the opinion of the Nova Scotia 
Court of Appeal in R. v. Boudreau (2005) 193 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (at [32]) 
that any analysis of the actus reus must be viewed in conjunction with 
the mens rea.   In particular, the Court of Appeal agreed with the 
analysis of Canadian law professor, Kent Roach, that “in practice,  
a more remote actus reus will be accepted if the intent is clear”  
(see Kent Roach, Criminal Law (Irwin Law, Toronto, 2000), 102, cited 
in R. v. Harpur (at [25])).  
 
2.   Focus on what the actor had still to do 
It was also submitted by Crown counsel that the court in Wilcox 
had wrongly focussed on what the actor still had to do rather than on 
what was already done and whether that was immediately or 
proximately connected with the intended offence.   It was submitted 
that this approach was contrary to what the Court of Appeal had held 
in Police v. Wylie [1976] 2 N.Z.L.R. 167, where the court found that 
there was ample evidence that the “declared desire of the respondents 
to purchase cocaine was being translated into action”.   The court 
found that the respondents’ attendance at the house where they had 
gone to purchase the drugs in the circumstances disclosed by the 
evidence “amply justified their conviction for attempting to procure 
the drug” (at p.170).   In R. v. Harpur, the decision in Wilcox was 
criticised on the basis of the court’s conclusion that it was not 
possible to hold that any of the passengers in the car, by the time it 
was stopped by the police, were doing more than getting themselves 
into a physical location close to the post office from which an 
attempt at robbery could be directly launched.   However, the court 
in Harpur was unwilling to criticise its earlier decision as erring in legal 
principle in considering how much remained to be done:  “That is 
always relevant, though not determinative” (at [28]) (and see also 
Henderson v. The King (1948) 91 C.C.C. 97 (Supreme Court of Canada), 
which the court approved).   Its criticism was rather on the court’s 
evaluation of the facts, determining that there must be a factual 
evaluation in terms of “time, place, and circumstance.”   As to the 
first two, the court noted that in Wilcox the car was stopped just short 
of its intended destination.   As regards the last, when the car was 
stopped, the occupants were found in a state “wholly ready to 
commit the robbery, with their weapons loaded.”   In the court’s view 
they had done more than “merely getting themselves into a physical 
location … from which an attempt at robbery could be directly 
launched” (ibid.). 
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3.   Conflict with earlier authority 
A third criticism of Wilcox was that the decision conflicted with 
earlier Court of Appeal authority, in particular R. v. Bateman [1959] 
N.Z.L.R. 487.   Bateman was a prosecution for attempted indecent 
assault on a male, where the appellant had made various indecent 
suggestions to a 17-year-old youth, A, that he should accompany him 
to his bach (cottage) for indecent purposes.   The same suggestion 
was made to a friend of A, suggesting that he should go to the bach 
on the following evening.   Both young men then arranged a meeting 
with B at another location.   They duly met him and informed him 
that they were going to get a policeman, which they did.   B was duly 
arrested and convicted of attempted indecent assault on a male.   It 
was held on the appeal that the series of acts were “sufficiently 
proximate and were more than mere preparation.”   The court upheld 
the trial judge’s ruling that the Crown evidence could constitute an 
attempt to commit the offence.   It held that it did not matter that B 
had not even commenced the “journey to the site of the proposed 
crime”, since in the circumstances he had done “all he could to 
persuade the lad to accompany him there and then to the place where 
the offence could be committed” (at p.491).   Acknowledging that the 
two decisions are difficult to reconcile, the Court of Appeal expressed 
its preference for Bateman. 
 
4.   Viewing conduct cumulatively 
The final criticism of Wilcox was of the view expressed there that 
the conduct of the actor could not be viewed cumulatively as 
constituting the actus reus.   As noted earlier, in Wilcox the court had 
held that the purchase of the weapons or balaclavas “could not give 
increased significance as a matter of law to the car journey or any part 
of it” and that “independent acts of mere preparation cannot take on 
a different quality simply by adding them together” (at p.194).   In 
Harpur, the court accepted the view that the reference in section 72(1) 
to the doing or omission of an “act” did not mean that the act had to 
be considered in isolation.   Their Honours noted that under section 
33 of the Interpretation Act 1999, the singular includes the plural, so 
that section 72(1) could be read as: 
“(1) Everyone who, having an intent to commit an 
offence, does or omits acts for the purpose of accomplishing 
his object, is guilty of an attempt to commit the offence 
intended…” (at [34], emphasis added). 
The court agreed that it was natural and inevitable to have regard 
to the conduct viewed cumulatively up to the point when the conduct 
in question stops.   This approach, the court found, was consistent 
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with what was said in Police v. Wylie and in R. v. Mullaney, unreported, 
May 3, 2000, H.C. (at [38] (Penlington J.))1. 
 
E.   The outcome 
The court concluded that the appellant’s intent, as expressed in his 
text messages, could not have been clearer.   The court found that 
strong evidence of intent, as here, can assist in assessing the 
significance of acts done towards the commission of the intended 
offence.   H told B where to meet him.   He was at the designated 
spot.   The meeting was close to a motel he had stayed in the previous 
night and where, presumably, the “children” would have been taken.   
While H was, no doubt, disappointed to find the driver of B’s car was 
a police officer, he had nevertheless intended to take the four-year-
old to a place nearby where the offending could take place.   The fact 
that the intended offence was impossible because the girls did not 
exist was no bar to the prosecution because of the operation of 
section 72(1).   Nor, the court held, did it matter that the completion 
of the crime was dependent on the co-operation of B and the child.  
The court accepted counsel’s argument that the district court 
judge’s decision raised real practical problems for the police.   It posed 
a range of questions around when the police could have intervened if 
there had been a child, whether H needed to have personally met the 
child and taken her to the motel room, and when the police would 
have been able to intervene before the offence occurred.   The court 
concluded that the Crown evidence, if accepted, showed a clear intent 
to commit a sexual violation of the four-year-old girl H believed B 
could provide.   He performed a number of acts which, taken 
together, amounted to an attempt to commit sexual violation: 
 “He had moved beyond mere preparation and, at the time of 
his arrest, was lying in wait for his victim.   His conduct was 
not too remote to constitute an attempt;  it was proximately 
connected with the intended offence” (at [44]). 
The court held that the district court judge had been wrong to 
discharge H on the charge of attempting to violate sexually the four-
year-old.   His acquittal on that count was quashed and he was 
directed to stand trial on that count alone.   The trial judge’s decision 
to discharge the defendant on the charge of attempting to sexually 
violate the 10-year-old girl was not challenged on the appeal.  
The Court of Appeal concluded that section 72 does permit the 
defendant’s conduct to be considered in its entirety.   It held that if 
the court in Wilcox was implying that a defendant’s acts must be 
looked at discretely when determining whether an attempt had been 
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made, then the decision was wrong.   The court considered that while 
the alleged errors of approach in Wilcox were “somewhat overstated”, 
the outcome in Wilcox was wrong.   It would have found the acts of 
the defendant in Wilcox to be sufficient to constitute attempted robbery.   
Accordingly, the court found the decision to be inconsistent with  
the decisions in Henderson, Wylie, Bateman and Boudreau, with which  
it agreed. 
 
F.   Comment 
Debate around the appropriate threshold for a criminal attempt is 
probably interminable.   This is because the law in this area is not 
dealing in certainties but in degrees of propinquity which are 
necessarily vague and indeterminate.   It is little wonder that courts 
have struggled to agree on the formulation of a generally acceptable 
threshold test.   In Harpur, the court refrained from any attempt to do 
so, recognising that in the circumstances of the case a “wholesale re-
evaluation” of the law of attempts was unnecessary.   What did 
concern the court, however, was the problem that police may have to 
wait longer before acting in order to reach the threshold of sufficient 
proximity to the intended crime.   In those circumstances, the court is 
then required to manage the risk to the safety of the public at large.   
However, this did not persuade the court that a “real and substantial 
step” test, favoured in Canada and the United States, would have 
taken analysis of the proximity issue significantly further, and may 
have amounted to “substituting somewhat fuzzy words for equally 
fuzzy words in the statutory provision.   There is no magic formula 
which avoids the need for judicial evaluation” (at [48]).  
While the English Law Commission’s idea of providing a list of 
“guiding examples” had produced a diversity of conflicting views, the 
court in Harpur was drawn to the examples provided in article 5.01 of 
the American Model Penal Code.   These supplement the definition 
of attempt by listing discrete forms of conduct that may constitute a 
“substantial step” under the American definition.   They include, as 
relevant to the present appeal: 
(a) lying in wait, searching for or following the 
contemplated victim of crime; 
(b) enticing or seeking to entice the contemplated 
victim of the crime to go to the place contemplated for its 
commission; 
(c) reconnoitring the place contemplated for the 
commission of the crime. 
Without formally endorsing the American model, the court 
concluded that trial judges might find article 5.01 of assistance in 
determining whether the actor’s conduct amounts to an attempt.    
366 Journal of Commonwealth Criminal Law [2012] 
 
© 2012 Association of Commonwealth Criminal Lawyers and contributors. 
But, by choosing not to endorse any particular test of proximity,  
the Harpur court took a bold step.   The court rejected tests framed  
in terms of “real and substantial step” or “last available act”.    
It also rejected the idea that “getting themselves into a physical location 
… from which an attempt … could be … launched” was merely 
evidence of preparation not amounting to an attempt.   In taking this 
approach the court left the field wide open for determining when an 
attempt has occurred.   At least for the foreseeable future, the focus 
in New Zealand law is likely to be on what the offender clearly intended.   
If his or her intention was clear, whether or not unequivocal, lesser 
acts of preparation, when considered cumulatively, may be sufficient 
to find an attempt which might previously have been too remote. 
 
WARREN BROOKBANKS.*    
 
 
 
WHEN FAILURE TO DISCLOSE HIV-POSITIVE STATUS  
VITIATES CONSENT TO SEX IN CANADA 
R. v. Mabior, 2012 SCC 47 
R. v. D.C., 2012 SCC 48 
(October 5, 2012) 
Supreme Court of Canada 
HIV – consent – sexual offences 
A.   The issue 
A number of jurisdictions have grappled with a particularly difficult 
question in respect of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV):  
when does failure to disclose that one is HIV-positive, combined with 
engaging in otherwise consensual sexual relations, make that act of 
engagement in sex a criminal offence? 
In two recent cases, the Supreme Court of Canada examined this 
question.   The cases ultimately turned on rather different matters, 
but were heard in tandem.   This case note focuses first on Mabior,1 
then outlines its “sister case” of D.C.2   Together, they provide a good 
understanding of the current Canadian approach to the criminali-
 
 
*  LL.B., LL.M., B.D.;  Professor of Law, Auckland University;  Editorial Board 
Member, Journal of Commonwealth Criminal Law.. 
1  R. v. Mabior, 2012 SCC 47 (hereafter “Mabior (SCC)”). 
2  R. v. D.C., 2012 SCC 48. 
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sation of exposure to HIV without disclosure – treating it as a sexual 
offence, rather than an offence against the person. 
 
B.   Mabior:  the facts 
Mabior was heard on appeal from the Court of Appeal for Manitoba.3   
Clauto Lual Mabior’s house was known as a “party place”.4   He 
regularly provided his guests with strong “Black Ice” beer and drugs.5 
Mabior was diagnosed as HIV-positive on January 14, 2004,6  
of which he was informed no later than January 27, 2004.7    
He underwent regular anti-retroviral therapy.   The effect of such 
treatment was helpfully outlined by the Supreme Court: 
“the transmissibility of HIV is proportional to the viral load, 
i.e. the quantity of HIV copies in the blood.   The viral load of 
an untreated HIV patient ranges from 10,000 copies to a few 
million copies per millilitre.   When a patient undergoes anti-
retroviral treatment, the viral load shrinks rapidly to less than 
1,500 copies per millilitre (low viral load), and can even  
be brought down to less than 50 copies per millilitre 
(undetectable viral load) over a longer period of time.”8 
However, a patient undergoing anti-retroviral treatment may display 
“spikes” in viral load, and common infections, sexually transmitted 
diseases, and issues with treatment (such as delays in taking 
medication) can lead to fluctuations in a patient’s viral load.9 
Mabior began anti-retroviral treatment in April 2004.10   He was 
tested regularly for HIV loads – in May, August, October and 
December 2004, and in January, May, September and December 
2005.11   His initial load was 6,100 to 6,300 copies per millilitre – 
typified as “probably low but possible infectivity.”12   It then dropped 
to 50 copies per millilitre or less (i.e. an “undetectable” viral load) 
from August 2004 onwards.13 
Between his diagnosis and the end of December 2005, Mabior 
engaged in sexual relations with a number of women, on some 
occasions with a condom, on others without.   Of the nine 
 
 
3  R. v. Mabior, 2010 MBCA 93, 258 Man.R.(2d) 166 (hereafter “Mabior (MBCA)”). 
4  Mabior (SCC) (n.1), [5]. 
5  R. v. Mabior, 2008 MBQB 201, 230 Man.R. (2d) 184 (hereafter “Mabior (MBQB)”), [47]. 
6  Mabior (MBCA) (n.3), [7]. 
7  Mabior (MBQB) (n.5), [95]. 
8  Mabior (SCC) (n.1), [100]. 
9  Mabior (MBCA) (n.3), [112]. 
10  ibid., [12]. 
11  ibid., [114]. 
12  ibid. 
13  ibid., [122], [127], [129], [133], [137]. 
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complainants, one was 12 at the time of the sexual encounters;14    
four others were aged 17;15  another four were adults.16   He did not 
inform these women of his HIV status – indeed, he replied in the 
negative when one of them asked if he had any “STDs” (sexually 
transmitted diseases) or “anything else”.17   Two of the complainants 
were informed by others of his HIV-positive status,18 and one of them 
continued to have sex with him thereafter.19   Eight of the nine 
complainants gave evidence that they would not have consented to sex 
with Mabior had they known he was HIV-positive.   None of the 
complainants contracted HIV.20 
 
C.   Canadian law on exposure to a risk of contracting HIV 
In Canada, non-consensual sex is a sexual assault contrary to section 265 
of the Criminal Code 1985.21   Under section 265, fraud can vitiate 
consent to sex.22   In R. v. Cuerrier,23 the Supreme Court of Canada 
held that the failure to disclose one’s HIV-positive status constitutes 
just such a fraud.   As exposure to HIV “endangers the life of the 
complainant”,24 this is an offence of aggravated sexual assault, under 
section 273.25 
 
D.   The decisions in Mabior 
1.   Appellate history 
Mabior was charged with twelve counts.26   These included one count 
each of invitation to sexual touching and sexual interference  
in respect of the 12-year-old,27 of which he was convicted,28 and  
 
 
14  Mabior (MBQB) (n.5), [42] (“D.C.S.”). 
15  ibid., [30] (“D.H.”), [35] (“S.H.”), [39] (“C.B.”), [47] (“F.L.”). 
16  ibid., [28] (“K.G.”), [33]-[34] (“M.P.”), [37]-[38] (“K.R.”), [53]-[56] (“J.L.L.”). 
17  ibid., [35] (“S.H.”). 
18  ibid., [43] (“D.C.S.”), [49] (“F.L.”). 
19  ibid., [43] – the 12-year-old (“D.C.S.”).   In the period at issue, Mabior was aged 
between 26 and 28, as is apparent from the police notice posted online:  
<http://www.winnipeg.ca/police/press/2006/03mar/2006_03_21.stm> accessed 
November 20, 2012. 
20  Mabior (SCC) (n.1), [6].   The trial judge wrongly stated, in opening, that he was 
charged with ten counts of aggravated sexual assault:  Mabior (MBQB) (n.5), [1]. 
21  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46;  Mabior (SCC) (n.1), [2]. 
22  Criminal Code 1985, s.265(3)(c):  “no consent is obtained where the complainant 
submits or does not resist by reason of … fraud” 
23  Cuerrier, 1998 CanLII 796 (SCC), [1998] 2 S.C.R. 371. 
24  Criminal Code 1985, ss.268(1), 273(1). 
25  Cuerrier, [95];  Mabior (SCC) (n.1), [2]. 
26  Including one count of forcible confinement, of which he was acquitted:   
Mabior (MBQB) (n.5), [1], [167]. 
27  ibid., [1]. 
28  ibid., [165]. 
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which convictions were confirmed by the Manitoba Court of Appeal.29    
They also included nine counts of aggravated sexual assault based on 
his failure to disclose to the complainants that he was HIV-positive.30   
This case note turns on these nine counts. 
The trial judge acquitted Mabior on three of the charges of 
aggravated sexual assault, on the basis that he used a condom in each 
case (or it could not be proved that he had not done so), and his viral 
load was undetectable at the time the sexual encounters took place.31   
The Crown did not appeal these acquittals.   Mabior was convicted of 
the other six of these charges.32 
The Manitoba Court of Appeal, however, overturned four of 
those remaining convictions, on the basis that “either low viral loads or 
condom use could negate significant risk”.33   It upheld two of the 
convictions:  in one case, there had been “unprotected sex on a 
number of occasions”;;34  in the other, the condom had broken on 
three or four occasions;35  both women were exposed to a significant 
risk of harm.36 
The Crown appealed on the four convictions of aggravated sexual 
assault that had been overturned by the Court of Appeal, and Mabior 
appealed the two remaining convictions, to the Supreme Court. 
 
2.   The Supreme Court’s approach 
The Supreme Court judgment – given by McLachlin C.J. – examined 
in some detail the history of aggravated sexual assault in Canada.37   
This showed that fraud had been held to vitiate consent where it led 
to a mistake as to the sexual nature of the acts, or as to the identity of 
the man with whom the complainant was having sex.   Although 
interesting, this analysis, with respect, goes nowhere in tackling the 
difficult questions at hand.   The judgment also undertook careful 
analysis of a number of other jurisdictions’ approaches to similar 
factual matrices – though it did not cover the relevant New Zealand 
law in full.38   Having found this analysis relatively inconclusive, the 
 
 
29  Mabior (MBCA) (n.3), [36]. 
30  Mabior (SCC) (n.1), [7].  
31  Mabior (MBQB) (n.5), [166];  and [142]-[144], [149]-[151], [152]-[154].   See 
the Supreme Court’s on the significance of an “undetectable” viral load, ante. 
32  ibid., [164] (emphasis added). 
33  Mabior (SCC) (n.1), [9]. 
34  Mabior (MBCA) (n.3), [119] (M.P.). 
35  ibid., [121] (K.R.).   There were other increased risk factors – Mabior “was 
involved with multiple partners” and “was listed as a Chlamydia contact by another 
woman during this period”:  ibid., [122]. 
36  ibid., [120], [122]. 
37  Mabior (SCC) (n.1), [21]-[43]. 
38  ibid., [53].   The court missed the Crimes Act 1961, s.128A(7) (see Pt F.3., post).   
Don Mathias identified this “mistake” in his “Risks, numbers and criminal 
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court counselled against “extending the criminal law beyond its 
appropriate reach in this complex and emerging area of the law”.39 
The Chief Justice then examined the Cuerrier test in some detail.    
It typified the test as requiring both a “misrepresentation or non-
disclosure of HIV”, and a “significant risk of bodily harm” for the 
complainant.40   Finding the Cuerrier test carved out “an appropriate 
area for the criminal law”,41 the judgment attempted to give it greater 
certainty by establishing more clearly where “sexual relations with an 
HIV-positive person pose a ‘significant risk of serious bodily harm’”42 
– where there is a “a realistic possibility of transmission of HIV”.43   
More clearly, it held that: 
“as a general matter, a realistic possibility of transmission  
of HIV is negated if (i) the accused’s viral load at the time  
of sexual relations was low, and (ii) condom protection  
was used.”44 
In so doing, it examined the effect of condom use and anti-retroviral 
therapy on the risk for vaginal intercourse where the male partner is 
HIV-positive.45   To avoid the difficulty of establishing, through 
evidence, an “undetectable” viral load – and as “detectability” related 
to the quality of the tests available for detecting viral loads at  
the moment – the court rather approached the test in terms of “low”  
viral loads.46 
Applying this refined Cuerrier test, the Supreme Court restored the 
convictions in respect of three of the four remaining cases,47 and 
upheld one acquittal48 on the basis that Mabior’s viral load was low at 
the time, and he had used a condom. 
 
E.   Thorny issues 
The Supreme Court’s judgment in Mabior left a number of questions 
unresolved.   A number of interveners – HIV and AIDS charities – 
argued that criminalisation discourages diagnosis and treatment, 
stigmatising HIV whilst damaging efforts to contain its spread.    
                                                                                                             
responsibility”, Criminal Law Casebook – Developments in Leading Appellate Courts 
(October 8, 2012) <http://nzcriminallaw.blogspot.co.uk/2012/10/risks-numbers-and-
criminal.html> accessed November 20, 2012. 
39  Mabior (SCC) (n.1), [5]. 
40  ibid., [57]. 
41  ibid., [58]. 
42  ibid., [82]. 
43  ibid., [91], [93]. 
44  ibid., [94]. 
45  ibid., [96]-[101]. 
46  ibid., [102]. 
47  ibid., [109] (S.H., D.C.S., D.H.). 
48  ibid. (K.G.). 
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This is not the place to discuss these public policy issues.   However, 
two clear issues arise from the judgment. 
 
1.   The Williams paradox 
In R. v. Williams,49 a man was charged with aggravated sexual assault.   
Six months into an 18-month relationship, he had been diagnosed as 
HIV-positive.   He had not disclosed this fact to his partner, and 
continued to have sex with her.   She was later found to have 
contracted HIV, and it was accepted that he had infected her.   
However, as it could not be proven whether the infection had taken 
place before or after Williams discovered he was HIV-positive, a 
conviction for attempted aggravated sexual assault – the lesser, 
inchoate form of the same offence – was substituted. 
This brings to light a paradox in the reasoning of Cuerrier:  it is 
easier to convict a defendant of a more serious offence where the 
victim did not contract HIV than where he or she did.   This clearly 
fails to account for the harm caused.   However, this paradox did not 
fall for consideration by the court in Mabior – though the court came 
tantalisingly close, recognising that “common law jurisdictions 
criminalize the actual sexual transmission of HIV”,50 but not recognising 
that what the Cuerrier test criminalises is not the actual transmission, 
but the exposure of others to the risk of infection. 
 
2.   “What are the chances?” 
The Supreme Court’s judgment in Mabior is fairly detailed, and the 
expert evidence relied on examined at some length the statistical 
likelihood of infection in various circumstances.51   However, this risk 
analysis did not explicitly form part of the decision on where a 
complainant is exposed to “a significant risk” of infection. 
Don Mathias has done some solid number-crunching, based on 
the rough figures and probability ranges given in the judgment. 
“Broadly, and converting the figures given in the judgment … 
the evidence was that the probability of transmission of HIV 
infection during unprotected sexual intercourse may be as 
high as 0.008 or as low as 0.0005.   That is, 8 in 1,000, or  
5 in 10,000.   If a condom is used, the risk reduction is 
80 per cent, so at the highest the probability of transmission 
would be 0.0016.   If therapy had reduced the viral load,  
as it had in this case, to a low level, the risk of transmission 
may be reduced by roughly 92 per cent, so that if a condom is 
used the probability of transmission would then be 0.000128.   
 
 
49  Williams, 2003 SCC 41, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 134. 
50  Mabior (SCC) (n.1), [50] (emphasis in original). 
51  See, in particular, ibid., [97]. 
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If a condom is not used but the viral load is low, the 
probability of transmission is 0.00064.”52 
Mathias goes on to compare this to other risks we run on a fairly 
frequent basis: 
“in the UK the average risk of death in any one year from 
injury or poisoning is 1 in 3,137, or a probability of 0.0003.   
The risk of dying in a road accident in the UK is 1 in 16,800, 
or a probability of 0.00006.   And for cancer death it is 1 in 
387, or probability 0.003. 
“So in Mabior a risk that might have been about ten times 
the risk of dying in a road accident amounted to a realistic 
possibility of transmission of HIV.   Or about one fifth the 
risk of dying of cancer.”53 
This is interesting.   Although this sort of relative analysis was not 
attempted by the Supreme Court, it underlies their analysis – and may 
legitimate their approach.   If one considers that the consequences of 
contracting HIV, even with modern medicine and healthcare, can be 
devastating, it makes some sense to compare these statistics with those 
for mortality.   And surely it makes sense that to expose another to a 
risk that is ten times that of their dying in a car accident is a significant 
exposure. 
 
F.   Comparisons with other jurisdictions 
By contrast to Canada’s approach, most other Commonwealth and 
common law jurisdictions will criminalise exposure to HIV as an 
offence against the person, akin to wounding, rather than a sexual 
offence.   These approaches were described in Mabior.54 
 
1.   England and Wales 
In England and Wales, the equivalent legislation to the fraud which 
will vitiate consent to sex can be found in sections 74 to 76 of the 
Sexual Offences Act 2003.   In particular, by section 76 (on presump-
tions), fraud will only be presumed to vitiate consent to sex where: 
“(a) the defendant intentionally deceived the 
complainant as to the nature or purpose of the relevant 
act; [or] 
 
 
52  Mathias (n.38). 
53  ibid.   Mathias basis these risks on:  Health and Safety Executive,  
“Risk education statistics” <http://www.hse.gov.uk/education/statistics.htm> 
accessed November 20, 2012. 
54  Mabior (SCC) (n.1), [49]-[55] – though not always entirely accurately (see text  
at n.38, ante). 
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(b) the defendant intentionally induced the complainant 
to consent to the relevant act by impersonating a 
person known personally to the complainant.”55 
In R. v. B.,56 this precise point was considered.   B, who was HIV-
positive, but had not disclosed this to a sexual partner, was charged 
with rape.   The Court of Appeal held that his HIV status did not go 
to “the nature or purpose of the relevant act”: 
“Where one party to sexual activity has a sexually 
transmissible disease which is not disclosed to the other party 
any consent that may have been given to that activity by the 
other party is not thereby vitiated.   The act remains a 
consensual act.   However, the party suffering from the 
sexually transmissible disease will not have any defence to any 
charge which may result from harm created by that sexual 
activity, merely by virtue of that consent, because such 
consent did not include consent to infection by the disease.”57 
England and Wales criminalise the harm caused by infecting 
another with HIV.   In R. v. Dica,58 the Court of Appeal held that, 
where a person, A, knows he or she carries HIV (or any other 
sexually transmitted disease), and engages in consensual sexual 
relations with another, B, without informing B of the fact he or she is 
HIV-positive, and not intending to infect B, A will be liable for 
conviction under section 20 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, 
for inflicting grievous bodily harm on B.   If B did know of A’s HIV-
positive status, she could be taken to have consented to that harm 
being inflicted;  but where A undertook a concerted campaign of 
infection, B could not consent to that infection. 
 
2.   Australia 
In six of the nine Australian jurisdictions, exposure to HIV without 
transmission of the virus is not criminalised.   In South Australia, 
reckless exposure is criminalised;59  and Victoria60 and the Northern 
Territory61 apply lesser offences to cases where there was exposure, 
but no transmission of the virus. 
 
 
 
55  Sexual Offences Act, s.76 (emphasis added). 
56  B. [2006] EWCA Crim 2945, [2007] 1 W.L.R. 1567. 
57  ibid., [17]. 
58  Dica [2004] EWCA Crim 1103, [2004] Q.B. 1257. 
59  Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (S.A.), s.29 (“Acts endangering life or creating 
risk of serious harm”). 
60  Crimes Act 1958 (Vic.), ss.22 (“Conduct endangering life”) and 23 (“Conduct 
endangering persons”). 
61  Criminal Code Act 1983 (N.T.), ss.174C (“Recklessly endangering life”) and 174D 
(“Recklessly endangering serious harm”). 
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3.   New Zealand 
In New Zealand, section 128A(7)62 of the Crimes Act 1961, provides 
that “A person does not consent to an act of sexual activity if he or 
she allows the act because he or she is mistaken about its nature and 
quality.”   No cases of HIV transmission have arisen under this 
section to date;  however, in a factual matrix like that in Mabior, a 
“mistake” might well be regarded as a failure to recognise a realistic 
possibility of transmission of HIV.63 
The leading New Zealand case on HIV transmission is 
R. v. Mwai.64   There, a man was convicted of criminal nuisance65 for 
recklessly exposing a number of people to HIV through unprotected 
sex.   Upholding Mwai’s conviction, the Court of Appeal typified his 
bodily fluid containing the HIV virus as a “dangerous substance” 
under his control, and for which he was liable.66 
 
G.   D.C. 
Both D.C. and Mabior related to charges of aggravated sexual assault 
due to non-disclosure of HIV status.   This explains why the cases 
were treated as companion appeals.   However, they ultimately turned 
on rather different questions of law and of fact. 
 
1.   The facts 
This case is rather simpler.   D.C., a woman, engaged in vaginal sexual 
intercourse with the complainant.   At the time, she was aware  
that she was HIV-positive, though her viral load was undetectable.    
The complainant alleged that she had not told him of her HIV status 
before one or more initial sexual encounters;  when she then told him, 
he broke off their relationship for a week.   He then renewed it, and 
they started a four-year relationship.   At the end of this time, D.C. 
was briefly hospitalised, decided to end the relationship, and asked the 
complainant to move out.   He refused.   When she then tried to take 
her belongings from the house, a fight ensued.   The complainant was 
convicted of an assault on D.C.67   She in turn was charged with 
aggravated sexual assault, in respect of the intercourse that allegedly 
took place before she had divulged that she was HIV-positive.68 
 
 
62  Enacted in 2005:  Crimes Amendment Act 2005, s.7. 
63  See Mathias (n.38). 
64  [1995] 3 N.Z.L.R. 149, [1995] 4 L.R.C. 719 (Court of Appeal, Wellington). 
65  Crimes Act 1961, s.145. 
66  Under the Crimes Act 1961, s.156 (duty of persons in charge of dangerous things);  
this was the legal duty that was allegedly breached, and founded the charge. 
67  D.C. (n.2), [4]-[6]. 
68  ibid., [7]. 
J.C.C.L. Case Notes 375 
 
© 2012 Association of Commonwealth Criminal Lawyers and contributors. 
At trial, she claimed they had used a condom, whereas he claimed 
they had not.69   The judge found neither witness was credible,70 but – 
rather surprisingly – found that a doctor’s note made seven years 
earlier and referring to a broken condom was “independent evidence” 
that D.C. had engaged in unprotected sex.71   The Supreme Court 
explained the judge’s reasoning as follows: 
“He took for granted that D.C. told Dr Klein a condom was 
worn but had broken.   He inferred this was a lie by assuming 
she wanted to camouflage from her doctor the fact that she 
had unprotected sex.   From this inference of a lie, the trial 
judge drew a further inference that no condom had been 
used, confirming the complainant’s evidence on that point.   
On this basis, the trial judge concluded the prosecution had 
established beyond a reasonable doubt that D.C. was guilty of 
sexual assault and aggravated assault.”72 
The judge held that D.C. had lied to her doctor, and therefore 
inferred that no condom had been worn then, or on the occasion the 
subject of the complaint.   The complainant did not contract HIV.73 
In the Quebec Court of Appeal, the conviction was overturned, as 
the doctor’s evidence was not “independent evidence” in support of the 
claimant.   The Crown appealed this decision to the Supreme Court. 
 
2.   The Supreme Court’s judgment 
Given the above, it is unsurprising that, in the Supreme Court, this case 
did not turn on the same issues as Mabior, but rather on the trial judge’s 
rather surprising reasoning.   The evidence the judge relied on did not 
corroborate the otherwise unreliable evidence given by the complainant.   
It was not evidence that a condom had not been worn on this other 
occasion, years earlier, but that it had broken.74   It was of dubious 
evidentiary quality, both for its cryptic nature, and for language reasons 
(the conversation it reported was in French, though the doctor was 
Anglophone).75   The judge’s “inferences” that D.C. had lied, on that 
earlier occasion to her doctor, and this to conceal that she had been 
having unprotected sex were, at best, “speculative”.76   To convict D.C. 
on the basis of speculative inference breached the criminal burden of 
proof, which would have required specific proof beyond reasonable 
 
 
69  ibid., [4]. 
70  ibid., [8]. 
71  ibid., [14].   The doctor did not remember her conversation with D.C.;  her note 
read:  “Sex c new partner – condom broke – consl to disclo”. 
72  ibid., [15] (references to the original judgment’s paragraph numbers omitted). 
73  ibid., [5]. 
74  ibid., [23]. 
75  ibid., [24]. 
76  ibid., [25]-[26]. 
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doubt that she had failed to use a condom;  and reversed the burden 
of proof, effectively requiring her to prove that she had used a 
condom, and not vice versa, requiring the Crown to prove she had not.   
D.C.’s conviction could not stand, and the appeal was dismissed.77 
 
H.   Conclusion 
The Canadian approach to criminalisation of exposure to HIV 
through sex is somewhat unusual among Commonwealth 
jurisdictions, in charging it as a sexual assault.   The refined Cuerrier 
test put forward by the Supreme Court in Mabior, and referred to in 
D.C. renders the test somewhat tighter, and gives clarity to sufferers 
of HIV in Canada:  where they are being treated with anti-retrovirals, 
and practise safe sex, and are therefore highly unlikely to transmit 
HIV, failing to tell sexual partners in advance of their HIV-positive 
status does not carry criminal liability. 
The burden of proving guilt sits squarely with the prosecution – as 
confirmed, unsurprisingly, in D.C.   This is especially important when 
dealing with a disease like HIV, which carries considerable stigma, 
and can engender such negative coverage in the public media. 
 
ATLI STANNARD.*    
 
 
 
77  ibid., [30]-[31]. 
*  M.A. (Oxon.), B.A. Hons (Cantab.), Barrister (Middle Temple). 
